Abstract.

In this work I explore the reception of Psychoanalytic ideas by anglo- saxon philosophy, the latter represented by Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley and Marcia Cavell, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and David Finkelstein. I also include Jurgen Habermas´ interpretation of Freud´s ideas under the label of Anglo Saxon Philosophy.

The first part of my work is dedicated to the concept of desire in Psychoanalysis and in anglo-saxon philosophy. I conclude that most of the criticism of these philosophers to the psychoanalytic notion of desire is well grounded and an improved notion of desire can emerge after this criticism is taken into account.

In the second part, I deal with the concept of Unconscious. I propose that anglo saxon philosophy has interpreted the concept of unconscious in two ways: as delinguistification and as fragmentation.

My conclusion is neither of these two ways exhaust the notion of the Unconscious.

The Unconscious, Drive, and Desire in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.

by

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Introduction

The relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy has always been two-sided. There has been much criticism, especially from philosophy to psychoanalysis, but there has also been a productive exchange that has led to mutual enrichment. On the side of criticism and disdain, Freud was the first to declare hostilities. On repeated occasions—and since his first works—he condemned philosophy for limiting the mental to the conscious and therefore ignoring the unconscious, and in one of his writings he even compared the philosophers' model of reasoning to psychosis [1]. From philosophy, there have also been many critical remarks directed to psychoanalysis, related to the lack of conceptual clarity, the impossibility of contrasting their hypotheses, and the absence of empirical support in their explanations.

But along with these often bitter controversies, there has also been a cooperative relationship. In the psychoanalysis of the twentieth century, many schools of thought have incorporated into their thinking what philosophers have said about the mind. The intersubjective psychoanalytic school is an example of this. In the field of philosophy, on the other hand, psychoanalytic ideas have been useful to various authors. Donald Davidson and David Pears, for example, have maintained that it is thanks to the Freudian conception of the unconscious that we can better understand the ancient problems of rationality and incontinence, problems that since Aristotle have been unresolved puzzles for many thinkers. In another field of philosophy, that of ethics and social theory, Axel Honneth has said that the idea of a potential for action that has escaped the processes of socialization, which is how the unconscious could be understood, is indispensable for an “intersubjective” conception of the person. This conception, which according to this influential author will allow a reasonable—i.e. post-Kantian—notion of personal autonomy, can only

[1] In *The Unconscious.* (Freud 1915)

be reached with an intersubjective theory of the subject “enlarged by psychoanalysis”. (Honneth 2009a: 283)

This work deals precisely with the tense relations that psychoanalysis has had with philosophy for almost a century. The story I tell here is, of course, only part of the conversation between philosophers and psychoanalysts. I want to correlate how the two most important concepts of psychoanalysis, drive and the unconscious, have been discussed by a group of philosophers who share the belief that it is not possible to reach a complete picture of the mind without incorporating and correcting ideas that originated in psychoanalysis. The discussions on which this work focuses range from the writings of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell in the early decades of the 20th century, to Marcia Cavell in the 21st century, through Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jurgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, and David Finkelstein. In all these controversies, even in Wittgenstein's, the philosophers' critical zeal points to the expansion or improvement of Freud's ideas.

What do these philosophers have in common? Except for Dewey, everyone else has been influenced by analytical philosophy, the school that originates in the studies of G. Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Wittgenstein that postulates that the analysis of philosophical concepts has to be done through the analysis of ordinary language, that is, the language that we use every day. In the case of the study of the mind, the methodology of this school proposes the analysis of the sentences that allude to attitudes, emotions, intentions, moods. Although Habermas is not an analytical philosopher, his works—and not only those dealing with psychoanalysis—are influenced by the teachings of the late Wittgenstein. Dewey, which is chronologically earlier, could not be an heir to the analytical tradition. On the contrary, his ideas have influenced that tradition (Rorty 1979, 1982). So it can be said that this work deals with how representative authors of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, which includes Dewey's pragmatism and the analytical stream, have discussed Freud's ideas.

The first part of this thesis is dedicated to the psychoanalytic concept of drive or “instinct”. I note that, for reasons that I will explain later, I will use these two words interchangeably. In this first part, I discuss the criticisms of Dewey, Russell, Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, and Marcia Cavell to this notion as presented by Freud and his followers, and I also propose that some contemporary psychoanalysts are productively using part of these criticisms. At the end of this first part, I propose how psychoanalysis can formulate a concept of drive that incorporates some of the critical remarks of these philosophers, and which can, in turn, be useful to the philosophy of action, which is the area of analytic philosophy most related to psychoanalysis.

The second part is devoted to the philosophers' interpretation of the concept of the unconscious. Here I analyze the ideas of Jurgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, David Finkelstein, and Marcia Cavell and postulate that there are two ways in which these philosophers have understood the Freudian unconscious. One of these modes, that of Habermas, MacIntyre, and Finkelstein, relates the concept of the unconscious with the expressive capacities of the person and maintains that the unconscious is the attitudes that influence behavior but that the person cannot verbalize. The other way is represented by Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Marcial Cavell, and also. For them, the notion of the unconscious is clarified if we use the figure of a region of the mind. These authors believe that unconscious content is defined by its interactions with conscious content. What makes unconscious contents what they are is that they belong to that part of the mind which, to borrow the suggestive phrase from Freud's Spanish translation of Lopez Ballesteros, has been subtracted from the “associative commerce” with the other mental contents. In other words, unconscious beliefs, desires, or intentions have a causal but non-logical connection to conscious attitudes. My proposal in this second part is that each of these two modes corresponds to each of the steps of the process by which an unconscious content becomes conscious, so a theory of the unconscious must consider both approaches. In addition, by

showing the shortcoming of both models I will conclude that a general account of the concept unconscious is not foreseeable in the near future.

Some books have dealt with this dialogue between Anglo-Saxon philosophy and psychoanalysis. The most influential have been Marcia Cavell's *The Psychoanalytic Mind* (1993), Donald Levy's Freud *Among the Philosophers (1996),* and Linda A. Brakel, *Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and the A. Rational Mind.* My thesis has things in common with these books but also differences. Cavell's objective is to call into question a conception that she calls “internalist” or “subjectivist” of the mind. This conception postulates that there are mental contents, particularly desires, that exist from birth and that are not constituted by experience. According to Cavell, Freud and later psychoanalysts endorsed this internalist view. Against this idea, Cavell claims to be following Wittgenstein when she argues that socialization is a necessary condition for the development of the mind. And it is only through interaction with others that a human being develops the most intimate aspects of his or her psychological life, including what some psychoanalytic writers know as “instincts”. Cavell's is a battle against the idea that there are pre-linguistic or pre-social mental contents. I feel close to this author's position in the sense that the impulses of human beings are constituted through experience, but I distance myself from her approach because of what I perceive as incongruencies, such as endorsing ideas from neurosciences or depicting the motivational structure of irrational actions in a way that is contrary to some of the ideas that she herself advocates.

Donald Levy's Freud *Among the Philosophers* is a fine defense of the scientific character of psychoanalysis. Levy's explicit interest is in responding to the epistemological criticisms of William James, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Adolf Grunbaum. That is not the primary interest of my work, even though we both discuss some of the same philosophers. Part of the research that is in the reader’s hands at this moment includes an epistolary exchange with Professor Levy, to whom I will allude on some occasions. Finally, Linda Brakel attempts a refinement of psychoanalytic concepts using Ruth Millikan's Darwinian metaphysics. I will be offering a few critical remarks about this project.

This work pursues two objectives. The first is to critically explore the conversation, in celebration of its 100th anniversary, between Anglo-Saxon philosophy and psychoanalysis. In that sense, I must also admit to having an exegetical interest in this topic.

The second objective is to defend a conception of psychoanalysis strengthened by its interchanges with philosophy. This psychoanalysis would have two salient characteristics: first, it shares the position of analytic or Anglo-Saxon philosophy, proposing that the mind is a product of socialization; second, it also advocates that psychoanalysis should incorporate a more functionalist vision in its explanations. In other words, psychoanalysis should not posit a mental entity or a mental process if this entity does not have a clear conceptual relationship—or necessary, we will say—with observable behaviors. Too many of these putative processes or entities, pushed forward by Freudian followers, have given arguments to those who consider psychoanalysis a pseudoscience because of their lack of connection with visible actions. For this second objective, it is important to build bridges between psychoanalytic theory and the other sciences in the field of the humanities.

Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the philosophers discussed in this paper, says that thinking about psychoanalysis is nothing more than a prologue to thinking psychoanalytically. But it is an inescapable prologue to this discipline. I hope this work can act as a contribution in that sense.

Part One

I. The Concept of Drive in Psychoanalysis

a) Freud and drive theory

Although it was born as a science for understanding and curing mental illness, since *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) Freud's work has become an intellectual enterprise driven by the ambitious project of explaining all human behavior. Not only the abnormal, but also the normal. Thus, in a few years, psychoanalysis went from being just a school of thought within psychiatry to also being a project that included aspects of philosophical anthropology.

Because he conceived psychoanalysis in the positivistic milieu of the late 19th century, Freud thought that the task of scientifically explaining the actions of human beings consisted in breaking down behavior and finding in it atomic units that would be causally related through a mechanism. These atomic units would be the simplest states or processes, the most basic, and it is through them that the most complex mental states and processes could be explained.

Nestled in this mechanistic spirit, Freud postulated that the “drive” or instinct was the most basic and irreducible unit of human action. This drive was conceived as an event that, without being caused by anything except a certain tension in the organism, would be the cause of all behaviors. It was also a psychological and biological event at once and, as such, constituted the point of union between the body and the mind. According to this idea the drive would also be the beginning, chronologically speaking, of the psychological life of the child—that is to say, the first contact of the human being with the world. In adult life, finally, it is always the commencement of the causal chain of all the actions and thoughts of

human beings, including the most complex thoughts and actions that are apparently more distanced from the demands of the body.

Mechanicism considers that everything in the world, including the mind, hides a mechanism that explains its functioning: parts, i.e. atomic components, causally related. This way of understanding things was imposed in physics with Galileo, Kepler, and Newton and in psychology most notably with the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Nonetheless, Freud and the majority of psychoanalysts have adopted the ontological aspect, if you will, but not the epistemological aspect of mechanicisim. They adopted the belief that the mind can be explained with the help of a machine model, but they did not adopt the epistemology most commonly associated with this belief, namely empiricism. They postulated that our inner world is composed of events that, like physical forces, influence each other, but they did not take an interest in finding the empirical regularities, nor the scientific laws, which could explain and predict the interaction of these forces. This is partly because, as we shall see, it was always been difficult for psychoanalysis to pinpoint precisely what those events or processes consisted of. This state of affairs has not changed in contemporary psychoanalysis.

Freud's mechanicism is very clear in articles such as “Formulations on the two principles of psychic occurrence” (1911) and “Instincts and their vicissitudes” (1915), where he addresses the questions of drive. There he postulates that drive is the response of the organism to lack or dissatisfaction. It is, therefore, a kind of first cause, of *primus movens* in the actions of human beings. In the second article mentioned, “Instinct and their vicissitudes”, Freud starts from physiology and what it had taught about how external stimuli set organisms in motion. The drive is also a stimulus, but a stimulus coming from an unsatisfied or unbalanced organism. It is a driving force of behavior that arises from within the body and that will gradually transform and acquire different forms, such as masochism and sadism, or that will succumb to repression, i.e. to its disappearance from consciousness. Freud describes all these transformations by adopting precisely that causal or mechanistic approach to the mind. The perspective

of the individual in whose mind this transformation occurs, or would occur, is absent. Therefore, there is no allusion whatsoever to the intention of the person or to the meaning that these transformations have for the individual who undergoes these processes.

Now, mechanicism is the structure that Freud used to try to understand the mind. However, Freud went beyond describing a structure and set out to explain what the drives were, i.e. what they were made of. In that sense, he always took for granted that the drive was an entity or a discrete event and when he wanted to delve into what the drive was, his response was, explicitly, an answer to the problem of the relationship of the body with the mind. In a famous phrase, he said that the drive was “a borderline concept between the soul and the body”. (Freud 1915)

The idea that the drive or instinct is an entity both bodily and psychological at once is present in almost all of Freud's writings and those of many of his followers. However, spelling out this mixed nature, physical and mental, was very difficult for him. As with Descartes 300 years earlier, Freud encountered virtually insurmountable obstacles to building a coherent version of this proposed interaction of the body with the mind. The philosopher and psychoanalyst Whitebook (Whitebook 1996) has said that Freud used a very rare vocabulary to refer to the drive because this concept alluded to a reality that is at the frontier of the psychic and the biological, the body and the mental. That is, to a reality that in part would be outside the space of concepts and language, so that its linguistic apprehension is impossible.

Repräsentanz, Vorstellung, Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Triebrepräsentanz, and psychische Repräsentanz are German words that are sometimes used interchangeably by Freud himself when it comes to aspects of the drive. Whitebook thinks that this complicated vocabulary responds to the invincible difficulty of representing with words something—the unconscious drive—whose “natural” mode of representation is based on images. “The psychoanalytic notion of drive,” Whitebook says, “represents the struggle to

conceptualize the boundary between mind and body, images and words, what can be said and what is ineffable. (Whitebook 1996: 164)

This “struggle” waged by Freud inside his mind was reflected not only in the difficult nomenclature he created, but also in the fact that in 1915 he presented two different definitions of the concept of drive in two short essays only a few months apart from each other. On one hand, he proposed a more psychological definition, which is the definition embraced by psychoanalysts who believe the explanation of human behavior must emphasize the beliefs of the person. Those are the psychoanalysts who have brought their discipline closer to phenomenology psychology or some form of hermeneutics. The other definition is more physiological and is the one viewed with sympathy by psychoanalysts who believe that it is in the body and in neurological mechanisms that we will finally find the essence of the drive. It is in this second way of understanding the drive that the economic, quantitative, or energetic dimension of the mind is most frequently accommodated.

Freud thus offered two definitions of this nuclear concept for his theory. The first, the most psychological, is in “Instincts and their vicissitudes”. There it is said that the drive “appears to us as a borderline concept between the psychic and the somatic”. (Freud 1915: 117)

According to this version, the drive is a mental event. It is the representation produced by the demands of the body, but it is a representation and therefore belongs entirely to the realm of the psychological. By placing the drive closer, one might say, to the head than to the body, Freud invites us to consider it as something more similar to other elements of the person's psychology, such as beliefs, whose reduction to a physiological mechanism is more unlikely.

On the other hand, in “The Unconscious” (Freud 1915b) there is a more biological idea about the drive:

> “A drive can never become an object of consciousness, only the representation that is its representative can be...If the drive did not adhere to a representation or come to light as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.” (My emphasis)

The only way to understand this passage is by assuming that drive is a fact that belongs to the neurophysiological realm and from which we only know its derivatives. Contrary to what some interpreters of Freud, such as James Strachey, say, the contradiction between the two texts is rather real and is palpable proof of the doubts that the creator of psychoanalysis had in finding the ontological domain to which the drives belonged. It is a dilemma that subsists until now in psychoanalytic thought. When it comes to drive, contemporary psychoanalysis is divided into two fields that coincide more or less with Freud's doubts: there are those who prefer the most psychological version of instinct (the one we find in the article “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”) and others who still feel fascinated by the biological resonances of the version of “The Unconscious”. In the first group are generally the theoreticians of objective and intersubjective relations. In the second group are, more often than not, the psychoanalysts of the French school. This indecision has not been exclusive of psychoanalysis, either. Seventeenth-century philosophy had already encountered a similar problem when it tried to explain the function of passions in human behavior. Professor Susan James notes in *The Cambridge History of Seventeen Century Philosophy* that in Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza, two models coexist, sometimes scattered in the same work, to explain the role that affectivity plays in actions. One of these models focused on the conscious experience of emotions and the other on unconscious physical events. If we consider that in Freud's work affectivity is closely related to the concept of drive, we will have no difficulty in seeing in this philosopher´s dilemma a precursor of the one that will later exist in the psychoanalytic field.

Is there something we could define as Freud's final position? The spirit of all his work is closer to the position which, in the absence of a better term, I have called biological. Freud believed in the existence of a proto-mind seated in the body. According to this posture, there would be emotions, thoughts, and, of course, drives, which have a paleo-symbolic or pre-linguistic existence when unconscious. He expressed

this position most clearly in *The ego and the id* (Freud 1923) when referring to how unconscious contents can become preconscious and then conscious. Although the following passage refers in general terms to unconscious "representations", it is necessary to keep in mind that of all unconscious representations the first one that appears and from which all the others are derived is the drive or instinct. Therefore, what Freud says about unconscious representations is fundamentally valid for the person's drive life.

> "Already in another place, I adopted the assumption that the effective difference between a representation (a thought) icc and a prcc is that the former is consumed in some material that remains unknown, while in the case of the latter (the representation prcc) the connection with word representations is added... So the question How does something become conscious? It would be more appropriately formulated as follows: How does something become pre-conscious? And the answer would be: By the connection with the word representations." (Freud 1923: 22. My emphasis.)

There are two ideas here that have had a significant influence on the history of psychoanalysis and that have also been the subject of criticism in philosophical circles. The first idea is that unconscious representations, therefore unconscious drives, exist in a material that could not be determined. The expression "remains unknown" refers to the state of psychoanalytic knowledge at the time of writing these lines, the year 1923. Thus, what Freud affirms in this passage is the same as what he said in his article "The Unconscious": that unconscious drives exist originally outside the mental state and from there we know only derivatives. Many psychoanalysts have interpreted this passage as affirming the existence of proto-thoughts and have believed that these exist in the body, which is an interpretation that Freud would probably agree with.

The second implicit idea in this fragment is that unconscious representations are "representations of things"—which can only be made conscious when they encounter "representations of words". By "representations of things" Freud meant, following J.S Mill, the representations or copies supposedly formed by the sum of the visual, acoustic, tactile and kinesthetic traces that leave the things of the world in our minds when they meet our senses. These are traces or representations that Freud considered

“genuine and primary” (Freud 1915 b: 198). Freud always considered “thinking in images” to be the most rudimentary form of thought. If we add both ideas together, we conclude that for Freud language represented a kind of public wrapping of thoughts and feelings that, in essence and in their origin, are somatic, private, iconic, and pre-linguistic.

The attraction that these two ideas, condensed in this passage from *The Ego and the id* and present in a good part of Freud's work, have exerted in psychoanalysis and certain philosophical currents is great. Moreover, the idea of a non-linguistic substratum of the person implies, according to most of the authors who sustain it, two additional beliefs: that something of our subjectivity is irremediably and irreversibly distorted by language and by socialization, that is, lost forever; and that there is another part of our subjectivity, which we can still experience and recognize in our lives, that is pre-social and non-linguistic. These are two ideas that have fascinated psychoanalysts such as W. Bion, J. Lacan and A. Green, and some postmodern philosophers such as Adorno.[2] Also, many of the epistemological defenses of psychoanalysis (e.g. Ahumada 2011) are based on the idea that the unconscious, being something essentially non-linguistic, cannot be apprehended with the concepts we use to refer to conscious attitudes.

But there are at least three problems with this characterization of the drives as fundamentally iconic, settled in a hidden region of the body and already existing before socialization. I want to point out three criticisms that I will review later when I consider Freud's heirs who adopted this conception of the drive as rooted in the body. The first of these problems is that, in psychoanalytic theory, nobody has sufficiently worked on the relationship that would exist between the two elements, namely, the relationship between

[2] ¨ Adorno in *Negative Dialectics* “The Child has trouble with his relations with words, which he appropriates with an effort that can scarcely be imagine any more at a larger age; he has far less trouble with the world that is familiar to him, in his early phases, as made up of objects of action. He wants to find out what the words mean, and the occupation with them - as well as an impish, nagging, psychoanalytical explicable stubbornness perhaps- leads him to the relation of words and things… His naivete is un-naive. As language, culture has invaded his stirring consciousness very early, mortgaging the talk of originality”. (*Negative Dialectics* 111) For a penetrating study of the linkage between Adorno´s and Lacan´s conceptualization of the ego and the process of socialization as a violent process against inner nature see Whitebook op. cit (132ff)

mental images and that which is putatively pre-mental and is seated in the body. Since Freud, this idea has become very widespread in psychoanalysis, proposing that mental images are more primary than representations through language and that, therefore, these images or figures in the mind are caused by that more primary that comes from the body. When Freud elaborated his concept of representations of things (or "object" representation. See James Strachey introductory note on this apparent confusion in Appendix C to his article "The Unconscious". Freud 1915b: 212), he did so by endorsing the epistemology of English empiricism found in *A System of Logic* of John Stuart Mill. This epistemology, which we can already find in David Hume, affirms that representations of things are reproductions, something like copies, of the objects of the world perceived by the senses, above all by sight. Surprisingly Freud limited himself in that essay to explaining how external objects are represented in the mind. Despite the importance he attributed to the impulses coming from the body, he did not use this empiricist conception, as Hume did, to offer a conjecture on how we could understand the passage from internal stimuli—from impulses or bodily sensations—to the mental. In the referred writing, *The ego and the id,* he only said that, unlike external perceptions, internal perceptions are much more difficult to understand, suggesting that something as the possibility of a private language, in the sense that Wittgenstein had for that possibility, is at place.

However, this position, which conceives representations as iconic copies, has been rejected for some time and is considered by philosophical reflection a naive way of understanding the mind. Below I offer the reasons why philosophy and cognitive science have abandoned this idea of the concept of "representation". In contemporary psychoanalysis, there are not many other attempts to develop a theory of how those images that would represent bodily impulses are formed in the mind. On the contrary, many psychoanalysts (e.g. Ahumada 2011, Green 1996) take it as an indisputable fact that there is a direct channel through which motivational sources with a somatic base are pictorially represented.

However, the works that speak of this contact between the drive of supposed somatic origin and its representation in images demonstrate that this is a conjecture full of conceptual confusion.

The second problem is that those who conceive the unconscious as populated by images and by unsocialized impulses of the body, usually say that many of these elements (i.e. images and drives) are beyond words, that is to say, there would be mental contents in the unconscious that can never be linguistified and that would therefore belong to the domain of the ineffable. There is in our impulses, according to these writers, an unsocialized remnant forever refractory to language. Authors who subscribe to the idea of the ineffability of some portions of the unconscious take as their starting point precisely passages such as that of *The ego and the id* cited above. However, they are not always so clear in establishing what is that of our subjectivity that is beyond the verbal. For example, Bion has repeatedly maintained that language encapsulates what already exists in "sensations". For him, what is beyond language, and therefore lost forever, are the impulses, affections, and even thoughts that could not be articulated linguistically by the young infant but that remained, in a manner not spelled out by this writer, trapped in the body existing in the domain of the "visceromuscular somatic" to use the expression of an author influenced by Bion. Some of this conception can also be found in Jacques Lacan and, as we shall see later, in Andre Green. This supposed ineffability, these psychoanalysts tell us, is derived from the fact that mind and body form two distinct domains of existence, and our concepts can only imperfectly approach what emerges from the body. That also seems to be Whitebook's idea.

Some authors who postulate that the unconscious contents are mostly ineffable claim as allies philosophers like Merleau-Ponty or Wittgenstein himself. But these two philosophers speak of another type of ineffability that should not be confused with the one defended by Bion, Lacan, and Green. These psychoanalysts thought that the drive has a nucleus that is impenetrable by the human intellect because the drive belongs to a different ontological realm. On the other hand, when Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein allude to a part of our experience that seems to surpass the possibilities of language, their

gaze is rather on the circumstances of human beings, and their ability to cope with them, rather than on an unsocialized body putatively loaded with (proto) thoughts and (proto) affections. It is the scenarios in which human existence unfolds, scenarios whose multitude of changing aspects is difficult to be perceived and therefore articulated by the actors, that generate that impression of ineffability to which Wittgenstein and Merleau Ponty refer. But in this case, it is an empirical quasi-impossibility, not ontological like the one defended by the psychoanalysts mentioned. If we follow these philosophers, the conclusion should be that it would require enormous amounts of work and attention for an individual to be able to express the many aspects of situations, the numerous presuppositions in which their interactions develop, and the variety of feelings and thoughts that a situation generates. But it is precisely this task, which will probably always remain incomplete, an important part of what the psychoanalyst and his patient do. The limits to the psychoanalytic task are not constituted then by the barriers that separate the body from the mind as Lacan, Green, Bion among others have it. According to Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, these limits result rather from the ever-changing scenario in which our ways of life unfold.

The third problem of this more biological conception of drive is that not all drives, i.e. not all impulsive behaviors, seem to be so clearly connected to the body. It is easier to attribute a somatic base to motives such as hunger, thirst, or sexual appetite and more difficult to attribute it instead to aggressive impulses. It's not that something like that hasn't been suggested, but the connection between aggression and body seems to be more complicated and to need more defense than has been offered so far. The connection between hunger, thirst, and sexual desire with the body, on the other hand, seems more coherent with our common sense. It seems to me that the division of the soul envisioned by Plato and then Aristotle takes into account this fact.

Freud's dominant position, then, was to consider the drive as rooted in the body. Besides this conception, there is also in his writings, although less emphasized, another, closer to psychological nuances, which left the way open for some of his intellectual heirs to construct a more phenomenological or intentional

theory of the drive. There is therefore in contemporary psychoanalysis a line that separates those who conceive the drive from more psychological terms and those who conceive it from more organic terms. To this dispute, which has also taken place among the philosophers who have approached Freud's work, we will dedicate the following section.

There's something else about the drive. In some works, Freud considered that the drive could be divided into two components: a representational component or part, (*Vorstellung)* that corresponds to the cognitive aspect (or its propositional aspect, if you will); and an affective part, usually referred to as the quantity of affection or psychic energy. Freud, however, was neither clear nor systematic in developing these drive components. As I have already said, I will try to bring some clarity to the quantitative-affective element of what psychoanalysis calls “drive”.

Summarizing Freud's position:

a) Everything mental originates in the drive. In the development of the human being, thinking is an effect, a consequence, of the activity of the drives. This was Freud's position endorsed by later psychoanalysts such as Bion and Green.

b) The impulses are of two types: those related to love and those linked to destruction. All human actions and thoughts are, therefore, transformations of either of these two drives. Even in cases in which they both act together as if they were “fused”.

c) The drives are unconscious in their origin and in their essence. This means that conscious drives retain an unconscious essence, even after they have become conscious.

d) The drives originate in the body and are the cause of a non-linguistic representation in the mind. Freud did not explain this process clearly or in detail and, in fact, his writings include divergences that have given rise to two great ways of conceiving drives. One more biological and one more psychological.

e) Freud almost always considered that words are something that is added to drives that, apparently, are already complete before acquiring this kind of linguistic clothing.

f) For Freud, the drive was a thing, an event, neurological or psychological. His writings never suggest that he considered the idea of “drive” as a theoretical or hypothetical entity (as Bertrand Russell thought “desire” was), that is, an entity that cannot be observed directly, but that serves to establish empirical regularities.

g) In the drive, there is a more cognitive component, which Freud called representation (Vorstellung), and an affective component, which in some passages is synonymous with psychic energy.

b) Objects relations theory

In relation to the drive, psychoanalysis has been, as I said, divided into two positions that coincide with Freud's two postures. There are psychoanalysts who feel closer to a psychological perspective of instinct, and, on the other side, there are those who emphasize the bodily anchorage of the drive. In the first group are the psychoanalysts of the school of object relations and currents marked by the idea of intersubjectivity. The second group is exemplified by, but not limited to, French psychoanalysis.

It is in the school of the “theory of object relations” where the most decisive steps have been taken to temper the biological resonances that exist in the concept of drive in psychoanalysis. Object relations is the current of thought that, following the path opened by the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, postulates that the determining factor of personality is the interaction of the child with its caring figures and the trace or sediment that these figures, these “objects”, implant in the child's mind. With these internal objects built in childhood, the person maintains a kind of dialogue for the rest of his or her life and it is from this tenuous and peculiar conversation with the internalized parental images from which the most decisive personality traits are derived.

Accordingly, relationships with significant others are the factors that build a mind. Unlike Freud, who conceived the drive as derived from the needs of the organism, these psychoanalysts asserted that if there is a thing, a mental event, that we should call drive, this event has to be a consequence of the socialization process. For this very reason, this argument says, the study of the drive is a psychological issue rather than a neurophysiological one.

In the introduction of these notions, which represent a distancing from classical psychoanalysis, several authors took part in the second half of the 20th century, in addition to Melanie Klein. W.R.D. Fairbairn and Hans Loewald were the ones who deepened the conceptual analysis, which makes their works the ones that more easily build bridges with philosophy. In their correction to what Freud said about the

impulses of human beings, these authors coincided with some of the ideas that, during those years, were held by both representatives of French existentialism and by philosophers who can be considered as belonging to the analytical movement in philosophy.

W. R.D. Fairbairn was a psychoanalyst who found that with certain difficult patients, whom he diagnosed as “schizoids”, it was therapeutically more useful to understand what these patients were doing with those “impulses”, rather than analyzing those impulses as isolated events. (Fairbairn 1952: 84) Fairbairn thought so because he was convinced that whenever we can detect what psychoanalysis calls an impulse or an instinct, the decision-making or deliberative capacity of the person, albeit precarious, must already be in place. In a passage that brings him closer to the French existentialism of his time, Fairbairn says:

> Psychoanalytic theory has been incorrectly captured by hypothetical “instincts and impulses” that would bombard passive structures as if we were before an aerial bombardment... An impulse is not, we will say, a kick in the pants given to a surprised and perhaps aching Ego, but it is rather a psychic structure in action, *a psychic structure doing something to something or someone*. (Fairbairn 1952: 150) (My emphasis.)

The ego cannot be “surprised” by an impulse or an instinct because wherever impulses or instincts appear there is already an element of agency. The phrase “psychic structure in action” in this quotation refers to the fact that an impulse is not an event resembling a spasm, but rather something which is constituted by—is necessarily made up of—other mental contents such as beliefs. There is therefore necessarily a cognitive dimension in instincts, according to Fairbairn. And the expression of doing something to something or someone refers to the fact that the field in which impulses are to be studied is the field of the person's intentions and that of his relationships with others and not that of his neurophysiological responses. Otto Kernberg, whose important contribution to the understanding of impulse we shall see below, is therefore mistaken in his commentary on Fairbairn's theory (Kernberg 2004) when he says that in this scheme the “id” disappears and that everything seems to be structures of the ego. The “id” (Id is the Latin word that English-speaking translators of Freud´s work chose for the German word Es) is that part of the personality that Freud understood as the reservoir of instincts. Fairbairn's theory should be

read, rather, as a foretaste of Donald Davidson's idea (which we will also examine later) in the sense that we must understand the mind as divided into various structures that we might call mental sub-structures, each of which with its impulses and beliefs i.e., each of them with an ego, an id, and a super-ego.

A consequence of this more cognitive conception of the subjectivity which closely relates the impulsive behavior with the thoughts of the person and which therefore does not deal with impulses as if coming from a non-mental sphere is precisely the realization that instincts are not things, discrete entities, which could somehow be studied by isolating them from the rest of human behavior. On the contrary, Fairbairn says, we must be careful to use the word impulse or instinct as a noun that refers to an entity that can be detached from the person's actions. Rather we should restrict the use of impulse or instinct to its form as adjectives or adverbs ("to act impulsively", "impulsive gesture"); that is to say adjectives or adverbs which serve to describe an action and not to affirm that adhered to the action there is an additional thing (that supposed instinct or impulse) that is pushing the person. Fairbairn says, agreeing on this point with ideas expressed by philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre (McIntyre 1958) or Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1949):

> In reality, from the point of view of a dynamic structure, the terms "Instinct" and "Impulse", like so many other terms in psychology, are misleading hypotheses that only serve to confuse the subject. The plural forms "instincts" and "impulses" are even more deceptive. These words only serve, they are only useful when we use them as adjectives. When we say for example "instinctive tendency" or "impulsive behavior". Because it is only in those cases that these terms refer to a psychic structure on the one hand and an object relationship on the other. (Fairbairn: 150)

Sometimes Fairbairn's theory has been glossed by overusing a phrase that belongs to him: "the drive is object seeking not pleasure-seeking and, with this formula, we wanted to capture its innovative content". But although it is a phrase from Fairbairn himself, it is a formula that may obscure the main contribution of this Scottish psychoanalyst. Because that expression seems to say that drive or impulse is a thing that seeks to adhere to objects (i.e. representations of people) and so Fairbairn's psychoanalysis would not have escaped what Jean-Paul Sartre called the "cosist mythology" of the science created by Freud. That's not the case. Fairbairn is rather the author whom we must recognize as the one who opened the way for

psychoanalysis to stop considering the drive as an event that happens to the person. Against this conception, which we can find in the writings of Freud and other pioneers of psychoanalysis, this author demands that it be understood that only in a context of interaction does it make sense to speak of a drive. This vision also requires understanding the impulsivity of human beings more as strategic rather than chaotic behaviors.

As powerful, theoretically, as Fairbairn's reflections are the writings of Hans Loewald, another psychoanalyst who developed his work under the premises of the theory of object relations. This author poses questions regarding the ontological status of the “instinct” or “drive” and the epistemology related to this concept. Loewald's objective was to correct the organicist and mechanistic excesses that these concepts had in Freud and some later authors.

Loewald was a medical doctor who was trained as a psychoanalyst, who also had the opportunity to study with Martin Heidegger, but who left philosophy discouraged by the political attitudes of the author of *Being and Time.* His writings on psychoanalysis reveal an eagerness for conceptual inquiry that is probably a consequence of his early interest in philosophy.

In his work entitled “On Motivation and Instinct Theory” (Loewald, 1971) Loewald offers one of the most devastating critiques of the biological conception of the mind. “What is the situation of the instincts in relation to the total organization of the psychic apparatus?” he asks. Relying on a quotation by Freud taken from the aforementioned article “Instinct and their vicissitudes”, he is emphatic in pointing out the psychological, i.e. mental, nature of the instincts. There are stimuli that come from the body, but they are stimuli that push the mind to represent and it is this representation that is the drive. Although these body stimuli are a form of energy, for Loewald they are not psychic energy, so these stimuli do not fall within the scope of psychoanalytic science. The neurophysiological and neuroanatomical dimension in human

beings is undeniable, but irrelevant to psychoanalysis. The function of psychoanalytic theory and the work of the psychoanalyst begins only when there is a psychic "structure", however incipient it may be:

> No one of course can deny neurophysiological processes or neurological structures, or the maturation of these structures. But to speak of an innate ego is to speak of a Hamlet who is not the prince of Denmark. In psychoanalytic psychology, the ego is a structure that cannot be found anywhere in biology or neurology, just as an organism cannot be found anywhere in physics or the superego in society. (Loewald 1971: 99)

Loewald, with greater insight than 21st-century psychoanalysts who are enthusiastic about neurosciences, is making in this quote a strictly "grammatical" observation, to use an expression put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein. He's not communicating a scientific finding. What he is saying is that the language game of psychoanalysis is one, and the language game of biology or neurology is another. The network of psychoanalytic concepts was built to explain human beings that have begun and exhibit in their behavior a relationship, however minimal, with the world. To try to apply a word from the psychoanalytic conceptual repertoire to the domain of biology or neurology or vice versa is to force a concept outside its field of application, which generates a good example of those linguistic confusions to which Wittgenstein drew so much attention. See what Loewald says: "You cannot find the ego in neurology, just as an organism cannot be found in physics or the superego in society". (Loewald 118) Of course, in a certain sense, there are organisms in the physical world just as there have to be "superegos" in society. But the word "organism" belongs to the domain of biology and only there, surrounded by the stock of concepts of this discipline, can it fulfill a function. The same goes for the notion of the superego. One has to be careful to extract this word from the clinical field because outside this field it has no clear application and produces entanglements when one tries to use it to explain collective behaviors. So, instead of trying to find in the brain or the body the truth of psychoanalytic concepts, we should keep in mind that these concepts have a real and vigorous sense only when they are applied to human beings who already accuse, albeit incipiently, the impact of the outside world, to human beings in whom meanings, that is, socially constructed senses, have begun to gain importance in their lives.

The empirical question then arises: if an instinct is the first manifestation of a person's mental life, and if this instinct is neither somatic nor innate, at what point in a person's life does it arise? Loewald answers this question:

> Speaking in terms of the ontogenesis of psychic reality, I would like to say that the incoherent demands and urgencies of the newborn and its reflex responses become organized and *coordinated as instincts* and assume goals and direction through their activities and environmental responses... The empathic activity of the primary caregiver not only provides satisfaction in the sense of appeasing the baby's arousal. The experience of satisfaction, I believe, is a "creative" process in which the correct response of the environment not only diminishes or ends the excitement but also engenders and organizes the excitation processes... The so-called "mnemonic images" are thus created, which are not additions but constituents of instinct. (Loewald, 1971: 119. My emphasis.)

It is the care the child receives that organizes the excitement processes and turns them into instincts. Only when the newborn has incorporated and can remember, we could say, the responses of the medium to his demands, only then does his conduct acquire that quality that allows us to use the word instinct or drive. This position, which as we shall see later was anticipated half a century earlier by the philosopher John Dewey, corrects the main problem of the "somatic and innate" view of instinct in Freud (Loewald's phrase) in which the drives seem prior to all socialization.

The ideas that these emblematic authors disseminated in the psychoanalytic world, which somehow were already claimed by different philosophers, namely, that the drive is built in the relationship of the infant with his environment, that these impulses are of a psychological nature and not organic and that therefore the impulsive actions are not an expression of the body but rather contain thoughts, are the pillars of what has been called the "intersubjective turn in Psychoanalysis", initiated by the school of object relations. In the twenty-first century, interrelationships and intersubjective schools receive all their strength and enthusiasm from these ideas. Some of these schools have even gone so far as to state that the word drive should be erased from the psychoanalytic dictionary and that its place, as the most important concept in the theory of psychoanalytic motivation, should be occupied by the idea of "affects" (Storolow 2013). Lines below I will express my opinion for this move that seems to me to be equally wrong.

This more interpersonal view of subjectivity has, however, encountered resistance. Although there is consensus on much of what Klein, Fairbairn, and Loewald proposed, there is, precisely in terms of the concept of drive, a significant number of psychoanalysts who prefer a traditional view. I am referring to those psychoanalysts who believe that what defines the drive is its somatic component and that there is an important part of subjectivity that is prior to social contact and prior to language and therefore thought and contact with others robs the human being of the most authentic part of his being.

c) The persistence of traditional vision: the somatic anchorage of drive and thought

Not all psychoanalysts accepted the totality of the ideology of the intersubjective turn. Although almost everyone admits the decisive importance of interaction with others in the constitution of the mind, there subsists in several psychoanalysts the idea that the somatic basis of our impulses and our thoughts is the key to understanding human beings. Authors who think this way usually associate this idea with three other claims: that a significant portion of subjectivity develops before socialization and outside of language, in other words, that there is an important non-linguistic substratum in the human mind; that psychic energy, that is, the economic factor Freud spoke of, is crucial to understanding our behaviors; and that the body expresses emotional sufferings of the person without the intervention of any kind of cognition whatsoever.

I have chosen Andre Green to criticize this way of understanding the mental because he is the most studied of psychoanalysts who follow this line of thought. It must be understood that my criticism of Green's conceptions is not a questioning of his important work. It is rather an attempt to question the set of positions that can be brought together under the label of “the bodily anchorage of the mind”. Of these ideas, to remember, that the most important impulses of human beings have an organic base, that before socialization and outside of language there are already existing important aspects of our mind, that the body is the origin of most of our thoughts and feelings, and that psychic energies are essential to

understand the motivation of human actions, I am going to propose that only the third idea mentioned, which is related to psychic energies, should be rescued to incorporate it and combine it with the advances of the intersubjective turn and postulate a concept of drive in psychoanalysis which in turn, I hope, can be a contribution to the philosophy of action.

For André Green "no conception of the psyche can be given with another foundation than that of its rooting in the body" (Green 1996: 31). As in Freud, this encounter between the body and psychology takes place in the drive.

Moreover, Green considers thought as "rooted in the life of the drive" (Green 1992: 104) and therefore believes that what psychoanalysis has to say about thinking and thought, "does not exceed the framework of relations between the unthinkable that is the drive and the elaboration of which is object by language ...". In other words, Green endorses Freud's bold view that all mental life is originally and essentially a derivative of bodily drive.

Green defends this supposed somatic anchorage of the mind by postulating a causal chain that begins with a demand from the body that produces, through a process that Green does not elucidate, a psychic representative which is, in good measure, the representative of the body in the mind. The nature of this psychic representative is also obscure in this scheme. This psychic representative is linked to a "representation of a thing", which is constituted by the memories of the experiences in which that bodily demand was satisfied. This representation of a thing, Green emphasizes, is pictorial or figurative in nature. Green uses the example of thirst to illustrate this path that goes from bodily demand to a thing representation:

> When the physiologist talks about dehydration or ionic imbalance, I'll say, "I'm thirsty." The sensation of thirst is the psychic representative of endosomatic excitation. But one could not say that thirst "represents" dehydration or ionic imbalance, as the representation of a thing represents the thing. My thirst will only be quenched if I drink. But if I find myself in such conditions that I cannot turn it off I will obsessively evoke the fresh drink (representation of a thing) that will bring me the desired satisfaction. (Green 1996: 140)

The sensation of thirst is the psychic representative (it represents the body, that is it represents those physiological changes) and the mental image of a drink is the representation of a thing. Green, following closely to Freud, affirms that the representation or the idea of a thing—that is to say, that image in my mind of the object or thing in the world which will satisfy my drive—plus the psychic representative (the sensation of thist) form an unconscious drive. Green is convinced that these parts of the drive can be treated as different and separate mental entities and that their influence can be ordered one after the other chronologically, precisely as in a chain. So separate is the representation of the thing of the psychic representative that he considers a danger of the psychoanalytic practice that the interpretations of the doctor address only the representation of the thing and fail to address the psychic representative.

> Here all our work as analysts is put into question because, if we go too much to the representing part of the representative thing, and not enough to the representing psychic part, that is to say to that which belongs to the order of the body, it is not rare that the interpretation slips on the analysand (the patient) like water on the feathers of a duck. (Green 1996: 88)

Although he does not offer a single example of interpretations going to the representing psychic part (what belongs to the body) vis-à-vis interpretations going to the representating part of the representative "thing", everything seems to indicate that, according to this model, the step or mutation to use the language that Green uses, from somatic excitation to psychic representation is an unconscious and physiological step. This is, more or less, the vision that Freud expounded in The Unconscious, that of the unknowable drive of which we can only know its derivatives.

Green's theory, however, is vulnerable to several questions that I want to rehearse here. Two of these objections are the same ones that I have made, lines above, to the biological vision developed by Freud.

The first question starts by asking whether this linear model of psychosomatic excitation-psychic representative- thing representation is a model applicable to all phenomena which in psychoanalysis are called "drives". It is not by chance that Green uses the example of thirst because the scheme he presents there seems at least plausible. But if we think of the aggressive drive, it seems difficult to sustain this

homeostatic model. Is an endosomatic excitation necessary for anger? Moreover, if we follow Freud in asserting that there is a drive to “look”, does it make sense to find the neurophysiological basis of looking or being looked at?

The second question is whether we can find in some other discipline, such as biology or empirically oriented philosophy, research results that confirm Green's intuitions. Since what Green does is defend a model of a mind very dependent on the body, it seems a useful exercise to ask what an empirically oriented philosopher says about desire and its relationship to neurophysiological mechanisms. Take Peter Carruthers' work, for example.

For Carruthers, it is not true that in the human being there is one or a few intrinsic or basic desires, generators of all other desires. According to his vision of things (Carruthers'), human beings, like animals, are programmed to generate and acquire new desires, which are produced by a combination of two factors: information from the environment and a certain state of the body. But it is a combination, in which both factors have to be present. Talking about the origin of desires, Carruthers says:

> It could be argued that the process that gives rise to desires is entirely physio-chemical in nature. And it seems without a doubt that such a statement has a grain of truth. Thus, in most mammalian females, the desire to mate is triggered directly by the levels of hormonal cycles. And the desire to eat and drink could be thought to depend on physicochemical processes...But this can in no way be the whole story. Because the desire to mate in most mammals is not triggered by (physiochemical) states of the body, but rather by olfactory and visual stimuli... and, although hormonally motivated, females generally discriminate with whom to mate... In fact, the most plausible model for explaining how intrinsic desires are usually generated is one that involves sensitivity to both body states and environmental information of various kinds. Although some cases (of desires) will be closer to the body end of the spectrum and others would be almost *entirely informational*. (Carruthers 2006: 114. My emphasis.)

The perceptions of the external world and the beliefs or judgments that these perceptions generate, says Carruthers, always intervene in the origin and development of animal desires. Moreover, there are some desires that are entirely informational, that is to say, generated exclusively by the information that the environment provides to the animal. It seems appropriate to think that informational variables are more important in the impulses of human beings, something that cannot be accommodated in Green's model.

Therefore, an empirically oriented philosophy based on naturalistic and evolutionary presuppositions does not seem to support Green's conjectures about drive.

From another perspective, but on this subject, Alan Gibbard, in his *Wise Choices Apt Feelings*, a book in which he defends an emotivist version of practical reason, makes a warning that applies well to the psychoanalytic stance exemplified by Green. Gibbard says that it is always a risk to infer internal neurophysiological states of behavior that expresses an emotion:

> "We conjecture an internal state that explains a syndrome (Gibbard calls syndrome the conjunction of the expression of emotion with the characteristic behavior of that emotion). But even if we are right, the connection (between internal state and syndrome) will always be approximate...It may be the case that more than one mechanism is behind a syndrome...It may be that there is no clearly definable mechanism that serves a function...What unites the various physiological states that constitute anger may not be a similarity that captures the attention of a physiologist who has set aside any idea of function, but a similarity of biological function. (Gibbard, 1990: 134)

What Green is doing is precisely to infer a neurophysiological mechanism—assuming that the representation as he understands it is such a mechanism—from a behavior.

The third question, which is also related to the problems already mentioned that pervade the more biological version of Freud's drive, has to do with Green's use of the term representation. In the introduction to this work, I said that one of my intentions is to help in the project of finding aspects of psychoanalytic theory that cohere with other scientific and philosophical developments and of establishing bridges between psychoanalysis and science and philosophy. For this to happen, certain concepts and expressions used in psychoanalysis mustn't be so conceptually foreign to those used in other disciplines. In this sense, the concept of "mental representation" that Green uses—which is the same that Freud used and that John Stuart Mill also used following David Hume, that is, the idea of the mind as a camera obscura that captures portions of reality as a camera does—has been abandoned. Green's assertion that the representation of the thing "belongs to the order of the figurative" , is based on that superseded conception of the representational capacities of the mind. In the twentieth century, it was

especially Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953) and Peter Geach (Geach 1957) who offered the most devastating arguments against the idea that mental images, which are understood as copies of the external world, are essential for thinking and for representing the word. Incidentally, Geach mentions Freud as the example of one of the authors whose vision on the capacities to represent remains fatally tied to this already outmoded model. But in addition, the idea of representation as something iconic is not a dead horse in the 21st century, as evidenced by the overwhelming plea against (bad) neuroscience's use of this idea (representation as images that are copies) by Bennett and Hacker. (Bennett, Hacker 2003)

The fourth question, finally, is that, in his eagerness to construct a causal chain that begins with the body and ends with action or thought, Green and the authors who think like him have hypostasized elements of this chain whose existence cannot be verified nor in behavior nor speech, such as the thing representation and the psychic representative. Wittgenstein sarcastically referred to those who, knowing almost nothing about psycho-physiological processes and their correspondences with observable behaviors, often say that there has to be a correspondence between a person's action of multiplying, reciting from memory a poem or reading, and a specific state of the brain. (Wittgenstein 1958) Why does Wittgenstein need to point out the ignorance about neurophysiology of those who claim that there must be something cerebral to accompany our behaviors? Because what he wants to emphasize is that such an appeal to supposed neuroscience (not corroborated by scientific observation) actually responds to an almost irresistible tendency, when we think of a person's ability to do something like multiply, read a poem or desire something, to attribute that ability to a state, specifically a state of the brain. For the same reason that we usually think of memory as a deposit, Wittgenstein says, we feel strongly pushed to postulate a material basis for our abilities. It may be conjectured that what motivates some writers to postulate the hypothesis of an (uncorroborated) neuro-physiological state which would explain the action is, in addition to the desire, pointed out by Wittgenstein, to find “solid” bases for explaining behavior, the need to not leave blank or empty space in the causal chain that ends in behavior. There's a fear of taking

a very big jump between one element and another. Thus, what is postulated in this vision criticized by Wittgenstein and which I am attributing to some psychoanalysts, is that between an order and the execution of an order, for example, there “must” be a state of the brain necessary for the explanation of the action. It's not that Green and the psychoanalysts who seem to invoke processes that take place in the brain to explain actions know nothing of neurosciences. What happens rather is that the whole state of knowledge of neuroscience does not allow at this moment to affirm, for example, that there are representations of things and psychic representatives that are different and that moreover happen in the order in which Green says they happen. It is most likely that neurosciences may never confirm the existence of these entities.

Neuropsychoanalysis is an example of this use of unsubstantiated conjectures to construct the causal chain of actions. This new discipline has several problems already pointed out by several authors. I agree with Axel Honneth (Honneth 2009) for example, when he says that neuropsychoanalysis represents a “flight forward” on the part of psychoanalysts, that is to say, a flight from the epistemological problems of psychoanalysis towards a promise to find in detailed knowledge of the functioning of the brain the ultimate explanation of psychoanalytic propositions. Psychoanalysts Rachel Blass and Zvi Carmeli have drawn attention to the regressive and mystifying nature of neuropsychoanalysis. Using Bennet and Hacker's arguments against the hasty use of neuroscience to explain behavior, Blass and Carmeli warn of the confused picture that emerges when a region of the brain is posited as the cause of a mental state or behavior. It is the mereological fallacy exhibited by neurosciences and from which neuropsychoanalysis suffers to a great extent and which also lurks at psychoanalytic theory.

The idea that the motives of our behaviors already exist in an embryonic way inside the body has another negative consequence: it pushes its adherents to offer a taxonomy of mental entities in an overpopulated inner world, where entities or psychic processes of uncertain existence cannot possibly be linked with actions. This is so because if it is postulated that within the body there are, for example, desires already

shaped, the temptation arises to posit a body that contains complex structures or mechanisms. For example, J. Laplanche, close in some of his ideas to Green, has said that psychoanalytic theory must differentiate between instinct and drive. The instinct would be “atavistic, endogenous and hereditary” and the drive “acquired and epigenetic”. The sexual drive is also “the sexual of intersubjective origin”. As in Green, here the main objection to this proposal is also that the criteria for differentiating instinct from drive are enigmatic. These criteria are found neither in visible behavior nor, at least to the extent that knowledge of that discipline has advanced, in the neurophysiological system. Laplanche himself will say, in the last paragraph of the article in which he makes this difference, that instinct is “very complicated epistemologically because it is never found in its *pure state”* (my emphasis). This clearly indicates that Laplanche is treating instinct as a spatial-temporal entity that can blend in with others.

But not only psychoanalysts of the French school, with its inclination for the what cannot be corroborated, postulates the existence of mental entities in the causal chain of behavior for which there does not seem to exist a criterion with which they can be identified. The contemporary psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg, who is essentially an heir to the theory of object relations, also believes that instinct and drive are different things.

Kernberg's (Kernberg 2004) most important contribution to a theory of human motivation is the assertion that drives cannot be understood outside of interactions. Every time there is an episode in a person's mind which psychoanalysis calls drive, there is also an image of self and an image of another internalized, both images linked by an affection. When I hate or love another person that impulse of hatred or love is constituted by an image of myself (of my “Self”) and an image of another internalized (usually an “internal object” sedimented throughout the life of the person. It doesn't have to be another specific person. The internalized images can be formed by the blending, so to speak, of experiences with different persons). It is an intersubjective drama—most of the time unconscious—that takes place when the presence of an impulse is noticed. (Kernberg, 2004)

However, despite this insightful observation, Kernberg thinks that if it relies too much on an intersubjective view of the human being, psychoanalysis could “minimize and ignore the lesser-known aspects of primitive hatred and the primitive nature of the earliest unconscious erotic and sadomasochistic fantasies”. (Kernberg 2004: 49) For this reason, he believes that to counteract this “excess of intersubjectivism” more attention must be paid to those more primitive aspects by looking with more attention to the earliest and deepest of the mind, something that leads, according to him, to find differences between the instinct and the drive.

In this regard, Kernberg's theory, which is another example of a mechanistic conception, *partes extra partes,* conceives the phenomenon of human motivation as a hierarchically organized structure, in which the most basic and simple point would be the instinct that Kernberg defines as “biologically determined and hierarchically organized behavioral patterns that integrate innate dispositions with environmental stimuli”. (Kernberg 1992, 2004) A little higher on the scale of complexity would be what Kernberg calls affections, which are instinctive structures, psycho-physiological patterns of behavior, but which have, unlike instincts, a cognitive component. It is affection that builds the bridges that connect biological instincts with the last step: the drive, which is highly individualized, malleable, and displaceable. Affects are like the building blocks with which the drive is built, a construction that occurs when the child interacts with his or her elders. (Kernberg, 1992, 2004).

As has happened to other psychoanalysts, including Freud, this supposedly more detailed look led Kernberg to conjecture the existence of internal entities and processes and thus yielded to the temptation to which Wittgenstein alluded. Therefore, Green, Laplanche, Freud, Kernberg, and others, were victims of an excess of scientism. In an attempt to break down into parts the whole that is behavior (i.e. to analyze behavior, in the traditional sense of the word analyze) and to understand how impulses originating in the body are metabolized into actions, they ended up proposing an overpopulated choreography of the internal that cannot be corroborated in either speech or behavior. Nor in neurology. We could say that

they over-adjusted the microscope and put aside what they were really trying to understand, which are the actions.

Psychoanalysts who hold this organic vision of the drive usually defend another thesis that coincides with what some philosophers of German romanticism and postmodernism assert: that socialization robs the person of the freest aspect of their subjectivity process in order to exist and to develop. This is, without going too far, Freud's idea expressed in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [3]and also somehow in *Civilization and its discontents* where he insists that civilization (*kulture)* demands from its members to inhibit the impulses that tend towards pleasure. Green (Green 1996) and Bion (Bion 1970), for example, interested almost exclusively in the clinical consequences of this idea and not in its normative or political derivations, have argued that thought has a distorting and restrictive effect on certain more primitive or, as Bion says, pre-verbal mental contents. Moreover, it is this idea of Bion that has given rise, in contemporary psychoanalysis, to the very popular—and mistaken—belief in "unrepresented" mental contents, an idea that is considered by its defenders as scientific innovation.

Linda Brakel, in her book *Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and the a-rational mind* (Brakel 2009), attempted to give philosophical form to the idea of processes or mental states radically alien to the rational and thus alien to the processes that organize second nature. She uses the term a-rational for that, to differentiate it from the irrational because, she asserts, the irrational is the rationality that has gone wrong, but the a-rational, despite being an obscure concept that this author does not clarify, is what dominates in "very young human beings, in dreams and hallucinations" and is governed by the "associative" principles" (Brakel 2009: 43) that would precede the Kantian categories of rationality.

[3] "In consequence of the belated appearance of the secondary processes, the core of our being, consisting of unconscious wishful impulses remains inaccessible to the understanding…" Freud (1900) Compare this with Adornós statement quoted in a foonote in page 12.

The same expression “arational” (with no hyphen) is used in the philosophy of mind by Rosalind Hurthouse (Hurthouse 1991) to refer to intentional actions done with no reason, a much deserving attention type of action about which I will be saying something below. Hurthouse sense of arationality differs from Brakel sense of a-rationality.

Brakel conceives of a- rational thinking as the hallmark of what Freud called the primary process. As stated, Brakel believes that the Kantian categories do not determine the conditions of the possibility of experience. It is rather possible to have experiences outside the *a priori* categories. As far I can see, this is a thesis that she does not elaborate on. Brakel contends that, prior to the person entering the space of reasons, there is another principle that organizes mental contents. It is the principle of associationism. This principle is not rational but yet nomological. The putative laws governing these processes are those related to mental contents being organized by “contiguity in time and/or space” (Brakel 2009: 41) and by the similarity of nonessential features. (Brakel: 98) According to this empirical law, mental contents in the primary process are associated not because of their logical relations but because of these contingent factors. For instance, Freud presents the example of the person who dreamt that his leg was broken and interpreted this dream as a symbolization of adultery. The associationist principle, in this case, would tell us that adultery is represented by a broken leg because of the word *Ehebruch,* which means adultery, but literally “a fracture of marriage”. This is the sort of resemblance of inessential features that Freud, according to Brakel, advocates. How important these associations are in our motivations is something that Brakel neither discusses.

In addition, Brakel asserts that the primary process “...cannot take the form of a belief. Given that primary process mentation is marked by no reality testing, in fact, no attempt to regulate representations for consideration of truth, beliefs cannot be among the propositional attitudes that comprise the primary process”. (Brakel: 65) Accordingly, in phantasy and wish, which are the attitudes paradigmatic of the primary process as depicted by Brakel, the child is not concerned with the truth of what the phantasy is

about because when it occurs in children “there is not yet the capacity to evaluate truth values” (Brakel: 76).

Notwithstanding that this kind of association of mental contents indeed occurs, there are some problems with the picture that Brakel offers of the primary process. Firstly, it is at odds with Freud's account, and also, given that Freud´s account is in need of refinement[4], this picture conflicts with a sound understanding of this type of mental process. Freud, talking about the primary process indeed stated that the first system[5] cannot but desire. And desiring according to Freud is an activity opposed to the reality principle, which means that desire disregards truth. But Freud did not conceive the primary process as so radically cut off from thoughts and from the formation of beliefs. It is the case, on the contrary, that in most of Freud's discussion, the primary process appears intermeshed and influenced by the secondary process. Daydreaming, for example, was conceived by Freud as the product of the combination of unconscious impulses, guided by the pleasure principle intertwined with thinking (Freud 1912). Far from being the case that the primary process cannot take the form of a belief, as Brakel claims, it (the primary process) uses belief as one of its modes of existence. Similarly, the composition of dreams requires, according to psychoanalysis, some complex cognitive operations. Daniell Dennett makes fun of the psychoanalytic explanation of dream contents because, quite the contrary to what Brakel suggests, Freudian explanations of dreams demand a “clever devil” and “an internal dream playwright composing therapeutic dream plays for the benefit of the ego and cunningly sneaking them past an internal censor…” (Dennett 1991: 14) If one eliminates the sarcasm in the quote, one has to accept that it is a fair, albeit exaggerated, picture of Freud´s explanation of the content of dreams. There is, therefore, together with the associationism that Brakel correctly points out, rational elements present in our dreams.

[4] I will suggest an improvement of the conceptualization of the primary process when considering Marcia Cavell´s discussion of this concept.

[5] This is the expression that Freud uses in the *Interpretations of Dreams* to refer to the primary process.

The moral of this is that the primary process cannot be understood separately from and radically opposed to the secondary process. I contend that Freud never considered so.

Secondly, it should also be called into question the way Brakel blends Ruth Millikan´s much-debated teleological explanations with psychoanalytic concepts. For Millikan (Millikan 1989), body organs and instinctive behaviors but also tools, languages, purposive behaviors, and actual actions, all have "proper functions", which are the functions that have helped account for the existence of all these things mentioned. Blaker takes that claim and uses it to assert that the proper function of phantasy is that it is a sort of training for future activities, such as some animals have a kind of playing where they get prepared for the activities necessary for their adaptation like fighting and hunting. (Brakel: 78)

However, if one wants to keep the reflection about phantasy within this Darwinian frame of thinking, it is not clear that training is the purpose of phantasizing. I suggest, contrary to Blaker, that it is the reduction of anxiety and the ensuing self-provision of hope, given the obvious evolutionary advantages of less anxiety and more hope. I think that one can do a better job of trying to find the contribution of phantasy to the history of our species if one thinks of the place that Donald Winnicott, in his writing about the capacity to play[6] assigns to this activity, this role being that of preparing children for a more relaxed relationship with their own aggressive impulses and, through a process that Winnicott famously and brilliantly explicated, to start building emotional autonomy. It is, finally, a matter of intrigue why Brakel claims that phantasies provide selective advantages to the beings so phantasizing "in the absence of rationality". (Brakel: 80) If we accept that the proper function of phantasy is that it affords a useful practice for the phantasizer for future challenges, such as fighting, (Blaker: 79) then rationality has to be part of it. It is inconceivable that in those phantasies, which have fighting as content, the child does not think, does

[6] Considering that playing, as Winnicott conceives of it, is part of what Brakel calls phantasy. Winnicott 1971. *Playing and reality.*

not choose the better means to accomplish the end of defeating their imaginary enemy. If phantasy is training, as Brakel claims, it must include these forms of rationality.

Better support for psychoanalysts who believe that there is behavior that is a non-rational expression of our thoughts and feelings is the work of David Finkelstein *Expression and The Inner*, to which I will refer to in greater depth in the second part of this work. Finkelstein is a defender of the idea that we cannot understand the mental state if we exclude what we human beings have in common with non-human animals, that is the sentient aspects of our selves; and that an important part of what we say, do, and feel is a spontaneous, non-rational expression of our inner world. What would make Finkelstein's work more interesting and potentially more fruitful for these psychoanalysts is that this author is not lost in the attempt to construct a taxonomy with the entities that would supposedly exist in the inner world. It avoids talking about instincts, impulses, or representations as copies of the external world. His idea is rather that we can only understand the force of the internal in conjunction with the external, in the manner of words that only make sense in the context of a sentence. It is the "logical space of animal life" where the external and the internal are conjugated. There is an internal (i.e. logical) relationship between the inner and the outer which, in some instances (for example some gestures), is non-rational.

One can summarize the position exemplified by Green, Kernberg, and Laplanche and to some extent Brakel in the following postulates:

d) There are direct and relatively simple causal relationships to understand between the body and behavior. And therefore, although these authors do not say it explicitly, the formulation of psycho-physical scientific laws should not be problematic.
e) There is a more or less complex subjectivity in the life of the infant that predates socialization and language.

f) Many mental contents are of a pre-verbal (and even ineffable) nature; these contents, some of which would correspond to the “instincts” are the first block, the simplest, of the causal chain ending in human actions.

g) Finally, and since all our motivations are anchored in the body, it is necessary to consider the impact on the mind of psychic energies—the economic point of view—in order to understand the behavior.

I will suggest that of all these ideas the only solvent and real contribution of psychoanalysis to the philosophy of action is the notion of an economic or energetic dimension of behavior. This concept, which neither in theoretical psychoanalysis nor in the analytical philosophy of the mind has received sufficient attention, arose in Freud's first writings when he needed to explain the “intensity” of the symptoms of some of his patients. But for this idea of energy factor to be incorporated as part of a theory of action, the concept of drive must be stripped of the organic and dualistic resonances found in most of the authors I have just discussed and accept some of the canons proposed by psychoanalysts of the object relations and intersubjective schools of thought.

In today's psychoanalysis, both visions exist. The one most inclined to think the mind and specifically the motivation around the concept of drive (with all the mentioned characteristics) and the conception most influenced by the intersubjective turn. There have been attempts to reconcile and even, as occurs on other issues of psychoanalytic theory, to deny the tension that exists between these two conceptions. For example, Henrick Endell (Endell 2007) thinks that the theory of psychoanalytic motivation should not choose between impulse and affection (let us not forget that the intersubjective believe that affection is the basic motivational unit and that it should replace impulse) and a solution should be sought that he calls “dialectic”. While W.W. Meissner (Meissner 2009) proposes that the concept of drive must be put aside and that the notion of motive, together with the concept of “need”, serves as the concept that organizes the theory of psychoanalytic motivation.

The problem with these two approaches, like that of the intersubjective thinkers I mentioned above (Storolow) is that they continue to look for an element of the mind, something like a “thing that moves” the person to act. When in reality the dilemma does not consist in determining which particle or entity of the universe is the main motivator of the actions of human beings but rather in deciding if the idea of drive is still useful.

Therefore, if it is decided, as I think it is the right thing to do, to leave behind the idea of an organically rooted drive, to which Freud gave so much explanatory power; and if it is also abandoned, as I think it is equally advisable, the idea of a part of subjectivity that develops despite socialization, and if, consequently, the idea that people's motives already reside in the body is left aside, then the alternative is not to find something that replaces the drive. It is advisable to stop looking for entities in the mind that as physical things explain the behavior and think rather of principles or processes that better reflect the structure of human motivation.

For example, someone might opt for propositional psychology, which states that desires and beliefs, always acting as a pair, constitute the motives for actions. I myself believe that a modified version of propositional psychology can engage well with object relations theory and it is with that combination that, towards the end of the second chapter, I will offer an alternative for a psychoanalytically informed understanding of “desire”. Others could say that if one thinks about subjectivity under psychoanalytic canons, the structure of practical reason that one must endorse is that which gives decisive importance to emotions, in the manner of Hume, an approach that by the end of the twentieth century has regained strength. With either of these two models, or others that may be adopted, sexual and aggressive desires will undoubtedly be important, but they will not be the only ones, nor will they always be present behind all human actions. Psychoanalysis has to adapt its theory to understand other desires and other more rational motives and renounce the project of a complete taxonomy of impulses. By adopting one of these models there will no longer be a single force from which all other behaviors will flourish and what we call

desire will be one of the parts, in most cases the most influential but in other cases dispensable, of our motives. Finally, if one abandons the elements of the classical theory of drive, as I am suggesting, one must also abandon the idea that psychoanalysis or neurosciences may one day say something truly novel and explanatory of “desire”. Abandon, that is, the presumption that this entity, what in popular psychology is called desire, still hides a structure or an essence that, once revealed, will improve our understanding of human motivations. The abandonment of this presumption is suggested by the intersubjective shift in psychoanalysis.

But that intersubjective shift did not begin in Melanie Klein's consultation room or those of her followers. There were rather philosophers impressed by Freud's writings who, while recognizing the revolutionary potential of the new theory of the unconscious, criticized the biological and mechanistic approach that threatened to erode the explanatory potential of the new psychology. This was done by John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, three of Freud's contemporaries, and later by Donald Davidson and Marcia Cavell. Although Russell has an understanding of desire close in some respects to the theory of drive, his notion of desire departs from the simple and reified view of the mind-body relationship that has characterized many psychoanalytic writers.

Beyond the importance of the critique of these philosophers to Freud´s Cartesian view, this critique contains a more radically intersubjective view of the mind than that of the psychoanalysts of the theory of object relations and interrelations. Among these psychoanalysts—among Melanie Klein's followers, for example—, the Cartesian idea of the mind as a private theater separate from the external world persists. The writings of these philosophers demand, on the contrary, to eliminate these Cartesian vestiges, but without falling into error, in which several intersubjective authors have fallen, for example, to believe that such a task, that of freeing psychoanalysis from Cartesianism, supposes looking for a substitute for the “drive” that could be “affection”. Reviewing the philosophical roots of the intersubjective turn of psychoanalysis can have the therapeutic effect of suppressing this false dilemma. At the end of this review,

I will propose how psychoanalysis can understand desire—the drive—once such assimilation has been completed.

II. The Conversation Between the Analytical Philosophy of the Mind and Psychoanalysis.

h) The Initial Consideration of Desire.

Psychoanalysis and the analytical philosophy of the mind have converged with each other in the investigation of that which constitutes the primary cause of the actions of human beings. Psychoanalysts call drive, instinct, or impulse the event that initiates the causal chain of behaviors. Analytical and pragmatic philosophers call desire—the word Freud preferred in his early writings—the most basic conceptual unit that must appear in the explanation of human actions. As stated in the introduction, sometimes the expressions “Philosophy of action” or “theory of action” are used to refer to the set of writings of analytical philosophers that deal precisely with the structure of human beings' actions. I'll use those expressions sometimes, too.

The fact that it is not evident that both inquiries have been about the same aspect of the human being is not due to the fact that psychoanalysis is an empirical discipline and philosophy is a conceptual enterprise. Psychoanalytic metapsychology, after all, has much of a philosophical task, because what it seeks is to define the concepts that will be useful later in empirical or clinical research. The fact that this convergence is not so visible responds fundamentally to two reasons: that psychoanalysis has remained captive to the Cartesian conception of the mind, and, second, to the difference of styles in writing.

The first reason is dealt with in a good part of this work. Little has been written about the second reason and that is why it is good to dedicate a few lines to it. When this dialogue between psychoanalysts and philosophers of the Anglo-Saxon tradition began, Bertrand Russell complained of unnecessary esotericism in psychoanalytic writings. Some years later Elizabeth Anscombe, in her pioneering work *Intention,* would say that the use of psychological jargon, for example, the use of the word “drive” to refer to that which first moves the human being to act, leads to a dead end. Distrust of philosophical (and psychological) slang

and the desire to avoid unnecessary proliferation of concepts has been precisely a characteristic of Anglo-Saxon philosophers. They believe that the words we use in everyday life are the ones we should use in philosophical psychology. In this sense, they have gone in the opposite direction to the majority of psychoanalysts who, as we saw in the previous chapter, have been victims of the problem generated by the multiplication of terms and entities.

The word "desire" is for the philosophers of the tradition that Russell and Dewey helped to establish that which better designates the atom of experience where the actions of human beings spring. I contend that this word, as used by these philosophers, covers everything that covers instinct or drive. In general, analytical philosophy has followed Aristotle in considering that desire is that "push" with which human action begins. "Desire (orexis)", said Aristotle, "ends where deliberation begins on what I must do, and deliberation ends in action." (De Anima 433 a15). Donald Davidson and John Searle have maintained, in line with what Aristotle said, that desire is a kind of raw intention, an intention on which the person has not yet reflected.

In our daily lives, however, we use the word desire in various senses. For this reason, it is convenient to digress on this term. Elizabeth Anscombe, in the mentioned *Intention*, says that the only meaning of this word that has relevance for a theory of action is "wanting" whose most primitive meaning is to try to reach or try to obtain what one wants. Thus, Anscombe says—questionably, I believe—that there are senses of the word "want" that do not contain in their meaning the doing or the trying something to get what you want and these senses should not be considered in the explanation of the action. Examples of those other meanings of the word wanting that do not contain the doing or trying to achieve are "how I wish my dog had not died," or "how I wish Troy had not fallen," or "how I wish Alan Garcia had never been the President of Peru". Other valid uses of the verb to want or to wish that are not interesting for a theory of action are presented, says Anscombe, when for example I feel a prick of desire for something I see in a store, but I don't have a thought related to an action that would lead me to have that thing. The English

language is more varied than Spanish for the description of these mental states and the names that Anscombe gives to these wantings that are not accompanied by a prospect of action are, besides the "prick", yearning, idle wishing, or hope. Between these and the desire to be relevant for action, the border is not rigid, suggests Anscombe. The longing or the prick can lead to action to the extent that, for the person who longed, doing something to achieve what was longed for became part of the horizon of their possible actions.

However, all these forms of wanting or desiring divorced from thoughts pointing to action are important for psychoanalysis. The concepts of fantasy and psychic energy refer to these mental events. And while one cannot object to what Anscombe says in the sense that in constructing a theory of action we should be interested only in wanting with the prospect of achieving, neither can one object to psychoanalysis when it affirms that some fantasies, in the form of what Anscombe calls longing, idle longing or a prick of desire, can be considered as the beginning of actions. There is a meeting point here between psychoanalysis and the philosophy of action that until now has been addressed only by Russell and J.D. Velleman, which is what this work is trying to explore.

In what follows, I am going to give an account of how John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein read what Freud said about the impulses of the human being, and then I will examine the work of Donald Davidson and Marcia Cavell, who gather what these authors said.

I will argue two theses. First, the philosophers whose work I will survey, were correct when they criticized the assumption of psychoanalysis in the sense that drive is, to use John McDowell´s expression, an unassimilated residue of our first nature. Freud and psychoanalysis have obliterated that our needs are always culturally interpreted and that whatever springs move us to do things are, since their constitution, entangled with thoughts about the circumstances in which we act. It is already a controversial point if there is a part of our subjectivity, of our motivations, that has completely escaped the social influence

that we receive through our caregivers, that is to say, is controversial if there is a part of us which has completely eluded *Bildung* or second nature. But what should not be subject to controversy, I will propose, is that Freud and his followers believe that this supposed residue of first nature has an exaggerated weight. Hand in hand with the philosophers who commented on Freud, I will argue that there are several reasons why psychoanalysis should abandon the belief in such a widespread and autonomous first nature.

The second thesis that I am going to propose is that the idea of "psychic energy" that was suggested by Freud can be, once modified and naturalized, a complement to the way Anglo-Saxon philosophy understands the structure of human motivation.

i) Dewey and Russell

In both *The Analysis of Mind* published by Bertrand Russell in 1921 and *Human Nature and Conduct,* published the following year by John Dewey, there is a chapter devoted to the then-novel ideas of Sigmund Freud. Russell and Dewey, considered two of the great thinkers of the twentieth century, were among the first philosophers who saw that a philosophical theory of the mind, which is what both tried to construct in those works, had to take into account the unconscious dimension. In that sense, they were more insightful than Martin Heidegger, another of the greats of the twentieth century, who perhaps because of ontological scruples never thought that his theory of the human being needed to accommodate the idea of an unconscious will. Despite sharing the epistemological point of view for analyzing Freud's ideas, which is that the essence of the mental and the inner world resides in actions, Dewey and Russell came to different conclusions. Dewey anticipated the core ideas of the intersubjective and relational psychoanalysts and Russell, it could be said, gave life to a version of the drive theory of which Freud is considered the creator.

j) John Dewey

The writings on the philosophy of psychology by John Dewey (1859-1952) constitute one of the most devastating attacks against Cartesian conceptions of the mental, that is, against the idea of the mind as a private theatre in each individual. Against that conception, traces of which we also find in Freud and post-Freudian psychoanalysts, Dewey argued that the mind is a product of socialization and language. What we call mind, therefore, develops in each of us through conversations with others, and from that conversational or dialogical nature are derived all the facts relevant to psychology.

But at the same time of having insisted that the mental is a result of mutual cooperation, Dewey had the perspicacity to realize the importance that the Freudian unconscious had for the understanding of the human being. That is why in his only work dedicated to psychoanalytic ideas he devoted himself to a task that probably remains incomplete to this day, namely, that of reconciling Freud's intuitions with the idea of the mind as a social product.

In 1918 Dewey gave a lecture at Stanford University which was later published in 1921 under the title Human Nature and Conduct (Dewey 2002) in which he criticized the psychoanalytic conception of instinct or impulse, two words he used as synonyms, and proposed that human impulsivity should be understood from a more intersubjective vision.

Before going into the details of Dewey´s treatment of Freud´s idea, it must be noted that when philosophers write about psychology, they always do so from an established conception of what the human being is. Thus, when Sartre wrote about emotions, or Merleau Ponty about perception and behavior, or when Dewey and Russell developed their theories about desire, the unconscious, and impulses, they did so from philosophical anthropology in which the mental state has already been defined.

In the case of Dewey, the anthropological intuition from which he questioned psychoanalysis affirms that what differentiates humans from non-human animals is their ability to share their experiences through language. Human beings, like non-human animals, are involved in a constant process of making changes in their environment. But in the case of humans, it is the faculty of communication through language that makes our relationship with our environment broader and more complex. Language facilitates a higher level of coordination and therefore more complex changes in the surroundings. From the perspective of the individual, thanks to communication through language, my interaction with the environment necessarily incorporates the experience that other people have had with things that I have not experienced. I no longer only respond to things around me based on my past experience but also based on what others have lived and told me. The world of others is therefore necessarily present in my world and my actions. My expectations, my feelings, and my thoughts are, from their root, constructed with the content of communications with my human colleagues. Says Dewey:

> Activity is psycho-physical, but not "mental", that is, it is not aware of meanings. As life is a character of events in a certain peculiar condition of organization, and "feeling" is a quality of life forms marked by complexly mobile and discriminatory responses, so "mind" is an additional property assumed by a living creature, when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication. Then the qualities of feeling become significant of objective differences in external things and of episodes past and to come. This state of things, in which qualitatively different feelings are not on just had but significant of objective differences, is mind. Feelings are no longer just felt. They have and they make *sense*; record and prophecy. (Dewey *Experience and Nature.* 1958: 258.)

Thus Dewey defines the mind as the ability that allows us to share with our fellow humans what we feel and see and, through these acts of communication, to endow things with objective characteristics. To have a mind is to know oneself as a being that lives immersed in that network of shared meanings.

When the mental is understood in this way, the dualism mind-body or mind-brain is dissolved. Mind and body are not two distinct realities, nor are they two causally connected "spheres of being". Mental is just a more complex level of coordination than that of a simple living organism. On this point, that of the relationship of the mind with the brain, Dewey also coincides with philosophers and physiologists who

are critics of neuroscience fashion in the 21st century. For him, the explanation of a behavior or a mental process such as thought and affectivity should not be located in any region of the brain. Postulating that precise knowledge of what happens at the most basic level, such as neuronal movements, is enough to understand the so-called “higher” mental functions, such as thinking, feeling, or planning, is a mistake. Knowledge of brain functioning can help to understand, but in no way explains rationality or affectivity. Rather, we must understand rationality and affectivity as ways in which human beings act to modify the environment or ways of reacting to accidents and surprises that we find around us. The brain, Dewey said correctly, learns. Logically, or conceptually, that is, in the order of explanation, first there are actions to adapt or modify the environment, and then there are brain functions.

For Dewey, neither the mind nor the brain is therefore something like a pantry within us containing memories, impulses, and thoughts that affect the body and guide behavior. The mind for Dewey is the ability to do things using the experience accumulated by our fellow humans and to use abstract ideas.

Given these two facts—first, that the mind is the ability to use socially constructed meanings and, second, that mind and body are not two distinct realities but rather two levels of organization used to modify the environment—Dewey concludes that we must not seek the truth of psychological concepts within the body nor within a mind conceived as the private Cartesian theater. The essence of psychological concepts should rather be investigated in the external theatre, in the actions of the human being. In the things that people do to change their environment and adapt it to their purposes. Without actions, without behaviors we could say, psychology, even that of the unconscious, is left without its subject matter. According to this way of understanding the mental, it does make sense to speak of an “inner world”, but only if it is understood as constituted by actions interiorized and sedimented in the form of habit.

But the psychology of the first decades of the twentieth century, Dewey thought, was still far from concentrating its gaze on the relationship of the individual to her circumstances. On the contrary, this

psychology lived imprisoned precisely in the opposite idea, which observed only “states of consciousness and inner private life, at the expense of acts that have public significance and that incorporate and demand social relations”. (Dewey 2002: 86) Faced with this state of science, Dewey salutes the emergence of psychoanalysis as an attempt to demolish the psychology we could call “interiorist”, focused on sensations, images, and ideas. According to Dewey, psychoanalysis represents a necessary rebellion against this psychology, due to its focus on “unconscious forces” that determine “not only visible behavior, but also desire, judgment, belief, idealization. (Dewey 2002: 86) Psychoanalysis “points to facts that have the greatest value...(which refer to) the affirmation of the existence and operation of the unconscious, of complexes due to conflicts and contacts with others...” (Dewey: 87). Postulating the existence of the unconscious as constituted by relationships with others is equivalent for Dewey to recognizing the dependence that the mind has on habit and the dependence of habit on social conditions, which of course include interactions with others. One could say that Dewey was then a sort of theoretician of object relations *avant la lettre.*

However, Dewey believes that psychoanalysis did not fulfill its promise. By emphasizing the role that conflicts and contacts with others have in the psychic life of people, Freud took the initial step of showing that mind and world are not far apart realities. He did not, however, complete the task of demolishing the ideas that he (Freud) had begun to combat and instead clung to the belief in a psychic realm separate from social practices, so that psychoanalysis, despite the advance that it undoubtedly meant, repeated the errors of traditional psychology. For Dewey, psychoanalysis left unfinished the task of destroying the dominant Cartesian conceptions in psychology. “(Psychoanalysis) obtains its truths from mixed in theory with the false psychology of an original individual consciousness.” (Dewey 2002: 87). What Dewey says about the concept of impulse can therefore be read as a suggestion about the path that Freud's heirs should have followed.

As has been said, these conferences took place in 1918 and were published in 1921. Freud had already presented the so-called “metapsychological writings”, in which he explained his theories of drives and in 1920 he would publish *Beyond the Principle of Pleasure* and in 1923 *The ego and the id.* These lectures were delivered and then published, therefore, precisely at a time when the founder of psychoanalysis was developing his most important thoughts on the drive. Dewey does not specifically cite any of Freud's work and speaks of psychoanalysis without referring to a particular work. However, the mode of rehearsal that these conferences have takes away neither rigor nor penetration.

Dewey's criticisms of the conception of impulse sustained by psychoanalysis are:

a) Although human beings display instinctive behaviors at birth, the impulses of human beings are the product of socialization. Interaction with others places these primary and chaotic impulses in context and gives them meaning, as Loewald also understood.
b) It is not scientific to restrict the original activities of the human being to a fixed number of instincts. If we confront this assertion with psychoanalytic theory, according to Dewey, it is wrong to think that a person's behavior can be described or explained through specific instincts, such as the instincts of “death” and “life”. A correct observation of behavior would reveal that there are as many types of instincts as there is time to deploy them and that there are as many people-specific reactions as there are stimuli. A list of instinct “classes” would be so long that it would make no sense to talk about impulse classes. Darwinian philosophers agreed with Dewey almost a century later.
c) The premise that all instincts can be classified into a few classes leads to the fallacy that the self is something established and simple. When the self is conceived as something in constant movement and development, when it is understood that the self is something that is being constituted at every moment, the idea that the human mind harbors instincts classifiable in a few classes is abandoned.

d) Finally, the idea that there are “motives”, understood as mental events that precede and cause the behavior, is also a type of confusion.

It is not difficult to see in these ideas the anticipation of the criticisms that the philosophy of the 20th century has directed against traditional psychology and psychoanalysis in relation to impulses. Heidegger's heirs such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and analytical philosophers Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein, to mention just four authors covering a good range of the spectrum of trends in philosophy of psychology, agreed with Dewey on at least one of the following points: socialization is necessary for the constitution of the psychological responses that we call impulsive; impulse and conduct are not two logically independent events; and in every impulse, which otherwise always acts in concurrence with other impulses, a kind of proto-knowledge that the person has of his environment is already incorporated.

Dewey does not offer in any of his writings a scholastic definition of what “impulse” is and rather uses this term in accordance with the assumption that in the behavior of the newborn there are reactions that cannot be considered anything other than natural or instinctive. What Dewey wants to warn is that such instincts have always interacted with the environment. Without that interaction, those impulses would become useless and the infant would die. What we know as sexual or aggressive impulses is the result of that interaction between, on the one hand, the primitive, inarticulate, and dispersed reactions of a newborn, and, on the other hand, an environment. Such was Lowewald's assertion three decades later. When the child learns what effects his actions have on his environment we say that the community has taught the child the meaning of his impulses. What happens then, according to Dewey, is that from now on it is no longer possible to separate in a scientific study the primitive and original impulse from the child's ever-increasing knowledge of the meaning of his actions. That meaning and the ability to anticipate consequences are part of the logic of the episodes we call impulses. For this reason, according to Dewey, it should not be maintained, as some contemporary psychoanalytic currents do, that the impulse or

instinct has a natural, biological, and non-cognitive part that subsists throughout life next to a conceptual or linguistic part that provides the meaning.

Two beliefs, also mistaken according to our author, usually derive from the idea that the impulse is only a natural or pre-social force: that instincts act separately and that there is a finite number of kinds of instincts. According to the first belief that Dewey fights, each person's action would be caused by an instinct or impulse that acts alone. “We still have a tendency to consider sex, hunger, fear and even more complex interests as if they were total forces, such as combustion or gravity in the old physical science”. (Dewey 2002: 150) But, Dewey adds, only in the case of a human being on the verge of starvation is hunger a natural, “pure” impulse, without the presence of other instincts. Because each impulsive behavior encounters different circumstances and the effects on the environment of that behavior are on each occasion different, the actions of the human being involved in most cases an amalgam of different impulses.

The second belief of Freudians that is incorrect according to Dewey is that there are “classes” of instincts, i.e. that impulses can be classified into two or three types. Dewey believes instead that what gives each impulse the quality that distinguishes it from others, what gives them their true content, are the circumstances in which the impulsive behavior unfolds and the consequences that impulse has on the person's environment. Fear of planes, fear of exams, and fear of ghosts may share some physical responses, but they are different reactions. Each of these acts has different interactions with other acts and each also produces different effects on the person's environment. Each of them is an original response, ad hoc, to each occasion, which is often forgotten by those who want to find the “essence” of certain behaviors, obliterating the novel character of each impulse. The word fear can be used to refer to these three behaviors, but it is a mistake to put aside their important differences. And what applies to fear also applies to anger, hunger, or sex.

> The notion that anger is a separate force is lazy mythology. Even in cases of hunger and sex, where the channels of action are clearly demarcated by background conditions, i.e. by "nature", the actual content and meaning of hunger and sex are indefinitely varied, according to their different social contexts. In fact, each reaction takes place in a different environment and its meaning is never the same because differences in the environment produce different consequences. It is only mythology that proposes a single and unique psychic force that causes all reactions... (Dewey 2002: 153-154.)

What we feel and think when we are upset, hungry, or live a sexual desire depends on the context and the objects on which we act these impulses. There is no sensation that is the essence of hunger, sex, anger, or aggression.

The same reason that pushed psychology and psychoanalysis to postulate separate instincts has also led these disciplines to hypostatize "motives" of behavior, a concept that is presented as an event that can be understood in isolation. These alleged motives, says Dewey, are nothing more than value judgments issued on children. "The concept of motive is the result of the human effort to influence people's behavior." (Dewey 2002: 119). Imagine, he says, that a child takes a piece of food in our presence and puts it in his mouth. The way he does it is unpleasant to us and then we say that the reason for his conduct is voracity. With the attribution of that motive, voracity, what we want is for you to refrain from doing so. Another child can lend his things easily, and since we want to encourage that behavior, we attribute the reason for "generosity" to him. It is the error, in which psychoanalysis also incurs, (Dewey 2002: 152) of turning the social consequences of behavior into a psychic "cause". The motives then are not mental events that cause the behaviors. They are rather value judgments of human actions for pedagogical purposes, some would say, of behavior control or surveillance, others would say, under Foucault's influence.

The erroneous belief in the existence of a few kinds of instincts and motives of conduct originates an idea, also wrong according to our author, of a fixed self. This distortion conceives the self as something that is

already done, a kind of depository or reservoir of impulses, and not as something permanently constituted. When one conceives, as does traditional psychology and in some cases psychoanalysis, the self as something already established, one thinks of impulses as defined things that act in the “service” of that self. Dewey, on the other hand, postulates personality as something in constant motion and impulses as “an adventure in the process of discovering a self that is possible but not yet realized, an experiment in creating a self that will be more inclusive than currently exists”. (Dewey 2002: 139).

Nor is the body a storehouse of pre-social impulses. Human nature demarcates certain channels of action, particularly with hunger, thirst, and sex, but the variety of circumstances in which these stimuli are satisfied means that the real impulse is in the circumstances in which it takes place. Thus Dewey expresses the position that he had articulated in various writings over the years: the mind-body problem, namely, that (the whole) body is “the organ of the mind”. (Dewey 1963). In other words, actions are prior to neurophysiology in the order of explanation. What the mind, i.e. the use of meanings, enables an organism is to influence its environment in a more complex and creative way. Dewey gives the example of two organisms burned with fire. A child, just like an animal, will avoid fire after being burned. But the child, unlike the animal, and by virtue of the fact that it participates in communication with its fellow beings, can, in addition to protecting itself, respond to fire in a playful, curious, or investigative way, so that fire becomes part of other new interactions. Thought and deliberation are functions that produce new and more complex consequences in the relationship of the organism with the environment.

As is evident, Dewey's ideas about the impulsivity of human beings already contain some of the innovations introduced by the so-called intersubjective twist in psychoanalysis. Dewey, however, did not think it convenient, as the psychoanalysts of the intersubjective school (e.g. Storolow) do, to eliminate the use of the word impulse or drive and replace it with the word “affection”. This radical position of the intersubjective writers is a consequence of the false dilemma in which they have put themselves, in trying to find which is that other thing that should take the privileged place that has the drive in classical theory.

And this false dilemma is in turn a consequence of the mechanistic remnants that seem to exist in almost all psychoanalytic currents. These remnants push to see the structure of human motivation as a mechanism composed of parts, and when one part is not so convincing, as in the case of the drive, must be replaced by another. On the other hand, Dewey prefers to understand actions and what motivates them as processes in which the supposed "parts" (i.e. stimulus, impulse, behavior) only exist in the analysis, but not in reality. The reality in an action is the whole and if it is convenient to postulate the existence of atomic particles of this whole, it is only from the perspective of study, as a heuristic resource we could say. These particles don't exist if you isolate them.

I am going to propose that the writings of Dewey and then those of Wittgenstein were decisive in generating an intersubjective vision of the mind in psychoanalysis and psychology in general.

However, the idea we might call the opposite, namely that of a pre-social nature of impulses has been very attractive not only to 20th-century psychoanalysts but also to some philosophers. This other position, against which Dewey's writings and more relationally inspired psychoanalysts stand, was cultivated by Freud, is followed by contemporary psychoanalysts (Green, Kernberg, Bion) and was partially shared by another great philosopher, contemporary of Dewey and Freud: Bertrand Russell.

k) Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell is another of the figures of 20th-century philosophy who believed, like his friend Dewey, that without taking seriously the idea of unconscious and particularly unconscious desire any psychological theory remains incomplete.

In his book *The Analysis of Mind* published in 1921, he proposes to redefine the traditional concepts of psychology from a perspective that overcomes the dualism of mind and matter. One of the psychological concepts Russell devotes most attention to is Freud's recently discovered unconscious desire. Russell

believes he can understand the nature of what unconscious desires are if he uses the conceptual instruments of William James (whose *Principles of Psychology* had dazzled him), David Hume's empiricism, and John Watson's behaviorism.

Although Russell's commentators have already pointed out the great difficulties inherent in this conceptual fusion[7], it must be pointed out that only a thinker as original as he was could attempt to reconcile behaviorism with psychoanalysis. Russell thought that psychoanalysis would have faced less resistance and less distrust if Freud and his followers had used a behavioral language, based on the description of observable behaviors, to postulate the idea of unconscious functioning. And that's precisely what he set out to do.

The third chapter of the book is entitled "Desire and Feeling". In it, Russell tries to answer three questions: what is desire, how can we understand unconscious desires and what explanation can we give to the phenomenon of self-deception, which is a phenomenon that is associated with the concept of unconscious desire and on which much of psychoanalytic theory revolves. In his answer to the first question, Russell departs somewhat from Freud, since his purpose is to define desire using only a behavioral language. In his answer to the second question, Russell coincides in some respects with what Freud had said at that time, to the point that one can conjecture an influence of Freud, through his *Metapsychological Writings,* on Russell. I will return to this influence at the end of this section. Regarding the third question, the one referring to self-deception, Russell, while agreeing with some points made by Freud, wants to question the idea that repression, psychoanalytically understood, is the only explanation for the fact that in many cases human beings do not know the true motives that guide them. As in the case of Dewey, we are not here either before a work that thoroughly explores the texts of the creator of psychoanalysis. The absence of vast quotations, however, does not diminish the strength of this criticism.

[7] For instance Anthony Kenny in *Action, Emotion and Will.*

Russell asserted that Freud has secured an important place in the history of thought by highlighting the influence of unconscious desires on people's lives and by bringing to light the connection between dreams, irrational beliefs, and absurd actions on the one hand and these unconscious desires on the other. But while recognizing these decisive contributions to the understanding of the human being, Russell also regrets that psychoanalysts have not explained what unconscious desires consist of. Instead of doing so, psychoanalysts have surrounded their ideas with an "air of mystery and mythology that explains much of their popular appeal" (Russell 1989: 26) "One of the merits of the general analysis of the mind in which we will be concerned in the following chapters" says Russell referring to what he is going to propose, "is to remove the air of mystery from the phenomenon to which psychoanalysis has drawn our attention. The mystery is charming but it is not scientific, because (the mystery) depends on ignorance" (Russell 1989: 28). The scientific potential of psychoanalysis, Russell thinks, would develop best if psychoanalytic writing cultivated clarity and simplicity, which are precisely the characteristics of the authors of the tradition of analytical philosophy of which Russell is one of the founders. This critique of the unnecessary mystery that abounds in the texts of psychoanalysts ("repulsive and often rather wild theories of the psychoanalytic pioneers". Russell: 1989: 23) has value today. Writing about the unconscious does not force us to cultivate either mystery or argumentative disorder.

The discovery of unconscious desires made by psychoanalysis demonstrates for Russell that desire is not "something existing in our minds, but a causal law of our actions". (Russell 1989: 46) The concept of desire must therefore be taken as a "fiction"—as is the concept of force in mechanical physics—suitable for describing the laws of human behavior. When the word fiction is used as Russell uses it in this context what is meant is that there is nothing, no event that occurs in space and time that we can designate with the word desire. What does exist and what we can observe and catalog is human being behavior, and to capture and explain those behaviors it seems necessary to invent a concept, that of "desire", to formulate the causal laws that govern those behaviors. In other words, the concept of "desire" has for Russell the

status that a theoretical term has in any other science. It does not refer to observables and derives its meaning from its role in explaining empirical regularities.

Russell's starting point is that there is a similarity between animals and humans, and what we can observe in the behavior of animals serves to explain their (i.e animals) behavior. The movements of animals offer a simpler presentation of the phenomena characteristic of the human mind so it is possible to reconstruct the traditional concepts of psychology, and the non-traditional such as unconscious desire, starting from the observation of animal behavior.

From the daily observation of animals, Russell infers the existence of what he calls the “Behaviour Cycle”. This word refers to voluntary movements that have a beginning and cease when the animal has achieved a purpose. The “purpose” is that which once obtained puts an end to the movements of the animal. Russell says that “wanting” is the animal's attitude toward the purpose of the behavior cycle. We watch an animal move from one side to the other. After he finds food and eats it, he stops moving. We then say that the animal “wanted” food and that the motivating stimulus that initiated and set in motion the animal's behavioral cycle was hunger.

In humans, the beginning of this behavioral cycle is an “unpleasant” sensation of “discomfort” that pushes people into activity. John Locke said something along these lines, referring to the uneasiness (Locke 1975: Chapter XXI. $ 31) that defines desire. Russell as well may have been influenced by Freud´s idea of “unbound energy” when he says that when we experience that sensation we do not know which object will silence the displeasure. This means that when displeasure sets in motion the cycle of behavior the person does not have in mind what he or she needs to placate that displeasure. That is why Russell says that all desires (desire and wishes are the words he uses as synonyms) are “to begin with, unconscious” and “only become conscious when they are “actively perceived” (Russell 1989: 27). To be actively perceived means that the primitive part of desire is coupled with the true belief in what it is that will cease

the discomfort or restlessness of the person. If experience has not taught the individual what it is that will calm her, the desire remains unconscious. In Russell's scheme and in what again seems to be an appropriation of psychoanalytic ideas, unconscious desires remain and cause this discomfort, “seeking” alternative ways of expression (Russell 1989: 57-58). The process by which the unconscious becomes conscious has a certain resemblance in both authors. While for Freud it is the “encounter” of unconscious impulses with words that manages his passage to consciousness, for Russell it is successful experiences that allow unconscious desire to be coupled with his conscious part. In relation to that non-cognitive, unconscious part of desire, Russell says:

> The primitive, non-cognitive element of desire seems to be a push rather than an attraction, a force that pushes me away from the real (from the context in which I am unfolding) rather than an attraction to the ideal. Some sensations and mental events have a property that I call *discomfort.* These sensations cause those bodily movements that are likely to lead to their disappearance. (1989: 52. My emphasis.)

For Freud, the mark of the desires is unpleasure, for Russell it is discomfort.

Since the two parts of desire—the essential (primitive) and the cognitive—have a causal and contingent relationship, it often happens that human beings make mistakes about which object appeases desire. And it is this mistake, and not the conflict related to the Freudian superego, that is the most frequent reason for what (mistakenly according to our author) we call a self-deception. Russell says, surprisingly, that erotic desire can lead to mistakes, and in fact leads to mistakes, when it comes to people who have little experience in their satisfaction. In the same way, I can feel a restlessness or an uneasiness and eat an apple thinking that this way the uneasiness ceases. But it may happen that it is not an apple but an orange that would have calmed me down, so the desire to eat an orange will remain unconscious. The most common reason desires remain unconscious is not an internal censor, Russell says, but that all desires are, to begin with, unconscious, and not always do people acquire the knowledge of what will truly calm the uneasiness.

Naturally, for Russell this radically cognitive explanation does not cover all cases of ignorance about one's own desires. He could not overlook cases in which there is a motivation in the person to hide from himself his motives for conduct. These are those situations that “with some property, it could be called self-deception” that Russell explains in a way that coincides with the psychoanalytic ideas of psychic conflict, super-ego, and secondary gain. They occur when the person does not want to know about any of her feelings or desires because they collide with what she wants to think of herself. The strategy that human beings use on these occasions is to replace the desires that we do not want to admit with secondary, “invented” desires. What often happens, Russell tells us, is that these secondary desires, which arose to disguise the primaries, acquire a certain authenticity, that is, they become somehow genuine although they will never have the strength of the primaries.

This explanation of self-deception is illustrated by the example of a person who has been rejected by a lover. This person is not going to admit desires for revenge on the lover who rejected him. The desire for revenge will remain unconscious because it is inadmissible for this person to acknowledge it, and its only manifestation will be that discomfort that constitutes for Russell the fundamental characteristic of unconscious desires. This rejected person will look for ways to get rid of that discomfort and find substitute ways (to travel the world, to cultivate knowledge about art, or to live a solitary life) as channels to appease the primary desire for revenge. The interesting thing about Russell's explanation, which approximates it to the psychoanalytic posture, is that this desire for revenge, although unconscious, remains “there” so that in “moments of uncontrol, under the influence of sleep, alcohol or delirium” (Russell 1989: 57) the person will say things that would inflict suffering upon whom destroyed his heart. Moreover, the influence of unconscious desire will be felt in the fact that those substitute desires (in this example to travel the world, to be a connoisseur of art, or to live a life of solitude) will not be so gratifying precisely because, despite having acquired a certain genuineness, they are not as authentic or as intense as the primary desires, which in this case is seeing the rejecting lover suffer.

In short, for Russell desire is made up of two parts. The essential or primitive, which is a discomfort that pushes the person to actions whose goal is to appease him (to discomfort). This component of desire, which Russell at times calls “instinct,” resembles the “unbound psychic energy” and the “force” (Drang) of which Freud speaks. The other part of desire, according to Russell, is the cognitive one that has to do with the beliefs - product of experience - of which are the objects of the external world that will eliminate discomfort. The desires that have not found their true object of satisfaction are unconscious. Desires are conscious when the person knows which objects eliminate unrest.

Russell avoided giving desire an ontological dimension other than that of a convenient fiction to explain certain things, in the manner of a theoretical term in any other science. Freud, on the other hand, tinkered in his writings with the idea that the drive had a reality, a substance that occasionally he considered to be an organic reality. Hence he has complicated and obscured his conception of the drive by making it an important part of the dualism with which he conceived the relationship of mind and body.

Dewey's and Russell's positions coincide with the two positions that today debate the drive within the psychoanalytic field. In one of the positions are those who, following a path similar to that of Dewey, have underlined the decisive importance and almost exclusive influence of experience and relationships with others in our instinctive life. To this position belong psychoanalysts relations, intersubjective, and some identified with the theory of object relations. On the other side are those who interpret the idea of drive in a way similar to Russell's, in the sense of considering that drive and object are two separate things and in thinking that drives are the cause of many behaviors that must be understood as bodily processes.

The intersubjective conceptions of the mind received a very strong, decisive, one might say, impulse from the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The second part of his work (usually referred to by the expressions “late Wittgenstein” or “second Wittgenstein”) is a critique of some of the dominant ideas in psychology, especially how the relations between the internal world-external world and between mind

and body were understood. We can situate this critique as a radicalization as well as a deepening of some of Dewey's ideas. The primordial role that social rules and conventions have in the constitution and in the functioning of our subjectivity was put in the foreground by this brilliant philosopher. Contemporary authors such as Jurgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and Marcia Cavell have taken Wittgenstein's ideas to reinterpret psychoanalytic theory. It is also a known fact that Wittgenstein believed that his philosophical method, which he called “therapy”, had similarities with psychoanalysis, which reinforces the conjecture that Freud's shadow was present in one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century.

l) Wittgenstein

One of the most important philosophical interests of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) throughout his life was the nature of language and the relationship of language to the world. This interest took different forms and approaches in each of the two periods into which commentators have divided their work. In the second period, which goes from his writings of the 1930s to his death, which includes the very influential *Philosophical Investigations,* he analyzes the psychological concepts— we could say he deconstructs them—and along this path attacks a “traditional” or Cartesian vision of subjectivity. The idea that our mind is for each one of us a scenario in which thoughts, emotions, memories, or desires appear and that when we express these thoughts, emotions, etc we are describing this private scenario that nobody else can see is a “Cartesian” conception, shared by various currents within psychoanalysis, which Wittgenstein fought.

The Blue Book (Wittgenstein 1958) inaugurates the second phase of Wittgenstein's work. Russell's theory of desire that I discussed in the last chapter and psychoanalytic ideas are used as targets of that conception of mind that Wittgenstein contests. The references to psychoanalysis in this work, which are

three and very brief, could give the impression of being there fulfilling only one analogical function. In other words, it might seem that Wittgenstein is saying something like: “just as Russell was wrong when he said x, in a similar way psychoanalysts say x...” or “the controversy between solipsists and realists is due to a lack of clarity in the terms used, in a way similar to how psychoanalysts are confused in the use of their own terms. But the allusions to psychoanalysis in this book reveal instead that Wittgenstein was interested in Freud's theses and understood that the new conception of the mental state that he exposes there should be able to accommodate the unconscious. In no other book does Wittgenstein show such a positive assessment of the potential of psychoanalysis as in *The Blue Book.*

The gloss that follows is more detailed with Russell's ideas than with psychoanalysis because that is how it is in the book. But without understanding the flaws Wittgenstein sees in Russell's theory of desire it is impossible to understand what he believes needs correction in psychoanalysis.

Wittgenstein thought that both the psychoanalytic and Russell's theories rest on the mistaken assumption that states of mind, such as feelings or desires, are logically independent of behaviors. He thought rather that the concepts that we use to describe our motivations, such as desire, necessarily include the ends that we pursue and the behaviors that we deploy to achieve those ends. Therefore, Wittgenstein agreed with Dewey that “thinking”, “feeling” or “remembering” are ways of behaving, they are ways of interacting with the world and with others.

To put this idea another way: psychological verbs always describe actions, or potential actions if you will, and not psychic objects that can be isolated. That is why when a person says “I want x” or “I doubt that y”, that person is not reporting the result or conclusions of introspection, because there is no internal psychological object that can be described abstracting it from the circumstances. These expressions are rather descriptions of what the person is doing. Desire or think or love or doubt are behaviors, abilities. Says Wittgenstein:

> Disorienting parallelism: psychology treats processes in the psychic sphere as physical processes in the physical sphere. Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, wanting are not objects of psychology in the same sense that body movements, electrical phenomena, etc. are objects of physics. You see this in that the physicist sees, hears these phenomena, reflects on them, communicates them to us, while the psychologist observes the manifestations (the behavior) of the subject. (Wittgenstein 1951: 571)

Wittgenstein's philosophical method, which is considered revolutionary, consists of analyzing our use of words. If the philosophical problem in front of us is the nature of the mind and if, for example, we want to understand the concept of desire, this method prescribes studying how we use the word desire or its synonyms, such as "I want" or "I yearn". This is what Wittgenstein called studying the "grammar" of a word. It is a method massively used in the analytical philosophy of the mind. Important writers of this tradition such as Anthony Kenny, author of the magnificent *Action, Emotion and Will,* Donald Davidson, and John Searle, among many others, have embraced this methodology.

In this regard, Stanley Cavell has provided a beautiful defense of the idea that this method, that of investigating everyday expressions, betrays a connection between Freud and Wittgenstein. Accordingly, Wittgenstein's examination of the utterances of daily life responds to the fact that the nature of self-knowledge is "one of the great subjects of the *(Philosophical) Investigations*" (Stanley Cavell 1969: 68). So it was in Freud's works, of course. If we follow Stanley Cavell[8], rather than saying that language and its relationship to the world was Wittgenstein's main philosophical interest, which is somehow true, it is more faithful to the second part of his work (of Wittgenstein´s) to say that its main interest is the exploration of the human condition, and more specifically of the presuppositions and the difficulties which occur when persons pursue knowledge of themselves. To explore this subject Wittgenstein proceeds, much as did Freud, by paying close attention to the homeliest of human beings´ utterances and with it to "the role of feeling in speech and conduct." (Stanley Cavell 69). In addition, this focus on self-knowledge, I take Stanley Cavell to be suggesting, should be seen as implying a subtle protest from Wittgenstein

[8] The insistence on referring to him by his first name is aimed at avoiding confusions with Marcia Cavell, whose work I discuss in the next chapter.

against the indifference of modern philosophy to this topic and as a rejection of the too abstract picture of humans embrace by modern culture and by certain currents in the sciences of man. This is a picture that tends to obliterate the particularity and irreplaceability of each human being[9].

Applying the procedure of exploring everyday language to Russell's theory of desire, Wittgenstein says that one can use the word “desire” per this theory. It's possible to say “I want something but I don't know what I want”. But this use is by no means the only or the most common. (Wittgenstein 1958: 22) In most cases, it is absurd to ask someone if they know what they want because desire is not, typically, a mental entity whose content one infers. Just as when we express a judgment we do not usually discover what we have thought and then communicate it to another, neither in desire is there usually a previous inquiry, prior to the expression of desire. Most of the time we express our desires without major cognitive work or looking at the evidence. It could be said that when we say what we want the expression of desire comes up without cognitive effort. “Desire seems to already know what will satisfy it or would satisfy it; proposition, thought, what makes it true, though it is not there at all!” (Wittgenstein 1951: 437) Gilbert Ryle coined the English expression Avowal to capture this idea of Wittgenstein and to refer to these speech acts where we give spontaneous, determined, and effortless expression to our desires, thoughts, or sensations. It is a word widely used by those working in the field of philosophy of mind in North America and the United Kingdom. Avowal can be an equivalent of the German words Ausdruck and AuSerung that Wittgenstein used. The Spanish translator of *The Concept of Mind,* (Ryle 1949) Ryle's famous book, has chosen “Expresión Espontánea”, which seems an adequate translation. The doubts one may have regarding one's own desires, which for Russell seem to be the general rule, are for Wittgenstein the least frequent cases. And the verb “to desire” derives its meaning from the typical cases, those in which without

[9] See Crary about a similar claim. She includes in her reflection the plight of simple minded beings. (Crary 2009) For expansion of the moral dimension of this aspect of Wittgenstein philosophy, see Axel Honneth´s *Reification. A new look at an old idea.* (Honneth 2008) Honneth uses Stanley Cavell´s writings for this expansion.

hesitation we say what we want. For Wittgenstein, avowals are a demonstration of the intimate relationship—a logical, conceptual relationship—that exists between our internal world and our actions. The investigation of psychological concepts must therefore be an investigation that pays attention, we would say greater attention, to our behaviors and social practices, to our "ways of life".

This schematic presentation of his ideas would seem to bring Wittgenstein too close to the positions of philosophical behaviorism. This is a charge that he answered in a subsequent writing to the *Blue Book.* In Philosophical Investigations, his imaginary interlocutor asks him if he is not a "concealed behaviorist" (308), to which Wittgenstein replies that he does not want to deny the existence of internal mental processes as behaviorists do. His criticism is rather directed at the fact that, without thinking about it, we attribute to the "mental processes" a certain nature. Or rather, we investigate the facts of psychology assuming that we already know what mental processes are like and what they are made of, but it is this assumption that plays against us. What he proposes is that we examine the analogies that serve us, or we believe that serve us, to understand the relationship of our thoughts to our actions. It is these analogies, these models taken from other spheres of knowledge, which, if not reflected upon, may cause conceptual confusions in psychology.

According to Wittgenstein, psychoanalysts fall into the same mistake that Russell falls into—namely, creating a hiatus between mind and behavior—when they postulate that the difference between an unconscious desire and a conscious desire is like the difference between a chair I can see and one I can't see because something covers it.

For Wittgenstein, it cannot be denied that psychoanalysis has discovered a new category of behaviors, but psychoanalysts are wrong to assert that unconscious thoughts or desires are the same as conscious thoughts and desires except that they are hidden:

> Psychoanalysts, on the other hand, were confused by their own way of expressing themselves and led to believe that they had done more than discover new psychological reactions; they were pushed to believe, in a sense, that they had discovered conscious thoughts that were unconscious. (Wittgenstein 1958, p 57)

Psychoanalysts have not realized that their contribution to psychology is a new concept, the unconscious, necessary to understand behaviors or reactions that before Freud had not been systematically observed. They mistakenly believe, always according to Wittgenstein, that the unconscious is a kind of scientific discovery, i.e. they believe that they have discovered a special variety of desires and thoughts as a botanist can discover a variety of a plant.

From what Wittgenstein says it can be inferred that Freud and his followers were pushed into this error by conceiving the mind as a "special medium" (a "queer medium") a kind of immaterial substance where there are emotions, thoughts, desires that resemble physical objects but are impalpable. This happens because when the mental state is detached from actions it is easy to fall into the temptation to reify the words that allude to mental phenomena, to think these phenomena as if they were things and from there, there is not much to travel to think that the unconscious contents are like the conscious ones, only that they are in a deeper place of our mind. Psychoanalysts would not have made this mistake if they had understood that thinking, feeling, or wishing "are not disembodied processes" (Wittgenstein 1951: 339). Instead, they considered the unconscious contents as incorporeal entities, something like ghosts inside a machine that would be our body.

The unquestionable achievement of Freud and his followers to broaden our understanding of the human, by directing our attention to behaviors hitherto unknown or little observed, may be lost if, in speaking of the unconscious, we forget the necessary link that exists between the words we use in psychology (to think, to hear, to love, to desire) and the observable behaviors. This necessary conceptual connection does not mean that a person always has to act when he thinks, wants, or feels something. I can wish for something and not confess it to anyone or lift a finger to reach it. What Wittgenstein means is that these

concepts “to desire”, “to feel”, or “to think” owe their meaning to the actions that are typical when these words are uttered. Human beings invented these words by observing actions, behaviors, and not hidden mental processes. Wittgenstein used the term “life forms” (Lebensform) to refer to this pattern of behaviors, of actions that generate our linguistic conventions. That's why, when we teach children these words, we allude to those characteristic behaviors. Dewey says something similar: “Thinking and desiring, no matter how subjective they may be, are preliminary, tentative and inarticulate modes of action. They are ostensive (visible) behaviors, with a communicated and public form, (but) in the process of construction.” (Dewey 1958: 221). The implicit conclusion in these ideas is that in order to investigate unconscious desire one must study the behaviors that are characteristic of unconscious desire (or feeling or thinking) and look with distrust at the fact that we use the same word, “desire,” to refer to conscious desire and unconscious desire. A superficial similarity, as the Wittgensteinian arguments say, cannot be taken as proof of a common essence. It can be thought, from Wittgenstein's critique, that a language richer and more precise than ours would create new words to refer to unconscious contents.

Although Wittgenstein was a philosopher who exercised more in showing “some or other simple nonsense (and the bumps) that understanding has made by colliding with the limits of language”, (1951: 119) i.e. in showing the entanglements into which philosophy or science falls when it does not clarify its concepts, there is a phrase from him, posed as a question, which has been taken by some analytical philosophers as a positive definition of the concept of the unconscious:

> Should we say that there are cases in which one man despises another and does not know it; or should we describe these cases by saying that he does not despise it but involuntarily behaves towards it in a certain way - the tone of voice for example - which usually accompanies contempt? (*The Blue Book:* 30)

I am going to suggest that a motive for behavior that appears in what the person does or thinks, but that the person cannot verbally articulate at that moment is the mode of expression that Wittgenstein thought was the least problematic for talking about unconscious desires. I will also propose that this idea has been

taken up by the philosophers McIntyre, Finkelstein, and Habermas as the starting point for a definition of the unconscious. Although for many psychoanalysts this definition would be too aseptic and with an unacceptable behavioral air, I am proposing that here lies the most productive aspect of Wittgenstein's critique of the discipline created by Freud. If these considerations are plausible, the true “depth” that psychoanalysis must reach is not hidden in invisible processes or mental states and without any connection with actions, much less in presumed events that occur in the brain, but in actions, thoughts, or feelings whose motives are not what the person can declare. And he cannot do so not out of insincerity, but because something in his inner world prevents him from telling himself, and others, the true motive for his conduct. It is in trying to explain this discrepancy, unnoticed by the person himself, that lies the genuine contribution of psychoanalysis to the human sciences.

One consequence of accepting this definition of unconscious contents is that one of Wittgenstein's own postulates about the epistemology of psychology, which states that behavior must be explained in teleological terms, loses its ground. Because if there are feelings or beliefs that the person is not aware of but motivate his reactions, there is no other way of conceiving the relationship between unknown motive—that is to say unconscious motive—and behavior than as a causal relationship. The teleological or hermeneutic explanation of actions, i.e. the explanation it seeks to interpret instead of finding causal relationships, is based on the person's description of his motives. If the person does not know why they are doing what they are doing, the “real” motive for the behavior acts as a cause.

Now, Wittgenstein recognized, without deepening, that the spontaneous expression of desires does not always occur and that sometimes the expression of a desire is possible only after a moment of self-inquiry or introspection, however episodic this may be. In other words, there are occasions when the person “discovers” her desires. These are desires that were unconscious or, most of the time, what psychoanalysis calls “preconscious”. Its existence demonstrates that self-observation can discover some

of our motives for action. Moreover, it is precisely these cases that are of critical importance for psychoanalysis.

I want to argue that one point of integration of the analytical philosophy of the mind with psychoanalysis should be the description and explanation of this process of self-observation, without obliterating two of the most important prohibitions proposed by Wittgenstein's theory: first, introspection should not be understood through a visual model that postulates a kind of inner mental eye. Assuming that the “inner eye” has had disastrous consequences for psychology, such as postulating that the contents of the mind are like things. Second, this kind of introspection should not be seen as the only way people can express their desires. It is perhapas the least frequent.

How then can we conceive of this kind of self-exploration of the contents of the mind? There are in our lives some situations that are candidates to be instances of this concept. One is the observation we make of our own behavior or the observation others make and communicate to us. That is to say, we infer what we want by assuming the point of view of an observer, as when I am surprised by a reaction of my own and I can discover behind it a feeling until then hidden. Something similar often happens in a psychoanalytic process. The patient in analysis may discover some of his wishes based on the observation made by his analyst. Incidentally, these are the most important moments of therapy. When that happens, the patient is observed as someone else would. Wittgenstein admitted this possibility: “...one does not normally say, on the basis of self-observation, “I desire”... However, you can sometimes perceive or discover a desire through the observation of your own reactions”. (Wittgenstein 1980. 3 Emphasis on the original). One has to assume that this remark points to the observation he made years earlier in *The Blue Book,* in the sense that unconscious motives manifest themselves when there is a dissonance between what the person does and what the person declares to be his motives. One can therefore think back on one's reactions or to one’s verbal behavior—or listen to what another says about one's actions—and recognize as one's own, motives that were previously unknown to oneself.

But while admitting the possibility of discovering desires through self-observation, Wittgenstein warns that it is a mistake to ask whether the desire discovered by self-observation is the same thing as the desire that one spontaneously articulates. “If you ask me now: do you recognize the same thing in this case as in the case you express spontaneously? Then there's already an error in the question.” (As if someone were asking, ‘Is the chair I see the same chair I can sit in?’) (Wittgenstein 1980: 3) For Wittgenstein, it is a mistake to think that what a person finds when he discovers a hitherto unknown motivation is the 'same thing' as the motive he can now articulate without the need for self-observation or inquiry. It is like believing that the unconscious desire existed as if covered by a kind of veil and that to recognize it and make it conscious consists in removing that veil. This is not so because mental contents are not things that exist within a private theater. There is therefore no common essence to unconscious desire and conscious desire. The essence of the mental contents, what defines them, are the behaviors that are characteristic of them. What has changed after his self-discovery, we could say, is that the person can now declare, if they are sincere, their true motives and that is a change in behavior. The person knows something more about themselves, can explain some past reactions, and now acts in awareness of their true motives.

Unlike the mode of introspection described in the previous paragraph, which is performed through a causal inference, there is another type of self-observation that is not inferential but direct. It is the one that takes through that kind of internal dialogue that can occur when we think. I contend that a complete description of the phenomenon we call “thinking” must include something like words pronounced inside, something of an internal dialogue rehearsal that takes place, for example before performing unusual actions. It happens that on some of these occasions the person can “hear himself talk” and in that way know motives that before one had not noticed. In this case, it is about the self-observation of something very specific. It is “listening” to fragments of that internal discourse that in many cases precedes actions.

The “inner discourse” is not a mysterious entity. It's been raised by psychologists and philosophers. For example, Peter Carruthers, writing under the frame of evolutionary psychology, says that “It may be that

in modern human beings there is a different form of speech essay...a speech essay that one can deploy quickly and unconsciously for much of regular communication, resorting only to an openly conscious essay when greater cognitive effects need to be predicted". (Carruthers) In the course of evolution humans have developed skills that allow them to predict the consequences of their actions. One of them is to privately "rehearse" what one might say in a situation. Carruthers' idea is that these essays occur frequently in our lives and that they are part of the phenomenon of thinking. And as Carruthers describes them, pieces or fragments of these essays that are almost permanent and unconscious can be occasionally "heard" by the person himself.

Despite how cloudy this terrain is for psychological and philosophical research, this inner speech as Carruthers presents it, can be considered as one form of the exteriorization of thinking. This discourse, one can assume, is mostly conscious or easily accessible to consciousness, but it does not seem wrong to think that a part of it corresponds to what psychoanalysis calls preconscious.

If one accepts the existence of these events, one must conclude that it is sometimes possible to "listen" to oneself, that is, to "listen" to oneself without speaking audibly and, on certain occasions, albeit seldomly, to surprise oneself with one's own thoughts and desires. It is this "surprise" that would give a seat to the idea that we may occasionally find ourselves with previously unknown motivations and thoughts. Therefore, we have in the work of Carruthers a way to think of a description of one of those episodes in which a human being can access a part of his motivations at first unknown.

Finally, a third way in which we humans can know desires of our own that are initially hidden, desires, that is, that despite guiding behavior cannot be spontaneously expressed - as most desires can be - but neither can they be inferred from one's own behavior nor "be heard" from the inner language, has to do with the way Russell says the essence of desire has. When we say "I have a wish but I don't know what I want, I miss something but I don't know what I miss" we are, according to Wittgenstein, before

expressions that make sense and belong to a different category than those expressions in which the person knows what he wants. They are objectless desires whose existence cannot be denied and which have been a topic of discussion in analytical psychological philosophy. The authors who have devoted some lines to this phenomenon often associate it with emotions that also lack an object. It is surprising that psychoanalysis has paid little attention to this recurrent fact in our lives.

Aristotle stated that an essential component of emotions and desires is the object to which they are directed. One is afraid of something, and that "of" is critical to understanding the nature of that emotion. Desire is also usually the desire for something, as Wittgenstein pointed out. The Cartesian tradition obliterated this fact, which eventually led experimental investigators of emotions (and some psychoanalysts as well) to conceive desires and emotions as events that took place in a private environment and divorced from the person's environment. When, as a consequence of Brentano's writings and the theoretical revolution that took place in Oxford in the years 30´s and 40´s with the investigations of Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle (some of whose ideas were anticipated by Dewey), it is recovered the Aristotelian idea of the mind as an ability and its contents as part of the actions or necessarily related to actions, philosophy abandoned the notion that a desire or an impulse is an isolated occurrence that can be identified and studied without taking into account the surroundings in which the person is feeling or desiring something. It was established, or reestablished better said, the idea that emotions and desires are about something, that is, are directed towards an aspect or fact of the world. That "about something", that "aboutness", is essential to its definition. You love and hate someone, you doubt something, you fear a situation.

But recognizing the necessary directionality of desires and feelings should not lead to ignoring the fact that on certain occasions there does not *seem* to be any object at which the desire or the emotion is directed. In analytical philosophy, it is said of these mental states that they lack "aboutness". John Searle (Searle 1983) says for example that there are depressions, anxieties, and jubilations (elations) that do not

have an object, that therefore are not about something, such as when I am anxious or depressed without knowing why or about what. Wittgenstein distinguishes directed from undirected emotions and says that we could call "anxiety" (Angst) a fear that has no object. "The Language game of 'I am afraid' already contains the object. 'Anxiety is what undirected fear *might* be called." (Zettel, paragraphs 489. Emphasis in the original). Ned Block has used the orgasm case in his writings as an example of a mental content that represents nothing, that has no directionality, i.e. that has no intentionality. A heroin user would probably say the same thing about his intense experience with that drug. Some authors say that mood is typically a state or mental event without direction.

Charles Taylor, influenced on this point by Heidegger and Merleau Ponty, offers an explanation of objectless feelings and desires which can be complemented with a psychoanalytic explanation. For Taylor, the absence of the object in these feelings or emotions is only apparent. These states reveal what the individual feels about his situation in the world. A fear of something without knowing what is feared reveals that the person perceives his general situation, we could say, as frightening. "To have the feeling of a nameless terror", writes Taylor, "is to have the feeling of a threat for which I cannot find a rational focus in the situation. (Taylor 1985: 42) The feelings that Taylor speaks of in this example, which are those that are usually spoken of in the literature on the subject, are fear and anxiety, which are related to a passive attitude of the person. But nothing prevents extending his explanation to the most active feelings, which give rise to impulses of love and hatred. Thus, undirected desires, those that Russell believes constitute the essence of desire, would also reveal an intuitive, one might say, apprehension that the individual has about him and his relationship to his circumstances.

These experiences may become more intelligible, I suggest, if we help ourselves with the notion, developed by psychoanalysis, of psychic energy. In certain cases, we experience undirected anger. These are cases in which we are "irritable" and we look for a reason or reasons to overturn that anger. It happens when the object of the feeling does not seem to be clear or very rational. Similarly, there are times when

the love impulse is not directed at a particular person. This is probably a more frequent experience in adolescence. Literature and philosophy have accounted for these facts of human life. I am going to propose that what happens in some of the cases, in which the object of desire is difficult to determine, is that we are faced with a naked manifestation of what Freud called psychic energy, a concept that with the aid of Dewey I will try, towards the end of the chapter, to formulate in a clearer and more naturalistic way. Suffice it to say for now that Freud considered that energy as a potential for the action that accompanies every drive and that it is one of its more important constituents (of the drive). If we couple Taylor's explanation of these states of things with the Freudian idea of psychic energy, we could argue that what happens in these cases is a situation (blurredly perceived by the individual) that generates something like a threat of action. This threat, also blurredly perceived by the person himself, is a manifestation of free psychic energy for psychoanalysis towards an end that appears as vanished.

Acknowledging the existence of a “free” psychic energy does not mean affirming that the relationship between desire and object is contingent, that is, that there may be an emotion or a desire that lacks complete directionality. Without that directionality, however hazy it may sometimes be, we would not recognize fear as fear, anxiety as anxiety, a romantic or sexual impulse as such. The Cartesian tradition has led psychology to mistakenly believe that such feelings are recognized by their characteristic sensations. When what really defines those feelings are the thoughts—the beliefs—that constitute them. In some cases, such as those mentioned above, these thoughts cannot be clearly articulated by the person, but if the individual makes the effort to explain what he or she feels, he or she will necessarily make a reference, however diffuse it may be, to a horizon of possibilities for action. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, that empty space is the place where the object should be. Nameless fear is a fear, directed toward something foggy that perhaps a sentence, or several, could not express, but it is nonetheless a fear “seeking” for an object. “Something” may be the clearest thing to say in these cases, but still one can assert that that something is frightening, potentially harmful, etc. The important thing for my argument

is that in some of these cases the individual can go further and find, after some introspective work, the feeling or the desire hitherto hidden and causally connected with the objectless attitude.

A variant of the above, which is perhaps more frequent, occurs when what psychoanalysis calls repression takes place. Juan does something that aggravates me. I feel angry towards him but I unconsciously censure that feeling because a person like me cannot feel that. Then, there is an apparent separation of the affection or impulse from the object, which now makes my hatred appear in my consciousness as lacking a rational focus. I get upset with several people, especially those who may remind me of Juan. In these cases, the psychoanalyst will find that there is a causal relationship between that diffuse hate feeling and the hatred that originated in Juan. We are therefore also before another instance of looking within, in the figurative sense of looking, which can lead a person to discover mental contents.

These modes of introspection show that that facility to express what one desires, i.e avowals, does not always obtain and that certain work of self-observation, such as that promoted by psychoanalysis, is necessary to reveal to us some of our appetites, impulses, or feelings, our attitudes in general. This is the case, as I will be arguing with more detail in the second part, because our motives for action are complex mental states, composed of an ensemble of beliefs, desires, and feelings, in addition to the circumstances in which they make their appearance. This is the case especially of those motives about which one deliberates, which are the motives of more interest for a psychoanalytic process[10]. I think that this is compatible with what Wittgenstein says in the *Philosophical Investigations* in some remarks about introspection (587) and regarding the self-knowledge of intentions *(PI:* 642-645-646) in which he questions the existence of an ¨inner experience¨ essential to intentions. About the latter, Wittgenstein refers to the various aspects of our behavior, such as actions as well as feelings, memories, and thoughts, that one pays attention to when recalling an intention. I think that what Wittgenstein says about the

[10] As opposed to more trivial motives such as the one I have that drives me to fix my breakfast.

infrequent case of introspection and about the recollection of an intention bears witness to the fact that motivating desires are not always immediately available for avowals in many cases due to their complexity.

To declare the existence of these modes of introspection is also compatible with the view that what is essential to the authority of the first person is the questions that we ask ourselves about our attitudes, for instance our intentions and desires, with a deliberative spirit. This is the position for example of Richard Moran, who in his Authority and estrangement claims that only about those attitudes of ourselves that we wholeheartedly endorse, after having subjected those attitudes to a normatively laden examination, can we say that they have the authority of the first person. For Moran self knowledge cannot consist only of the modes of introspection that I have outlined in the previous paragraphs, which he deems as merely attributional, as opposed to a stronger form of self knowledge where what is essential is the endorsement, following a rational examination, of the attitude in question. The forms of introspection that I have canvassed can be considered as a necessary previous stage in the self reflective process that Moran consideres the more rational and free form of self knowledge.

Wittgenstein´s guidelines of philosophy of mind—namely, that language is prior to human thought in the order of explanation and that desires, and therefore impulses, necessarily contain learnings about the world—have exerted a dominion in the analytical philosophy of the twentieth-century mind.

These are ideas that have been resisted by those psychoanalysts who insist that there are motives for action that come from the body, which would imply that the conceptual capacities of human beings do not intervene in these motivations.

This objection is the main sustenance of the resistance that a good part of the psychoanalytic community received Marcia Cavell's book *The Psychoanalytic Mind* with.

m) Marcia Cavell

The Psychoanalytic Mind, the book of the philosopher and psychoanalyst Marcia Cavell (M. Cavell 1993) captures the most detailed conversation that has taken place so far between psychoanalytic theory and analytical philosophy, represented in this work by Ludwig Wittgenstein but mostly by Donald Davidson. Marcia Cavell believes that if one accepts the point of view of these two philosophers in the sense that there are no non-linguistic thoughts it is necessary to abandon two ideas of classical psychoanalysis. The first is the idea of desire as a fundamentally organic occurrence. The second idea that must be abandoned is that of a "primary process" - the process that governs the minds of children, schizophrenics, and the content of dreams - as a mental territory untouched by reason and culture. On the contrary, according to Cavell, the apparent disorder of the primary process is built with contents that the human being acquires in the process of socialization.

The criticisms of these two ideas, long-held by psychoanalysis, are made by Marcia Cavell from the perspective of "propositional psychology", the current within psychological philosophy championed by Donald Davidson that states that the best way to identify the mental contents that make our actions intelligible is through propositions. This approach, which I will develop further below, has been the subject of criticism, and it is precisely these criticisms that will serve as my starting point for proposing a way in which psychoanalytic ideas, through the notion of psychic energy, can contribute to the philosophy of action.

In reference to desire, Marcia Cavell says that when we say that a child "wants" something, we are necessarily attributing to that child some true beliefs, that is, knowledge, about the world. If the child wants the breast, it is because the child knows that the breast satisfies that desire. Without that knowledge, there can be no desire. Therefore, far from being just a biological emergency, desire in human beings needs the putting into action of skills and concepts:

> I have argued that Freud´s use of the Psychological term "wish" to describe what he calls the primary process is not justified. My thesis was this: a creature that can represent to itself, via a hallucinatory image, the object *for* which it longs is a creature capable of making judgments about reality, regardless of whether he exercises that capacity fully in any given case of wishing. (Cavell 1993: 166)

What is said in this quotation about "wishing" is also applicable to desire. In the original text, the author uses italics (the object *for* which it longs) to emphasize that desire or longing must be about something, and that something is outside the mind. And one can only know things outside the mind through thought and the abilities acquired in the process of socialization. This criticism of Freud is fair. While in *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud defines wish (*Wunsch* in German) as the memory of the gratifying object—and thus inadvertently conferred to the desiring activity a conceptual content—he abandoned the use of the word wish in later writings and replaced it with another with less intentionality and greater biological resonances such as drive (Trieb). Along this path, he endeavored to describe this drive as something autonomous, prior to thought, driven from "inside" the organism and which demands from the child neither concepts nor knowledge of reality. We have already seen that this is the case in the most biological definition of drive that we find in the Metapsychological Writings. Related to this idea is the claim Freud made in "Two Principles about psychic occurrence", in the sense that thinking is a consequence of the frustration of desire. This thesis, which with minimal variations will be adopted by the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, points out that thinking is a faculty that develops after a desire is frustrated. When frustration takes place, Freud says, the psychic apparatus "resolves" to thinking. (Freud 1912) In this way Freud severed thinking from affectivity and desire and thus made the cognitive stand in clear opposition to the affective. Marcia Cavell's approach, on the contrary, is that thinking and knowing are constitutive of desire. "Concepts, and a knowledge of reality, are necessary constituents of both one and the other" (of desire and belief). (1993: 167.) This position, that desire is caused by belief, is the one held by most of the analytic philosophers.

Now when referring to “belief” in this context, it is important to stress that we are referring to some general belief, a presupposed belief, functioning as the background of a desire. A belief, we could say, about general features of the situation. This needs to be differentiated from the instrumental belief which is about the better means to achieve the goals dictated by a desire. This difference is important as we will see soon. Some writers claim that in certain irrational actions there is no instrumental belief. Marcia Cavell is one of these writers. I will be saying more about this topic of the apparent lack of instrumental beliefs in some irrational actions.

The philosophical tradition has mostly been inclined to consider that it is belief that generates desire. Aristotle, for example, says that what causes movement in human beings is an object of desire that is thought or imagined. (De An 433 b10-11) A living being has no desire or appetite (Orexis, the generic term invented by Aristotle to refer to the three types of desire which according to him exist) if it has no thought or imagination (Fantasy). Therefore only some animals, those who have imagination, can be said to desire. Neither ants, nor bees, nor worms, says Aristotle, possess imagination. For Aristotle imagination is the faculty that allows the human being to relate to objects or states of things that are not present at the moment and that allows also to project into the future, from which it should be said that for Aristotle objects of desire must include references to prospects, to possible states of affairs, to counterfactual scenarios, which implies the functioning of conceptual capacities. Here lies, according to my reading and that of other commentators, the evaluative, and hence conceptual, dimension of desire in Aristotle's philosophy, including those desires that are based on the body, such as thirst or sexual desire, which Aristotle grouped under the name Epithumia. Wanting to go for a walk, wanting to eat ice cream, or being sexually attracted to another person involves the belief that there is something good about going for a walk, or eating ice cream or something good to seduce or be seduced by that person. As imperceptible as these thoughts may seem, that cognitive dimension is part of desire. Similarly, from the perspective of evolutionary psychology we have already seen that, according to Carruthers, there is an informational -

therefore conceptual - element necessary in the desire-generating mechanism. The possibility of non-conceptual mental contents, arduously debated in philosophy, is usually brought up in reference to perception. The most used examples among the defenders of this possibility are those of the perception of colors and tones of colors. A mental content that points to an action, on the other hand, must be constituted by concepts and beliefs. Along the same lines, John Searle considers that the most basic forms of intentionality in the human are perception and action. To perceive and to do are the activities that form the most elemental structure of the mind and from it are derived, according to Searle, other structures such as desire and belief. But it is usually the case, says Searle, that belief causes desire. (Searle 2018) So there is no desire without some belief about the world. Another way to put the necessary conceptual dimension of desires and its dependence on belief can be found in the writings on power by the political philosopher Rainer Forst tries to define what power is (Forst 2013). For this author, reasons are what explain the actions of human beings, which form our beliefs. Reasons, says Forst, are "more basic, more basic than interests or desires. The deeper one digs into the mind of the person to understand the motive for his actions, the more one needs to investigate the reasons, i.e. the beliefs, of the person." Therefore, Freud and Green's suggestion of a pictorial mental representation, settled mysteriously and exclusively in the body, which would have the most important role in explaining our motives, is an impossibility.

The fact that beliefs are constitutive of our desires, an assertion that is already somehow present in the writings of Lowenstein and Fairbairn, has consequences for psychoanalytic therapy, because this preeminent presence of beliefs in the core of our motives, implies that the process of making conscious the unconscious, which is what defines psychoanalytic therapy, consists of the patient discovering the thoughts, or beliefs, with which his impulses are made of. In fact, in practice, most psychoanalysts know that turning unconscious motives into conscious ones consists of revealing the beliefs or reasons that are at the root of those desires. Moreover, what psychoanalysis has revealed is that most of the time in very

impulsive individuals, incontinent individuals one could say, the predominant beliefs are fantasies, which are thoughts in which certain rules of thinking have been set aside.

In addition to pointing out this cognitive aspect of desires, Marcia Cavell argues that actions are caused by a conjunction of a desire and a belief, an idea referred to by some authors as “the desire/belief model of action” and by others as “propositional psychology”. This second name responds to the fact that those who defend this model, such as Donald Davidson, propose that desire and beliefs -and in general intentional states and mental events- have propositional content and should be considered “propositional attitudes”. They are so-called because, following a suggestion by Bertrand Russell, (Russell 1918) it is stated that the content of a belief is a proposition. In the same way, even if it is not so obvious, the content of a desire is also a proposition. If I believe that the capital of France is Paris, the content of my belief is the proposition “Paris is the capital of France”. If I wish to marry Mary, my desire is contained in the proposition “Mary becomes my wife”. Psychological verbs, adherents to propositional psychology claim, are verbs that refer to a person's attitude toward a state of affairs.

The idea that all mental contents are to be identified through propositions or that every attitude involves a proposition has been dominant in the analytic philosophy of mind, but it has been contested in recent years. [11] I will use some of these arguments against propositionalism as a point of departure to suggest how psychoanalytic theory can help to better consider the concept of desire and the structure of human action.

Although Cavell does not differentiate them sufficiently, this idea, that of understanding actions as caused by a conjunction of a desire and a belief, is different from the former, which says that a desire is caused by beliefs. The desire/belief model asserts that a person's motivation to act intentionally is always a desire that points to ends and a belief or beliefs that refers to the appropriate means to achieve those ends.

[11] For example *Non propositional intentionality* (2018) gathers several articles questioning this view.

These are the instrumental beliefs. According to Donald Davidson, “Therefore, whenever someone does something for a reason, he can be characterized: a) as having some kind of favorable attitude toward actions of a particular class and b) as if he believed (or knew, perceived, noticed, remembered) that his action is of that class. (a) attitudes such as desires, impulses, instincts, and a wide variety of moral convictions, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, public and private goals, and values should be included in (a) to the extent that they can be interpreted as attitudes of the agent directed at certain kinds of actions. (Davidson 1995: 18)

The desire-belief model, which goes back to Aristotle, has been given a propositionalism form and, as such, has been endorsed by the majority of analytical philosophers of the mind. [12] Against this stance, other authors point out that this model cannot capture the complexity and variety of human motivations. One of them is the philosopher J.D. Velleman, who thinks that the psychoanalytic concept of psychic energy can complement the insufficiencies of this model. In the last part of this chapter, I will return to propositional psychology and its critics and use Velleman's suggestion as one of my premises.

The other of Freud´s ideas which, according to Cavell, is not compatible with the teachings of Wittgenstein and Davidson is the idea of the primary process. If it is assumed that drives have cognitive content, then what Freud said about the primary process is in need of correction. As already stated, Freud invented the expression “Primary Process” to refer to the primitive functioning of the mind at the beginning of life. An important part of the psychoanalytic theory depends on this conceptualization of the primary process, since, for psychoanalysis, the psychosis—and in general all the affections of the soul - are manifestations of primary processes that reign over the person´s life because of it (the primary process) or portions of it

[12] The claim that propositionalism has been almost universal within analytic philosophy is made by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague in the introduction of *Non propositional intentionality.*

has escaped the mental organization that is reached with socialization. Bion's theory, for example, depends heavily on this idea.

Freud postulated that the primary mental process does not function according to principles of logic, is timeless, and is organized by its constant pursuit of pleasure. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud refers to this primary process as the natural way of being of any mental process. Thought, which for Freud is what defines the secondary process, is coupled to the primary process in order to direct it toward the attainment of satisfaction. Accordingly, for Freud, as for Hume, reason is merely at the service of attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Moreover, the secondary process never gains total dominance over the primary process, because it is the wishful or instinctual life of the individual which defines most of his or her motives.

Marcia Cavell does not deny the existence and importance of what in psychoanalysis is known as the primary process. What she objects to is the conception of this primary process as the expression of an unsocialized area of the human being that is constituted prior to the acquisition of certain concepts.

Both daily life and clinical practice acquaint us with a host of ways in which the mind turns away from what it perceives and knows. To explain this and other phenomena, Freud pitted an initial kind of thinking that is inherently wishful, driven by sex and aggression, against a later kind of thinking that is oriented toward reality. We now have good reason to say that the infant mind is acquainted with reality from the first. The primary process describes a particular organization of thought in a minded creature who has made all the tracks to the world to which the secondary process alludes. As for fantasy, I suggest that it is an anxious thought, not at its earliest stage. (Cavell 2006: 82)

The idea that, for example, psychosis expresses or represents the original mode of operation of the mind is questionable and has been the cause of harmful confusions. Similarly, fantasy or daydreaming needs

materials from the secondary process, i.e. socialization, to exist. In this respect Marcia Cavell is right. It is important, as she does, to underscore the presence of learning and culture in the primary process. However, there is a rush on her part when she says that the primary process occurs only after the infant has traveled *all* the paths or processes to the world to which the secondary process alludes. On the contrary, there are certain manifestations of what Freud called the primary process that precedes, normatively and chronologically, more mature forms of thinking. They are, therefore, "primaries" in the sense Freud gave them.

For example, it has long been established by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, developmental psychologists famous for, among other contributions, their studies in moral consciousness, that the development of our capacity for resolving moral conflicts evolves from a state of self-centeredness to more mature and complex forms. Since self-centeredness is one of the ways in which, according to Freud, the primary process can manifest itself, it would more accurate to say that regarding our moral capacities, there are forms of behavior that are primary or more primitive in both the normative and the chronological sense. It is also the case that there are defects in our reasoning that account for some irrational behaviors, which are the product of lack of training rather than a flight from reality. For instance, cognitive psychologists have proven that we tend to give more weight than is worth to salient evidence, or that we insist on retaining the first formulation of a theory even in the presence of strong evidence against it. These seem to be natural insufficiencies of reason that account for some of the actions that Freud would have connected with the primary process.

So the correct thing would be to say that most, but not all, of the modes of mental functioning that Freud included in the primary process are fled to more primitive modes of functioning of thinking under the pressure of certain demands of life.

Whether the primary process is, as Marcia Cavell contends, exclusively a flight from the actual or it is *also* a manifestation of reason´s normal shortcomings is important because the primary process is the psychoanalytic concept that could help explain irrational behavior such as self-deception, wishful thinking or weakness of the will.

In fact, regarding the problem of irrationality, there seems to be in philosophical psychology two sides in the debate, broadly speaking. There are those who are inclined to consider that self-deception or incontinent behavior is intentional, caused mostly by the person himself. These authors, such as Donald Davidson and David Pears, who usually invoke Freud's ideas to explain how a person can deceive himself or act against his better judgment, would be prone to explain the primary process more as a flight than as an instance of immaturity. But there is another group of philosophers, such as Alfred Mele, who consider that many forms of self-deception are explained without recourse to any intention, conscious or unconscious, of the person. For this approach, certain mental contents go against the dictates of reason, not because of any action of the person, but because of reason's frequent shortfalls. In line with what Freud said, Mele claims, that *desire*, if not checked or monitored by reason, is a powerful incontinent or self-deceptive agent. (Mele 2001)

Besides this seemingly narrow version of the primary process, two other questions can be raised about Davidson and Cavell´s reading of Freud. The first is how to understand a child's mind at the beginning of life. If beliefs and certain knowledge of the world are necessary for the constitution of desires, how should we call what the infant demands something from his environment? The other question, which has been less debated by these authors, is whether the particularity and variety of affective states and desires can really be understood within propositional psychology, i.e. by the desire/belief model. Some think that Marcia Cavell and Davidson's theory understands desires too abstractly and that a theory of mind should not be based on such a formal conception of human motivation.

The first objection is: If desire implies the acquisition of certain beliefs, certain knowledge, and certain linguistic competencies, how can we describe what happens in the minds of infants of months when they act if they want something?

How to talk about what newborns "do"? Do they have intentions? Many psychoanalysts do not consider these to be even questions worthy of scientific discussion because they take for granted that from birth (or even before) babies have thoughts, desires, and emotions. But the question is important.

Donald Davidson says that there is a conceptual difficulty in describing the behavior of a pre-verbal child.

> "We have a vocabulary to describe nature when we conceive in its non-mental aspect. And we have a mentalistic vocabulary to describe intentional thought and action. What we are missing is a way of describing what it´s in the middle.¨(Davidson 2001: 128.)

The conceptual difficulty to which Davidson refers is not the same one that psychoanalyst W. Bion (Bion 1970: 11) points out when he says that "mental space is a thing in itself that is unknowable but that can be represented through the verbal" nor when he attributes to thought a "restrictive character over pre-verbal material" (Bion 1970: 11). Neither for Davidson nor for Cavell, not for Dewey not for Wittgenstein for that matter, there is something like a "pre-verbal material" *restricted b*y thought. For these authors, thought—and therefore language acquisition—does not restrict anything. On the contrary, it is through language and experience that human beings enrich their desires and their feelings. Nor would it be appropriate to associate what Davidson says with what the psychoanalyst André Green states: "The drive is a thought in germ and there is undoubtedly a thought without language... We touch here the limit of the knowable... The future may teach us something more about the representations of what we call today unrepresentable...". (Green 1996: 153) Nor is it, of course, Lacan's lament in the sense that language makes us lose something very much our own and authentic. For Davidson and Cavell there is not a pre-verbal mind that language distorts or buries.

To overcome the difficulty inherent to the task of conceptualizing the mind of the babies, Davidson, and Cavell suggest focusing on the activities that the infant develops with his caregivers at the beginning of life which are the necessary condition for the development of a mind. These activities are physical, that is, minimally verbal, and have the consequence that the child learns, surely first through the feeling, that he or she shares a world with his or her mother or primary caregiver. That what he or she looks at is also seen by his or her mother. This is the idea that Davidson called triangulation: “Each creature learns to correlate the reactions of other creatures with objects or changes in the world to which (the creature) also reacts. (Davidson 2001: 129) This is the first condition for the acquisition of language and for the development of a mind. These “practices” and these “capacities” (smiling, recognizing the mother's smell, sensing some other people's mental states) are part of the attitudes we call thinking, representing, and desiring. (Cavell 132) But although these activities form something like the infrastructure of the mind, it is only with the advent of language that the human being can develop the feelings and thoughts that form the units of study of psychoanalytic theory.

The problem with this response to the challenge of describing and explaining the minds of babies is that it leans too much on the cognitive aspects of the infant situation and thus neglects the importance that the affectively laden relationship of the newborn with his caregivers, during the first moments of life, have in the subsequent development of the capacity to think. Different authors from different fields converged on the importance of this emotional aspect for the emergence of a mind. Peter Hobson and Michael Tomasello in the field of developmental psychology and John Dewey and Stanley Cavell from a philosophical perspective, have a more nuanced and insightful perspective of the early stages of the development of a mind. From different starting points and different research routes, they all converge in highlighting the fact that without the emotional identification of the child with her caregiver, of the human

being with her fellow humans, the infant would be incapable of any significant cognitive operation. [13] From a philosophical i.e conceptual perspective, the idea is that, at the root of our capacity for thinking and predicating about the objects surrounding us, there is a deep-seated interest that human beings have in everything concerning their fellow human beings. It is this interest that is the condition of possibility of any cognitive endeavor.

The second question, or objection if you will, to Cavell and Davidson's interpretation of Freud is that it relies on propositional psychology, that is, the desire-belief model which, according to several writers, is exaggeratedly abstract and formal. Mark Johnston expresses this impugnation when he says, talking about Davidson's scheme, that it is a "superficial" and "fantastically abstract" scheme that misses the particularity of human existence.

> (But) When it comes to giving meaning to our life and our activities, it is the differences between these pro-attitudes (desires) that are crucial, not the fact that they can be included in a generally determinable "rationalizer of action that is not a belief". (Johnston 2001)

For Johnston, grouping very varied attitudes under the title of "desire" is what makes the proposal of propositional psychology untenable, because such a broad category does not capture the array of impulses, urges, aims, and the like that drives human beings into action.

Many other philosophers have questioned propositional psychology, based on similar ideas as Johnston´s. Some say that propositions cannot capture all mental states we can think of, others that they cannot capture all of a mental state and something is left out when one claims that propositions are the best vehicle to understand how the mind represents the world. Han Jonas Glock (Glock 2015), for example, has made the claim that regarding several mental states no single proposition, not even a list of propositions can do the work of capturing the essence of the person's attitude. So for example it is not enough that I

[13] The convergence of these authors on the importance of the affective pre conditions of thinking is made by Axel Honneth in his study of reification. (Honneth 2008)

have the thought that something is admirable in order for the feeling of admiration towards that thing to emerge. In addition to that thought (that of a person or a thing being admirable), there is an "affective or emotional aspect of admiration that is not captured by the propositional paraphrase¨. (Glock 2015).[14] Even John Searle (Searle 1983) who is an advocate of propositional psychology, thinks that the desire/belief model is "not fine-grained enough" to distinguish between some intentional states. Searle does not think that all intentional states can be reduced to a belief and a desire, but, nevertheless, *most* intentional states contain a belief and a desire and so the analysis of mental states through belief and desire, while not exhaustive, is useful. Searle contends that most intentional states are a form of desire assuming some belief. In other words, most desires are caused by a belief. He contends that a few mental states, such as boredom, cannot be analyzed in terms of desire and belief. (Searle 2018). Other writers have a more radical view and reject propositionalism altogether, suggesting novel ways to understand the architecture of the mind. For example, Elizabeth Camp thinks that the intentionality of mental representation is analogous to the ways maps represent.

On this matter, I am following Ernest Tugendhat, Anthony Kenny, and John Searle, who, notwithstanding their differences, share the idea that the use of propositions is the best way to represent what goes on in the person´s mind when he or she is thinking or feeling or intending to do something. Accordingly, most mental states can be profitable analyzed in terms of belief and desire because those mental states reveal an attitude towards a state of affairs. The attitudes psychoanalysis is more concerned about, namely motives for action and feelings, contain, without question, beliefs, and desires.

[14] However the example with which Glock illustrates his reproach to the propositional paraphrase might not be the most felicitous. He said that he sees many things admirable in Angela Merkel but cannot admire her because of his (Glock´s) left wing ¨leaning and sensibilities¨. For me, those leaning and sensibilities, those political beliefs, which in this particular case block admiration, are quite expressible with sentences. So in this case, Glock has reasons to admire Merkel and reasons for not admiring Merkel. The reasons for not admiring outweighed the reasons in favor of admiration. I cannot see the inexpressible element in Glock´s stance toward Merkel.

However, as Johnson, Glock, and others have pointed out, the problem is that the psychology of propositional attitudes fails to capture the flexibility, intensity, and eventual vagueness of our feelings and desires. I contend that this is the most robust reproach made to Cavell's and Davidson's attempt to reformulate psychoanalytic theory. Although it is not a detraction that completely destroys the results of that enterprise, this critique correctly points out gaps of a theory of motivation that combines psychoanalysis with 20th-century philosophy of mind, as it has been tried so far.

I propose that, if one assumes that it is not problematic at all to identify our motives for action with propositions that contain the desire-belief pair, there is the danger of leaving aside two things that psychoanalysis has drawn attention to more significantly than other disciplines in the field of human sciences. The first is the vagueness of some of our desires. Remember that Russell, and before him Locke, postulated a “non-cognitive part of desire” that would be, at the beginning of the cycle of behavior, an indeterminate psychological force, characterized by a kind of anxiety (“restlessness”) that pushed the person towards initially diffuse objectives. In a very similar sense, Freud had raised the idea of an “unbound energy,” that is, psychic energy that has not yet found its object. It is a verifiable fact in everyday life, indeed, that some of our desires emerge in an inchoate, rudimentary way, we would say, and that only after some work of self-interpretation do those initially diffuse desires acquire the form that allows us to refer to them with clarity and that can push us to more defined goals. Sometimes it also happens that one finds that certain objects or experiences satisfy but only half certain desires and that a part of these desires will never find a full expression. There is therefore some aspect of our motivations that seem opaque to us and seem to escape the possibility of verbalization.

The other thing that the so abstract level of the desire/belief formula overlooks is the intensity of our desires and feelings. One could say that “intensity” is a word that alludes to something contingent and as such should only be the subject of psychology study. However, the strength of our affections, not too often studied in psychology or philosophy, is what makes several of our behaviors intelligible, even though

the words we use to refer to desires and the feelings that accompany them do not always cover their varying intensities. We believe we understand that an outburst of anger is the response to feelings of jealousy, but we find it strange, irrational, that equally intense anger is motivated by jealousy directed towards a person we have just met. As it happens, we usually classify this reaction as strange. We can understand prolonged and even paralyzing grief over the loss of a loved one, but we find it rare that a similar grief reaction is caused by the death of a person with whom we had no personal experience, such as a movie or football star. We understand in everyday life that certain emotional reactions and certain desires have an intensity that responds to a certain logic, a certain rational structure, and we are inclined to consider irrational or out of place those feelings that have a disproportionate intensity. Therefore, if 'intensity' is the criterion for describing a reaction as irrational or strange, an inquiry into the concept of intensity seems necessary. To be sure, not all agree that the felt intensity of a desire or an emotion has an explanatory place in human action. Alfred Mele (Mele 2003) for example thinks that the concept of motivational strength should not be considered synonymous with felt intensity. I, for my part, disagree with Mele and agree with Simon Blackburn in that the felt intensity of our desires and emotions does play a part in the causal explanations of our actions and therefore in the elucidation of practical reason.

There is another reason for analyzing the concept of intensity. I agree with Michael Stocker (Stocker 1979) when, writing about the weakness of the will, says that “motivation and evaluation do not stand in simple and direct relation to each other, as is often supposed. Rather they are interrelated in various and complex ways and their interrelation is mediated by large arrays of complex psychic structures such as mood, energy, and interest”. (Stocker 1979: 738- 739) He goes on to argue that it is all too common that human beings are attracted to what is bad and that in order to understand this fact one should invoke the aforementioned psychic structures, “mood, energy, and interest”. Stocker, however, does not elaborate on these psychic structures and leaves them unexplained. He thinks, contrary to what I believe, that it is the office of the social sciences and psychology to penetrate these structures. I once again agree with

Blackburn in that philosophy should get inside the muddle of those psychic structures as they, as Stocker correctly states, are an important component of practical reason. Moreover, the concept of intensity seems to partake in the structures that Stocker points to.

Precisely to try to explain these two things mentioned before, namely, that some of our desires and their affections present themselves for the first time in our consciousness as something vague and diffuse that demands interpretation, (and that can sometimes be channeled through a "wrong" objective) and that our feelings can be differentiated from each other by something that, for lack of another word, we usually call intensity, Freud invented the term "psychic energy" and its correlate, that of "economic dimension of the psychic apparatus". With this concept, equivalent in many of his works to "amount of affection" he wanted to account for these facts that seem to have no place in the formalism of the desire/belief model.

In the following section, I will propose a naturalistic way of understanding the concept of psychic energy in order to incorporate it into what was proposed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Marcia Cavell (Davidson) and thereby offer an improved way of understanding psychoanalytic drive or desire and, at the same time, shed some light into the structure of motivation for human action. Such conceptual fusion responds to my belief that the line of thought that Dewey outlined in relation to impulses, which was later developed and expanded by Wittgenstein, and later led to a direct dialogue with psychoanalysis by Davidson and Marcia Cavell, offers good arguments in favor of the social nature of the desire and about the necessary relationships that the drive has with the rest of the contents of the mind, such as beliefs. It is also difficult to question that the best way so far conceived to identify desire is through propositions. I am going to propose, following philosopher J. D Velleman but broadening his proposal, that what propositional psychology, that is, the desire/belief scheme, needs to take into account the variable intensity with which desires are present in our life and the vague or diffuse character with which they sometimes appear. I contend that to do so it is convenient to incorporate as a complement the idea of psychic energy.

Such incorporation of the Freudian concept of psychic energies into a theory of mind was already suggested by Richard Rorty in a footnote to the article he wrote about Freud and Davidson. In it, to which I will refer with more detail in the second part, Rorty confesses however that he has not "had the time" to think about how to develop this suggestion. J.D. Velleman, an analytical philosopher known for his writings on practical reason, also thinks that the concept of libidinal energy can help overcome the rigidities of propositional psychology. In what follows I will try to make Rorty's suggestion a reality and improve Velleman's proposal.

III. Psychic energy and desire.

n) The idea of psychic energy in psychoanalysis.

In Freud's work, the idea of psychic energy appears sporadically and, except in his 1895 work *Project for a Psychology for Neurologists,* a book that he later did not want to publish, he did not devote to this subject a systematic work. But despite the absence of rigorous studies on this notion, Freud frequently resorted to ideas associated with "the economic point of view" to explain some psychological reactions that, in addition to being very intense, were, to use a word more used in philosophy but that correctly expresses what Freud meant, irrational. A non-psychological dimension, associated with the energy that supposedly emanated from the neurons and that he conceived as a non-psychological potential for action, was the cause to which Freud attributed these strong reactions, which, moreover, were incoherent with the rest of the person's mental contents in a determined situation. Since what Freud called a quantum of energy emerged from neurons, the use of the concept of psychic energy implies adopting the quantitative or economic point of view.

The idea of the amount of psychic energy, says Freud:

> "is extracted from pathological-clinical observations, in particular, those in which it is a question of hyperintense representations, as in hysteria and in obsessive-neurosis, where, as will be demonstrated, the quantitative character stands out with more purity than in the normal case". (Freud 1951: 340)

Freud is using the word intensity as we normally use it to point to a feeling, a reaction, or even a strong or persistent idea. It is not a concept drawn from his neurological speculations but rather from everyday life and his experience as a psychoanalyst.

This intensity, Freud thought, could reach a degree of an exaggeration to the point of making irrational, in the eyes of an observer, an idea or a feeling. This occurred in individuals suffering from some form of neurosis:

> Hyperintense representations are also normally had. They give the Ego its particularity. We are not surprised when we hear about their genetic development (education, experiences) and their motives. We usually see in such hyperintense representations the result of large and justified motives. On the other hand, the hypertensive representations of hysterics are striking because of their rarity; they are representations that in others do not bring any consequence and of whose dignity we do not understand anything. They appear to us as upstarts, usurpers, and therefore ridiculousness. (Freud 1895: 395)

Although the first justification for proposing the existence of a quantitative factor of personality was the need to make intelligible some "exaggerated" psychological reactions, the idea of psychic energies, which in some texts are called "cathexis", had a curious destiny within the theoretical body of psychoanalysis: although its creator never dedicated a systematic exploration to it, its explanatory function silently widened over the years. As already said, it was conceived to try to explain the intensity of affections and the intensity and persistence of some psychiatric symptoms; then it would become the key to explain the fact that sometimes our desires are diffuse and do not have a clearly established intention (which Freud attributed to "unbound" psychic energies) and the fact as well that these desires are displaced and that in certain cases they are fulfilled with different goals from the original ones; finally, the concept of psychic energy would also become critical to explain some of the defense mechanisms, especially that of repression.

I'm going to concentrate on these three aspects pertaining to the concept of psychic energy:

In the relationship between psychic energy and emotional intensity; in the possible explanation that this energy could give to the phenomenon of “objectless” desires or feelings; and in the phenomenon of displacement. It is more difficult, and I think I would get lost along the way, to explain the relationship between psychic energy with certain psychiatric symptoms; nor will I penetrate the relationship of energy with defense mechanisms.

Something that alleviates the difficulty of elaborating a discourse on such an apparently elusive concept is that when Freud wanted to offer a more phenomenological - and less organicist - version of this energetic or quantitative dimension, he made it equivalent to “amount of affection”. The intensity of our emotions can therefore be the starting point for an inquiry into the economic dimension of personality.

Now, when one speaks in a colloquial sense of affective “intensity,” one can be referring to two things. Either to an intensity manifested in the things one is willing to do to satisfy the desires that are pushed by a feeling and the extent to which a desire occupies our thoughts, or the “subjective feeling” that accompanies affection, that is, “The feel or the qualia”. For example, in García Marquez's “Amor en Los Tiempos del Cólera,”(*Love in the time of cholera)* no one would object if it were said that Florentino Ariza felt an intense love for Fermina Daza because he waited “fifty-three years, seven months and eleven days and nights” to be with her. A strong political idea, sustained over the years, can also be described as responding to an intense feeling of conviction. But the intensity of affections can also refer to the intensity with which we feel something for a few moments. We can say that somebody felt an intense twinge of envy for a second. Both uses of the word intensity seem valid in everyday use. Some authors (Kenny 1963. 24; Shope 1971) have remarked that there is a need for research in order to spell out the link between the two types of “emotional intensity”. Others such as Mele (Mele 2003), as I already mentioned, think that the perceived intensity of a desire or an emotion does not contribute to the explanation of human action. I am aligned with Simon Blackburn and Michael Stocker in the sense that the felt intensity of an emotion is important within the structure of human actions. Moreover, I think that felt intensity at the

base of long-term intensity and, for that reason, I will begin tackling the problem of psychic energy with the class of episodic intensity.

I have already rehearsed Freud's writings on psychic energy and its putative relationship with psychological intensity. Post-Freud psychoanalysis has taken a largely pessimistic stance in relation to the idea of an economic dimension of behavior and therefore to the idea of psychic energy. For example, in a panel held in 1962 at the fall conference of the American Psychoanalytic Society to discuss the concept of psychic energy, psychoanalysts such as Robert Waelder and Lawrence Kubie questioned this concept at its root as a “metaphor that can lead to confusion” and proposed that psychoanalytic theory dispenses with it. Almost half a century later, psychoanalyst W.W. Meissner (Meissner 2009) does not seem more optimistic about this concept. For him, the idea of psychic energy alludes to nothing more than the transition from potency to action. Siegfried Zepf, MD (Zepf) 2010) thinks that psychoanalysis can dispense with the use of the terms “economic” or “energetic” or “cathexis” because these terms refer to nothing more than affections. This psychoanalyst thinks that feelings are the manifestation, in the “representational” world, of stimuli that originate in the body. Given that, he continues, the area of interest for psychoanalysis is the representational and that bodily tensions manifest themselves in the mind in the form of affections, psychoanalysis must dispense with the terms alluded to (cathexis, energy or economic point of view) and use exclusively references to the affective. This author does not rule out that the relationship between the stimuli supposedly originated in the body and their manifestation in the representational (i.e. the mental) must be investigated, but such an inquiry exceeds the resources of psychoanalysis and must therefore be interdisciplinary. One can surmise that Zepf is thinking of neurology.

Other authors from the psychoanalytic field believe that the Freudian notion of the primary process, a process essentially constituted by free energy, has a neurobiological correlate. For example, Carhart-Harris & Friston (Carhart-Harris & Friston 2010) sustain that a physical substrate of the primary process and secondary process, in other words, a translation in terms of neurophysiology would consist of the

brain using a hierarchical model, which allows it to process and above all order the information that comes from the outside world and from the body itself. The assumption that this hierarchical system is consistent with Freud's division between primary and secondary processes is based on the fact that the brain operates in such a way that the perception of stimuli in a chaotic first moment is ordered by the brain into more durable units and organized according to learning processes. Thus, say these authors, we can go through an ascending channel in complexity, which goes from sensations to perceptions to concepts. Implicit in this way of seeing things is the fact that there is a progression that goes from the lowest levels of organization where the brain represents the simplest and most fleeting stimuli (sensations) to the highest levels where there is a greater complexity of what is represented (Concepts). Accordingly, the primary process would be the simplest, which would then be integrated into longer-lasting representations.

The problem with this search for consistency between what Freud said about the primary process and brain structures is twofold: On the one hand, as authors inside and outside psychoanalysis have already noted, coincidences can always be found between two disciplines if one appeals to the metaphorical use of their terms. This is the case of the use that these authors make of the term free or unbound energy.

The other problem is that Carhart-Harris and Friston seem to believe that the primary system can be equated to the most basic units of information, such as sensations. And, as Marcia Cavell persuasively argued, and as Freud himself recognized, there is much of the primary process that is made up of complex representations and mental operations that involve cognitive faculties of the person and that need just that which Carhart-Harris would not allow being part of the primary process, which is representations that include a temporal extension greater than that of sensations.

o) The concept of psychic energy in philosophy

It is rather in the philosophy interested in psychoanalysis where the stakes have been raised in relation to the concept of energy.

In his exegetical work, *Freud and Philosophy*, Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1971) offers a sympathetic interpretation of Freud's idea of psychic energy and tries to give coherence to this puzzling notion, although Ricoeur´s explanation is not free from complications.

For this author, some instincts belong to the body. They are represented in the mind by something psychical. At the same time, instincts are energy, although Ricoeur does not elucidate if he, or for that matter Freud, is referring to psychic energy or to some other type of energy. "Instincts, which are energy, are "represented" by something psychical." (Ricoeur 1971: 135) So it appears that, according to Ricoeur´s reading of Freud, instincts belong to the body, to the ineffable. This something psychical represents or presents the body to the mind. "(This psychical representative) stands for instincts as such, *presents* them purely and simply". (Ricoeur: 135). However, a few lines below, Ricoeur drops the talking of "something psychical" that represents the body and, correcting his previous statement affirms: ¨More radically, it must be said that instinct themselves express the body to the mind (*in die Seele)".* (137) So now, instincts are the representatives and not the represented. [15]

However confusing this might be, that the body is somehow represented in the mind is for Ricoeur the "fundamental hypothesis" and the *raison d'être* of psychoanalysis.

Instincts represent the body in the mind through ideas and affects. These affects are called by Freud "the quota of affect", " the *quantitative* factor". They are closer to the concepts of energy and economic factor

[15] However, a few pages later Ricoeur went back to the first formulation and speaks of "the psychical representatives of instincts.

than are “ideas”. As such, they would remain in the domain of the inexpressible but out of the fact that they are always in search of ideas, thoughts we could say, to adhere to. “...we should not overlook the fact that a pure affect, an affect that has come directly from the unconscious—such as anxiety with no particular object—is an affect *waiting* for a substitute idea to which it can attach itself” (146. My emphasis) It is precisely there, in that conjunction between affections—the non-verbal representatives of instincts—and ideas, that occurs the encounter of the language of force, which is the only one we can use to refer to the instincts and the feelings that represent them, and the language of interpretation, which is the one we regularly use to refer to our thoughts and the ideational component of the instincts. It is the link, says Ricoeur, between hermeneutics and economics.

Ricoeur is aware of the difficulties and confusions that persist when trying to build a theory of psychic energy. Toward the end of his book, he says, regarding the energetic discourse: “Nothing, consequently, is firmly settled in this area, indeed, it may be that the entire matter must be redone, possibly with the help of energy schemata quite different from Freud´s”. (395)

From a different position than Ricoeur's hermeneutics, that of the analytical philosophy of science, Robert Shope (Shope 1971) suggests that although the psychic energy Freud spoke of is not the energy spoken of in physics, the concept of an economic or energetic factor of behavior should not be abandoned by psychoanalysis. Shope thinks that Freud was illuminating when he considered psychic energies as a postulated tendency that facilitates certain actions. Accordingly, psychic energy adheres or attaches to the psychological structures, i.e. the sexual and aggressive wishes, and by doing so allows these wishes to be the true causes of behavior. This author thinks that this energy should not be conceived as having a directionality of its own. Rather, it should be thought of as having a “quasi directionality” “non-vitalistic directionality” that enables sexual or aggressive behavior. Something similar that happens with heat, he says, which tends to transfer to areas of lower temperature. “But there is nothing to prevent us from regarding the psychological “entity” or “structure”, e.g a wish, which has a portion of this energy, and we

may simply regard psychic energy as making the wish *able* to do what it does, able to be such a cause. Similarly, the heat of one body makes it able to warm another". (Shope 1971. Author´s emphasis) According to Shope, it is possible that we may never get a detailed explanation of why psychic energy has the tendency that it has and "perhaps all we can do is describe that tendency" or hope for future science to do come up with the explanation. So it happens in other sciences where in some cases it is not possible to go beyond the description of a postulated concept, but that is not an impediment to use that concept in a causal explanation. Shope´s is a defense of the idea that the concept of psychic energy, or a cognate, must not be discarded by psychoanalysts, because, among other reasons, it might be our entrance into the problem of the intensity of desires.

This seems to be also the opinion of J. D. Velleman, a philosopher from the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition who has developed a theory of practical reason using some ideas derived from Freud. One of the psychoanalytic concepts he has incorporated in his work is the idea of drive. Velleman thinks that without this concept a philosophical theory of human action remains incomplete. Velleman, like Mark Johnston, believes that the traditional model of desire/belief does not capture crucial aspects of the motivation for our actions. That is why we have to use the idea, for him a metaphor, of a stock of amorous or aggressive psychic energies to cover a greater area of the motivational assortment of the human being. Velleman's argument for decreeing the inadequacy of the desire/belief scheme is that there are motivational forces that cannot be well described using language. By this, he means that, since certain desires point to aims that the person cannot precisely define, we need something more than words to fully explain a person's motivation when acting. There is something else beyond belief and desire that moves us. That something else, diffuse and malleable, cannot be named. Since we have no words for it, as Velleman's argument states, we need to invoke the idea of drive and psychic energies.

The version of the drive concept that Velleman uses is what Freud would call unbound psychic energy; that is, indeterminate motivational forces that can find satisfaction in a wide range of behaviors and objects. It's an idea that largely coincides with what Russell said about the noncognitive part of desire.

Velleman illustrates the need for the incorporation of the concept of drive to the philosophy of action with the example of the kicks he gives in his Tae Kwon Do class. He says that his perseverance in this task could not be explained only through the desire to stay in form and that rather only by incorporating the metaphor of psychic energies, in the case of the Tae Kwon Do of aggressive energies, can he understand the efficacy he displays as a martial arts student.

Why do these movements correspond to a Tae Kwon Do exercise and not to a dance or warm-up before a football match? This author's answer is that there is something to do with posture, timing, muscle tension, and body language that can only be captured by the idea of a stock of aggressive energies.

Studying Tae Kwo Don I discovered that I had a background of aggression that I could spend on kicks and punches... This aggression is not best characterized if we use the terms desire and belief... that aggression could be dumped on virtually any solid object, including a person assigned the role of my opponent. (Velleman, 2009)

Velleman is not making any assertion that compromises him with the belief that he is talking about energies that neurology could explain. They are metaphors, however, irreplaceable:

> Some philosophers will find the allusion to psychic energies intolerably metaphorical... (But) The metaphor of psychic energies is a very useful instrument for remembering that, even if all motives are in principle propositional attitudes, some (motives) have motivational possibilities which, in practical terms, cannot be formalized in written or spoken language. (Velleman 2009)

Velleman, like Russell, accepts the existence of the phenomenon Freud called “displacement,” which would explain why human beings sometimes seek substitutes for their original desires. The psychic energies thus conceived can, and sometimes do, seek satisfaction in objects that are different from the

original ones. According to Velleman, Freud, and Russell, this phenomenon authorizes us to speak of a non-cognitive or non-propositional part of desire or, as in Freud, of unbound psychic energy.

It is not clear however what is meant by Velleman when he says that we have here motivational possibilities that cannot be formalized in written or spoken language. That stock of energies to which Velleman alludes has a direction and that direction is what allows us to know that they are erotic or aggressive energies. It can be called “free, unbound” energy”, but it is still possible to construct some propositional content for these vague or diffuse impulses because there is always a future state of things to which these energies or drives are directed. Therefore, it seems appropriate to say, in interpreting Velleman, that there are unarticulated motivational possibilities, not very precise in their aims, that can be referred to only with greater linguistic elaboration.

Velleman is talking about a known and recorded fact in everyday speech as well as in literature. Since it would be astonishing if this kind of extra push present in our desires—and displaceable in addition—does not correspond with any entity in the world, it has to be possible to construct a less metaphorical and more naturalistic formulation of this energy and consequently of the phenomenon of intensity, which is the starting point for the use of the expression “psychic energy”. Given, moreover, that psychoanalysts have thrown in the towel in the search for a theory that explains the concept of “intensity” (as has also been the case in non-psychoanalytic psychology), it is in philosophy that the bases of this conceptual inquiry into intensity must be sought.

In the following section, before using Dewey's writings for a more realistic formulation of what Freud meant by psychic energy, I will analyze what Hume said about emotional intensity, considering that he is the only philosopher who has attempted a detailed description of this phenomenon. We will see that Hume can be considered, with a little imagination, a forerunner of Freud regarding the primary process. In the same way, I will explain Simon Blackburn's approach to the strength of our feelings and their role

in our practical reasoning. Blackburn is one of the few contemporary philosophers who has studied the phenomenon of emotional intensity and connected it to our moral decisions. Blackburn resorts to explaining the intensity to the neuropsychology of Antonio Damasio, which I am going to question.

p) Hume and Blackburn on intensity.

The variable intensity of our emotions has haunted most of the philosophers who have written about affectivity and some of them resorted, as did Freud, to physical factors to explain this phenomenon. Descartes, for example, attributed to the "animal spirits" and the force of their flow the different intensities of the emotions. For instance, in love, says Descartes, "the spirits sent by the heart to the brain have parts which are coarser and more agitated than usual; and as they strengthen the impressions formed by the first thought of the loved object, these spirits compel the soul to dwell upon this thought". (Descartes 404) Whereas in hatred "the spirits going to the brain also have very unequal parts, and move very strangely. As a result, they strengthen the ideas of hatred which are already imprinted there, and they dispose the soul to have thoughts which are full of acrimony and bitterness". (Descartes 405) .

Spinoza considered the importance of the intensity of emotions as well but explained it as a measure of the importance that the object of the emotion, be it a person or an activity, has for the person affected. The intensity of the "joy" that Spinoza sees as proof of the love I feel for a person or an activity is a measure of how important that activity or person is to me. But Spinoza, whose approach is almost entirely cognitive, was not interested in offering a probable neurological or biological explanation of the intensity of the emotions

David Hume, like Descartes, did attempt to construct a detailed description of the mechanism through which feelings increase their potency. As we will see, what Hume says about the origin and functioning of "violent passions" has a strong resemblance with some of Freud's ideas about the primary process.

Hume thought that it is our passions that cause our actions, while reason is confined to discovering the means for us to achieve the goals that our feelings point to. To this idea corresponds the famous and deliberately provocative phrase of Hume "reason is, and must be, the slave of passions".

In this causal relationship that goes from feelings to behaviors, a causality that for Hume is no different from what we find in the physical world, the “calm and strongest” passions are the ones that exert the most influence on our actions. Moreover, it is these kinds of passions that determine the kind of people we are because they are the ones who become “a principle of action and constitute the predominant inclination of the soul”. (Hume) Hume does not deny that violent passions, i.e. those characterized by greater emotional turmoil, may sometimes be motives for action, and may even in some cases exert more influence on our will than calm passions. But the predominant passion, the one that defines our personality, is the passion that is at once calm and strong. Violent passions explain specific, episodic actions such as actions we might call impulsive or perhaps incontinent. Such behaviors, which for Hume respond to a motivational structure different from the structure that is functioning in actions that are more coherent with our personality (those that respond to calm and strong passions) are nevertheless a necessary part of Hume´s psychology since “there is no man who possesses this virtue so constantly” (this virtue meaning the strength of the soul that implies the predominance of calm passions over violent ones) “to the point of not yielding on some occasions to the requests of passions and desires”. i.e. the solicitations of violent passions. In addition, another reason why emotional agitation is an indispensable part of the study of the mind for Hume is that violent passions become calmer through repetition. Although he is not very clear to say how this happens, the suggestion is that habit turns an intense passion into a calm and dominant one, thus becoming a passion that defines our personality. (1987: 169) There is therefore in Hume's psychological philosophy a causal relationship between violent or intense passions and calm passions.

Hume believes that philosophical tradition has confused calm passions with reason. That is to say, it has attributed to reason what is really an effect of calm passions. Philosophers have been carried away by similarity in appearances: calm passions are “almost imperceptible” (Hume) and, since reason, according to Hume, exerts its influence generally without any emotional accompaniment, these philosophers have

led astray in believing that when we do something quietly, without experiencing some kind of agitation of affections, it is reason that guides our will. For Hume, that is a mistake. Reason never chooses the ends of our actions, only the means. The action that is not accompanied by any affective vibration is an action directed by the calm and strong passions, those that define the type of human beings we are. It is these passions that must confront and dominate violent passions.

How do violent passions arise according to Hume? In the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume initially states that what determines the strength of a passion is the distance that separates me from the thing or person that causes in me that passion. Far from the beloved person, my love will not be as intense as when I am close; in the same way, to live close to my enemy intensifies my aversion and to move away from him would diminish it. But Hume dedicates only a few brief introductory lines to this simple and rather common-sense explanation of the violence of passions and moves in the direction of another type of explanation of another type of violent passions - in which unconscious factors, so to speak, play a role. Indeed, while for Hume distance explains the intensity of passions when it comes to a "perfect union" of passions, which is the phrase he uses to refer to the process that takes place when one passion produces another, there is another mechanism that increases the violence or intensity of passions. This other mechanism occurs not when one passion generates another new passion, but when "two passions are already produced by their separate causes and the two are present in the spirit...". (Hume 1987: 170) When this happens, in a process that resembles the fusion of drives that characterize the "primary process" that Freud spoke of, two feelings that may not even have any ideational or logical connection "mix and presumably unite even though they have only one relationship or have none at all. (Hume 1987: 170)..." In these cases, the predominant passion is assimilated to the weakest and converts it. "The feelings that already exist, according to Hume, have a sort of "natural" tendency to combine and be carried away by what this author calls the dominant passion, which is the passion that is intensified because it feeds on the strength of the weakest.

Thus, “when a person is deeply in love, the small faults and whims of his lover, the jealousies and quarrels to which these relationships are subject, although related to hatred and anger, grant additional strength to the dominant passion” (Hume 1986: 170) i.e. mild anger increases the intensity of love. In the same way, a soldier on the battlefield feels more courage and confidence when he thinks of the martiality and pomp of his comrades in arms; but if he sees that majesty in the enemy, it will increase his fear. This means that the same emotion (the impression caused by martialism and pomp) will increase courage if it is generated by allies, but fear will increase if it is caused by enemies.

For Hume, there is a force, which does not respond to logic and which resembles Freud's free psychic energy, which pushes passions to mix and reinforce the position of the dominant passion. What is that force that does not respond to reason?

Hume's mechanicism is characterized by trying to construct the complete casual chains, we could say, of mental processes. There is no mental entity, no “perception” to use the language of the *Treatise,* the genesis of which Hume did not try to explain accurately. Impressions, ideas, feelings, abstract ideas, all have in the *Treatise* a well-drawn path, which begins, in all cases, with the contact of the human being with his environment through his or her senses.

Hume attempted an explanation with the same tidiness of the process through which passions are mixed and enhanced. And in that effort of explanation, he resorts to a fact that can only be located in the realm of the physiological. In fact, what in Hume's psychological philosophy decisively contributes to the combination of feelings to strengthen the dominant passion are the movements and agitation of “animal spirits”, entities that are mentioned in *Treatise* only twice, one of them when Hume wants to explain the violence of certain passions.

When the dominant passion engulfs the weaker one, it happens that “animal spirits, once excited, easily receive a change of direction and it is easy to imagine that this change comes from the prevailing

condition". (Hume 1986: 170). Thus, when anger at the loved one increases the intensity of the love I feel for him, or when the impression I get from the martial nature of a military unit is associated with my friends, in which case it produces courage, or with my enemies, in which case it produces more fear, what seems to be the engine of these changes, or at least an irreplaceable fact in the causal chain, is that change of direction of the animal spirits to which Hume alludes.

Although most of the specialists in Hume affirm that it was not a neurophysiological explanation on the intensity of the feelings what he was looking for, because for him the physical aspect of the emotions belongs to the study of the "natural philosophy" and not to that of the moral one, my position is rather that the agitation of the "animal spirits" is, in the *Treatise*, a necessary neurophysiological moment in the causal chain that ends in intense passions. Hume, like his 17th-century French counterpart Descartes and Malebranche - who popularized the concept "animal spirits"—thought that a physical component was needed to account for the turbulence of some feelings. Without those episodes that supposedly take place in our brain, Hume's explanations seem incomplete, with clefts in the causal chain too large to be tolerated by Hume's very detailed mechanicism. This is even more evident in another type of fusion of passions that also have as a consequence the intensification of emotional agitation. They are the ones that take place when the human being makes what Hume calls a mental "effort", which corresponds more or less to what psychoanalysis calls psychic conflict. It is what happens for example when a desire must "fight" inside the mind with other desires that oppose it. This kind of internal combat also produces an agitation of the animal spirits which in turn leads to an intensification of passions. This is the explanation, according to Hume, of the fact that our desire for the forbidden is more intense and, for the pleasure, we experience when performing actions forbidden by law. Certain desires, according to this argument, gain intensity when they face opposition such as a prohibition. "The motive of duty when it opposes passions rarely dominates them, and when it does not achieve that effect it is rather apt to increase them (the passions), producing an opposition between our motives and principles. (1987:170) ... And in these cases

also the animal spirits have that crucial role in explaining the affective intensification. “The efforts the mind makes to master obstacles excite animal spirits and enliven passion.” (1987: 170) The same goes for uncertainty. Because when we experience uncertainty human beings use fantasy to “complete the idea” and that effort to fantasize, as in previous cases, “agitates animal spirits and gives additional strength to passion”. The animal spirits, which some commentators of our time have equated with the neural movements of contemporary neuroscience (the bad branch of this discipline), seem to be emanations of the brain. Hume does not the whole story of why this supposed “mental effort” involving affections increases emotional intensity. On the contrary, he considers it a fact that needs no verification: “The agitation of thought; the rapid movements it makes from one point of view to another, the variety of passions that follow one another, according to the different points of view, produces agitation in the mind and fuses them with the main passion. (1987: 172) The neuroscience implicit in Hume is a piece of folk psychology.

I contend that without this neurophysiological element Hume's explanation of the mixing of feelings under the dominant passion would seem weak. Hume, like Freud, yields to the temptation of an inner physical explanation because, if there is a process through which feelings become more intense, this process is not visible nor is it immediately associated with the behavioral manifestations of emotional turmoil. A physical explanation is the only possibility that remains.

Hume has the merit of emphasizing the psychological importance of the study of some facts that some could call strange and that have not received as much attention from soul scientists because they do not seem to be serious enough for scientific psychology. In that sense, he is like Freud when he tries to understand why some individuals are attracted to what is forbidden. He also tries to understand why quarrels or fights between couples can increase the intensity of the love feeling. Hume was aware that these oddities, if they are oddities, cannot be explained rationally and, for that reason, he, like Freud,

resorted to events that supposedly occur in our bodies to fill the hiatuses in the causal chain of these unusual behaviors.

And here it is important to point out another coincidence between Hume and Freud. Animal spirits and cathexis appear in both thinkers when they want to penetrate emotional intensity. But these psychic energies were for both thinkers not only the ground of emotional agitation but also the cause of irrational behaviors. Faced with the task of deciphering these irrational responses, they both yielded to the temptation to attribute explanatory power to blind forces of the body.

In both cases, Hume and Freud, it is however a question of conjectures constructed from the observation of psychological reactions of daily life, or of the consulting room in the case of Freud, not of true neurophysiological knowledge.

What Hume and Freud, like Descartes and Spinoza, were right about is that the intensity of our feelings is a factor that, when taken into account, can broaden our understanding of our actions, especially of those considered impulsive or irrational. I have already mentioned that some writers think that emotional intensity may have a place in the explanation of incontinent behavior. For this reason, a more naturalistic description and explanation of emotional intensity and concomitant facts such as the mixture of apparently contradictory feelings is desirable. By more naturalistic I imply, at a minimum, an explanation that does not resort to mysterious entities such as cathexis or animal spirits and that deals with the subject matter of intensity with the available knowledge in neurology and related sciences.[16]

[16] After rejecting the idea that the felt intensity of a feeling is a factor that can explain certain behaviors, Alfred Mele offers an interesting picture of motivational strength that, at least partially, relies for its completion on a future neurophysiology. “If there are action-desires, perhaps a future science will uncover the physical basis of their strength and the physical grounds of relative desire-strength”. (Mele 2003: 173)

q) Blackburn and Damasio

In our time, it is usually "neo-Humean" writers who incorporate emotional intensity into their theories of intentional action. It is the case of Simon Blackburn who, in his *Ruling Passions,* endeavors to demonstrate that practical reason (whose study he equates with that of the theory of action) is governed by affective proclivities and that what determines the result of the deliberations that precede an action is the force of our interests or what he calls our concerns. With this term—"concerns"—Blackburn refers to our most stable inclinations. Blackburn believes that it is the emotions that best reflect—and sometimes warn the person themselves—what those concerns are. Although he states that our practical life has many "flavors" and, for that reason, it is useless to try to define with precision "the" moral attitude, which means that for him the ethical attitude is not only an emotional response, nevertheless feelings are something like our most reliable radar to discover the features of the world that really matters to us. To discover, in other words, how we value our surroundings.

When we deliberate on what to do, the most important input is, according to this theory, the strength or intensity of our concerns, which is expressed in feelings. But as the assertion that our strongest interests -a force usually manifested through affectivity- are those that determine our intentions may seem tautological, Blackburn believes it necessary to find empirical evidence to "amplify" our knowledge of the phenomenology of human deliberation and corroborate the idea that the intensity of our feelings is one of the most important factors in our actions. Blackburn finds this experimental support in the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. [17]

[17] Blackburn posits that the relation between desires and believes on one hand, and actions on the other, is both logical and empirical. According to the principle that Blackburn issues to explain this double relationship: "It is analytic that (typically) creatures exhibit a causal structure that is *isomorphic* with the rational structure that the normative approach prizes". (Blackburn 2009: 57)

Damasio's idea that Blackburn appropriates is the “somatic marker hypothesis,” which is based on William James' theory of emotions. According to this hypothesis, evolution has endowed human beings with a system that operates in the body and that, through sensations, informs the person about the situation she is in and about the most probable consequences of the actions that are presented to the person as her possibilities of responding to that situation. For Damasio, without this system, the person would take much longer to detect the most important traits (most important for her well-being) of the scenario in which she is moving and it would also take longer to decide how to act. It is then a great evolutionary advantage that our brain can send us signals so quickly. The idea of Damasio and Blackburn is that these somatic markers act before the deliberative process and are the most important input of our rational processes. These somatic markers are of course the result of previous experiences of pain and pleasure, but once the person has incorporated them, the somatic markers machinery acts immediately. It is implicit in Damasio—and Blackburn—that the intensity of these somatic signals is a function of what we need to do. Very intense displeasure at a stimulus speaks to us of a greater danger than that involved if the displeasure is not so strong. The utility Blackburn sees in Damasio's theory is twofold: on the one hand, Blackburn starts from the premise that we often perceive and evaluate aspects of the environment unconsciously and the neuronal circuits that support the hypothesis of somatic markers would explain why some of our dispositions to act, or part of them, have been deliberated outside our consciousness. The second aspect that seems to interest Blackburn is that somatic markers have a variable intensity that reflects our assessments of the environment, including assessments of the various possibilities of action. Blackburn says about somatic markers:

> ... approval or disapproval of the options we deliberate on and the characteristics of the situations in which we think. …our visceral excitations are not only perceived but also play in determining what attracts and repels us or what we are inclined to do... somatic markers function as “instruments of bias”. Eventually (these markers) are translated into ticks and crosses on options about which we deliberate and features of the situations that we think about (Blackburn, 2009. 131)

But this aspect of Blackburn's theory as well as Damasio's hypothesis of somatic markers is vulnerable to at least five objections.

The first is that not all our decisions are preceded by a deliberation in which different options for action have competed through the strength of the feelings that accompany each one of them. This is warned by Blackburn himself when he says that there is not a single moral attitude and that many times we act guided, for example, only by duty. “An ethic can be shown in perfect calm” (Blackburn: 2009:13)

But if this is the case, it's not clear why Blackburn gives somatic markers such a level of generality. If we consider that it is possible for a person to act motivated mainly or exclusively by duty, in the way Kant considered an action to have moral worth, a moral reaction without emotional turmoil seems conceivable. The first objection is then about the exaggerated degree of generality given to these somatic markers.

A second objection is about how questionable it is to affirm that when there is an attitude of disgust or anger these intense bodily reactions *must* necessarily be present. Blackburn thinks so:

> ...A person who feels cold and calculating anger, determined to execute long calculated revenge, may not show his teeth or clench his fists involuntarily. But if he is genuinely furious, and not, for example, feeling dispassionate malice, then there will be a disposition to that kind of behavioral expression. If you know that your enemy has gotten rid of your plans, or if you have obtained another triumph, your heart beats more intensely, you grit your teeth, you vent your bad mood with your family, and so on. (Blackburn: 130)

The intensity referred to by Blackburn in this passage is episodic intensity. Granted this type of strength is important to understand many intentional actions. It is likely that the eagerness to explain this kind of momentary intensity led Freud to postulate a quantitative factor. It is the one that, by means of sensations, imposes on the person a kind of urgency to act, while dominating most of her thoughts of the moment. This intensity is effectively characterized by the “strong” visceral and muscular reactions that Blackburn mentions and that William James called the essence of emotion. But previously I said that we also use the expression emotional intensity or intense emotions to refer to those feelings that motivate over a more or less long time repeated actions that pursue the same end. And it is when we think of this

type of attitude that we should ask ourselves if they are necessarily accompanied by these somatic markers. It is also possible to be guided by a feeling of hostility in perfect calm. The events that Damasio calls ¨somatic markers¨ may be important for understanding some episodes, but hardly they can be part of the definition of what Blackburn terms ¨our concerns¨. Neither psychoanalysis nor any other psychological theory has investigated in depth whether there is a relationship between, on the one hand, the intensity of the "short term", that is the intensity of the subjective experience, and, on the other, the more attitudinal intensity, which motivates more actions in longer periods. Freud insinuated that there was. Deepening Freud´s answer will be what I will do in the penultimate section of this chapter.

The third objection to Blackburn's proposal is Damasio's theory of emotions, which has been subjected by M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker (Bennett and Hacker 2003) to a devastating critique. The strongest criticism is that neuroscientists like Damasio commit the mereological fallacy, which is the fallacy made when functions or characteristics of the whole are attributed to a part. Thus, Damasio and neuroscientists say that brains "thinks," "perceive," or "makes choices" and that is a conceptual error. Thinking, perceiving, or making choices are behaviors that can only be attributed to an animal or a human being as a whole, not to one of its parts.

When this critique points to the theme of emotions, it replicates several of Anthony Kenny's arguments, presented half a century earlier in his still influential *Action, Emotion and Will,* (Kenny 1963) against the pretense of identifying emotions with certain states of the body. It is the critique therefore to that idea of William James that reappears in Damasio's theory of emotions. For Kenny, as for Hacker and Bennett, in line with Wittgenstein's teachings, a state of the body is not an emotion. The definition of fear is not just shortness of breath or increased heart rate. These reactions are part of what we call fear when they occur in certain circumstances, namely in the face of a situation that I find frightening. Without such circumstances, the body's reactions do not constitute an emotion. Damasio would answer that, in addition to visceral and muscular responses, certain neural circuits are characteristic of emotions. Thus, what

would define an emotion are these circuits that would be activated each time the emotion occurs. But this answer insists on the same conceptual error. This error is to ignore the fact that the criterion for identifying a certain emotion are the circumstances in which these physiological responses occur and the observable behaviors of the person. Only with that criterion do we know that we are facing fear and not anger or love. Perhaps it is because of this conceptual error that the empirical bases of the neurosciences to explain emotion are so weak. The evidence of a causal relationship between the stimulation of some areas of the brain and the occurrence of certain emotions is currently dubious.

A fourth objection is that Damasio is firmly committed to establishing causal connections between mental states and specific regions of the brain. However, as have been pointed out by different authors (Crary In *Emotions and Understanding*. 2009) there is consensus in the sense that psychological states are realized in many different ways. Moreover, if a lesion of the brain precludes an individual to feel an emotion, this fact does not authorize the inference that feeling an emotion is feeling the somatic reaction to certain circumstances. Rather, what needs to be investigated is whether that injury in the brain affects the capacity to be committed to ideals or persist in caring about goals. (Hacker in *Emotions and Understanding.* 58)

Finally, the fifth objection is that because he is trying to emphasize the precise physical location causing mental states, Blackburn, following Damasio, has to point out that many of these somatic reactions occur outside consciousness awareness, as if a strict neurological causal mechanism is at play here without the intervention of cognitive faculties. Referring to the limbic system, responsible for basic emotions such as fear or anger, Blackburn says: " (this system) operates without control by high order cerebral processes. We may be, and often are, unaware of what sets it off, although we will be conscious of the resulting anger and fear… we are often opaque to ourselves¨. (Blackburn 127). But this is dubious as well. Consciousness is a matter of degree. It is difficult to conceive that an aspect of the environment that is affecting us can *wholly* escape consciousness awareness. There are indeed some situations in which our

feelings are caused by something in the surroundings that is difficult to pinpoint. But that is not the rule, nor is possible, I believe, that a salient feature of the situation that has the power of eliciting an emotional response can remain completely hidden from the person.

Blackburn is attentive to these limitations in Damasio's theory and therefore speaks of the integration of neurophysiological facts with an essential characteristic of emotions which is their “directionality” i.e. emotions are always directed at an object, they are about something, they are intentional. But the way in which Damasio proposes - and Blackburn endorses—that this integration takes place is also objectionable. Damasio says that there is a “juxtaposition” between representations or, as he calls them, “images” of a situation, let's say dangerous, and the characteristic reactions of fear, or arrogance. The objection is to the use of the word image as used by Damasio which is a use that dates back to the 18th century. It is Hume's notion that “ideas” are faint images of “impressions”. This concept of images, as a well-defined thing, is also a consequence of a mechanicism that tries to explain emotions through causal relationships between putative atomic mental components.

Notwithstanding these objections, Blackburn is right in underscoring the importance that the intensity of our affections has in some cases of intentional action. For this reason, it is advisable to look for another way for approaching the subject matter of the strength of our feelings.

Before finding this other approach, it would be good to remember how we have come to ask ourselves about the strength of affections. What I am trying to offer is a concept of drive or desire less entangled in the biologism of Freud and some of his followers. I have considered that the aspect of the concept of drive, as proposed by psychoanalysis, which can contribute to the understanding of intentional actions is what Freud called psychic energy. Regarding this concept, Freud offered very general outlines, but even these thick notes are trapped in biological conjectures never tested. Freud postulated the existence of psychic energy when he wanted to explain a fact that no observer can escape, which is the force or

violence of some feelings and reactions. Then the experience of “intensity” is the starting point for studying the concept of psychic energy. We find this intensity in two aspects of our lives: feelings and desires, which are in most cases intertwined. What is needed is a more naturalistic version of the phenomenon of intensity and with this version try to understand the role that the phenomenon of intensity plays in the drives.

I propose that John Dewey's theory of emotions can do justice to Freud's intuition about psychic energy and thus fill that void that Velleman and others believe exists in the explanation of human action when we stay with the tradition of propositional psychology.

r) A theory of emotional intensity with Dewey and Freud.

Dewey's theory of emotion contains, I suggest, the elements necessary to frame a naturalistic understanding of the notion of psychic energy. Consequently, I will endeavor to demonstrate that this theory can contribute to clarifying the concepts of emotional intensity—and therefore of the strength of desire, which is critical to understand psychic energy—and also the notions of displacement, as described by psychoanalysis and the concept of objectless desires and emotions. The explanation of these phenomena can be accomplished, with Dewey, without resorting to entities or events such as cathexis nor resorting to a theory, such as Damasio´s, that misrepresents the phenomena of emotional strength.

As I stated in the first part where I rehearsed his approach to psychoanalysis, one of Dewey´s core ideas in the field of philosophical psychology is that it is a mistake to dissect behavior into discrete entities - mental or physical—causally connected. From his early article, “The reflect arc concept in psychology” (Dewey 1963: 252), Dewey strove to demonstrate that stimulus and response, as conceptualized by Pavlov and American conductism, are not two separate events that happen to be causally connected. Rather “...what is wanted is that sensory stimulus, central connections, and motor responses shall be viewed not

as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as a division of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc". (Dewey 1896) The "whole" is always the human being acting to arrange his or her environment. The technical term that Dewey coins to refer to this whole is "coordination". It refers to the coordination that results from the entanglement of the human being with her circumstances.

Dewey uses the example of a child candle interaction. Imagine the situation of a child, excited by the view of the fire, reaching it with her hand and getting burned. Rather than conceptualizing the candle and its fire as a stimulus and the withdrawing the hand as a response, we should begin

> "with sensorimotor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement which is primary and the sensation which is secondary... In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking and not the sensation of light. " (Dewey 254)

Multiple things occur around a human being in any given situation. Of all the events that are constantly happening, only a few are given a meaning, which is to say that only a few are invested with value by the individual. Those things that are endowed with value are the ones that are part of a bigger form of coordination and it is only from amongst these already meaningful events that the naive psychologist can find something to be called stimulus and response. The problem with the naive psychologist is that he ignores the whole structure and instead searches for atomistically conceived events. "The reflex arc idea is defective in that it assumes sensory stimulus and motor response as distinct psychical existence, while in reality they are always inside a coordination and have their significance purely from the part played in maintaining or reconstituting the coordination." (Dewey 255) Thus, in the case of the child-the candle-the burning, the act is the seeing. The movement of the arm, that is the reaching the fire and the withdrawing, has to be controlled and stimulated by the act of vision. The movements of the arm have no value or significance if considered outside the coordination of movements imposed by the act of seeing. The reality is that the act of seeing and the movements of the arm constitute a whole and have no significance

whatsoever but for this structure. It is only when we reflect on them that we can artificially designate individual parts or causal factors. But the reality is an undivided experience.

In his article “The theory of emotion” (Dewey 1963: 214) Dewey considers an emotional reaction under the tenet of it being the coordination of activity. Upon reflecting on an emotion we may find, only for purposes of analysis, three elements: the mode of behavior -which is the primary thing-; the idea or the object of an emotion; and the quale or the “feel” of the emotion, this last element which I would like to equate with Freud's psychic energy. But these elements have significance only as parts of the coordinating activity.

The mode of behavior is the primary thing. Dewey states that “Emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior which is purposive, or has intellectual content, and which also reflects itself into feeling or Affects, as the subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose.” (Dewey 233) This means that both the emotional seizure (i.e the quale) and the cognitive content owe their existence to the activity of the person.

Let say that I see a tiger and an emotional response ensues, as most likely would be the case. What is central in the explanation of my experience is my action, be it running away or fighting with the animal. It is either mode of behavior that constitutes both the ideational component of the emotion (the object of the emotion) and the emotional seizure (the feel of the emotion).

It is clear that my activity, say that of running away, constitutes the emotional seizure. Running away, which is an act useful for survival and which is due either to instinct or habituation, causes my heart to beat faster, the circulation of my blood to accelerate, and so on. All these physiological changes have a

teleological content because they are changes that occur as a preparation for my running. It is the repercussion in my consciousness of these changes that makes for the feel or quale of the emotion. [18]

What is perhaps less evident is that the ideational content of the emotion is due to the action of running as well. Indeed, the object of my emotion, "a frightful tiger", is constituted as such solely by my reaction. Only because of my running, or to the preparation for my running, the tiger acquires the meaning of an object to be afraid of, or to escape from. If it were not for my action of escaping, the tiger would be one amongst many things on the horizon of my possible actions with no special value for me. So the act of running is central for the explanation of the emotion.

Accordingly, for Dewey, every emotion is a form of coordination, or adjustment, of the sensory activity, the so-called stimulus, and the induced motor activity, the response. They are both phases of the same act and have to be thought of as such, as phases cooperating with each other to accomplish a single end. These phases have significance or value only because they belong to a whole which is defined by an end to be accomplished. Emotion occurs when this coordination does not occur spontaneously, one might say. When the sensory input, the seeing, and the actions need to be adjusted in such a form so as to accomplish an end. In the example I have been using the end would be to escape. If there is no need for an adjustment, we have a case, according to Dewey, of mere habit, that is, a frictionless action where the sensory and the motor phases are well adjusted. Therefore, emotion takes place when an event disrupts my expectations regarding the horizon of my possible actions. Because of this unexpected quality, there is a struggle since the exciting stimulus overflows the possibilities of acting. These two phases have to be adjusted so that they contribute to the act. When there are no obstacles in my way, when I can perform an action without impediments, there is no emotion itself. It is the conflict, i.e. the presence of inhibitors or obstacles that generates the emotion. And the greater the conflict, the greater the distance between the ideal motor

[18] This is the part of William James' explanation of emotion, which Dewey endorses.

response and the limitations of the environment, the greater the emotional excitement. For example, the feeling of injustice is stronger the less I can do to repair it. The anger I can have for a person is much more intense, says Dewey, when I'm sitting on the couch at home than when I can execute the acts of my revenge. That is to say, the more the barriers for the discharge action, the more will be the intensity of the emotions. Anger, our author affirms, is greater before the fight, or when the possibility of avenging an offense is remote, than at the moment of swapping fists with my adversary.

When this coordination fails, we have a case of disorganization, means and ends are divided. The different acts interfere with each other and the coordination is disturbed. As when I fall prey to terror and my movements cease to have any usefulness.[19]

My thesis is that the repercussion in consciousness of the attitude in question, say running, is a more naturalistic way of referring to the concept of psychic energy, as postulated by Freud. If we don't lose sight of the fact that the reverberation in my mind of organic changes following motor response cannot be isolated from the situation of the emotional response[20], we can find in this emotional feel or quale, most of the features that Freud attributed to psychic energy.

The intensity of felt emotion, due to the intensity of the organic changes, is what Freud was referring to when he spoke of “hyperintense representations. “

Moreover, the way in which Dewey presents things allows us to understand better, in a more naturalistic way, the phenomenon of displacement, which psychoanalysis has focused on and which exhibits something akin to an unbound or free psychic energy. In fact, according to Dewey, when the channels of

[19] It is in these cases, according to Dewey, where I am thrown back upon myself and my self consciousness occupies most of my thoughts.

[20] This means that it does not make sense to analyze the feel of the emotion, the return of the wave of the attitude, as an independent phenomenon. This is one of the problems that faces the experimental investigation of the emotions, the idea that an artificially induced viscero motor reaction can be taken, for analysis purposes, out of its context.

discharge through action are denied, (for moral, strategic, or practical impediments) the reverberation in the consciousness of that muscular and neuro-vegetative activity has to be adapted for other purposes and become what Dewey calls an "attitude". This attitude, which consists of condensing memories and the recapitulation of past actions, can become a reinforcer of actions directed to new ends. This is also what Freud said of psychic energy "being invested" in other persons or other activities. The emotion of anger for example, no longer being at the service of attacking, can be used for a different aim. It is the concept in Dewey of "emotional attitude" which has a close meaning, I suggest, to that of unbound psychic energy.

The attitude is precisely that which was a complete activity once but is no longer so... The activity of seizing a prey or attacking an enemy, a movement having its meaning in itself, is reduced or aborted; it is simply an attitude. (This action of attacking) As an instinctive reaction is thoroughly ingrained in the organism; it represents the actual coordinations of thousands of thousands of ancestors; it tends to start into action whenever its associated stimuli occur. But the very fact that it is now reduced to an attitude or a *tendency*... shows that primary (originating) activity is inhibited. Pursuing or attacking no longer exists as a whole but simply as a coordinated phase, or as a contributory means in a larger activity. (Dewey 1963: 246. My emphasis)

What Dewey thus describes is the basis of what Freud called displacement. The organic changes that appear when prepared to attack are, as a consequence of something that inhibits the aggressive response, put at the service of another behavior. A new activity that, without allowing the complete discharge of aggression, can put that attitude at the service of other goals:

It is then in the reduction of actions once performed for their own sake, to attitudes now useful simply as supplying a contributory, a reinforcing or checking factor, in some more comprehensive activity... The

attitude stands for the recapitulation of thousands of acts done in the past... but the immediate and present need is to bring this attitude of anger which reflects the former act of seizing into some connection with the act of getting even or of moral control or whatever the idea may be. (Dewey 248)

Dewey's theory, written at the time Freud composed his first writings, (the article is from 1894) is, I suggest, a more naturalistic explanation than Freud's of how psychic energy can be displaced and invested in new aims.

Moreover, there is also in Dewey's theory an explanation of the feelings and desires without objects, to which I allude in previous sections, that fits well with Freud's quick note on this phenomenon. What happens in these cases, according to Dewey, is that these "attitudes" appear in the absence of the object that normally arouses them, and when this occurs these attitudes "provide themselves with an object, with a rational excuse for being" in the manner, I would add, of a Freudian rationalization. This occurs when "an unusual stimulus takes advantage and controls the lines of coordination and discharge that were constructed in relation to the usual or normal stimulus". This is a regular process. (Dewey 224) So it is possible, and indeed frequent, for a feeling to appear in unusual situations and in the absence of its usual object "supply itself with an object".

I contend that this function of contribution or reinforcement described by Dewey, without the aura of mystery of the cathexis, and these attitudes that emerge without its usual objects, is what Velleman refers to with the metaphor of psychic energies. Human beings, says Dewey, learn to inhibit these energies and direct them to other ends.

Dewey's theory also has the advantage of directly linking the impulse, or, if you want to use psychoanalytic terms, the drive, with the affections and thus overcoming the polemic within psychoanalysis, a pseudo-

problem indeed, about whether “affection” or drive should be the most important concept in the theory of psychoanalytic motivation.

I am proposing to understand emotional intensity as Dewey understands it, to equate intensity with psychic energy, and to use this notion of intensity or energy as a complement to the desire/belief model of propositional psychology. The term “psychic energy” however, which is only used by psychoanalysis, has the advantage of functioning as a theoretical concept with explanatory potential. It refers to various observable facts, such as those described by Dewey, and thus it is expedient, for the sake of economy of expressions, to maintain its use.

Now what Dewey said in his theory is referred only to episodic emotional turmoil. Outside of his brief note on the possibility of channeling an emotional reaction to ends other than the original, there is not in the theory of this American philosopher much more to think what Hume aptly called “calm and strong passions”, i.e those that exert more influence on the character. Freud hinted at an explanation that blends the concept of psychic energy with more stable features of personality.

A suggestion to understand that transition from what is intense but momentary to what is calm, strong, and more stable, is given by Freud in his beautiful essay “Mourning and Melancholia”. There he unveils the trajectory that the libido (the word Freud used to refer to the erotic psychic energy) has followed throughout the life of a person. He does it retrospectively, that is to say not from an evolutionary perspective that would show how the human being “accumulates” affections towards people from the beginning of life onwards, but instead, he discovers the sediment that the intense relations have left in the internal world of the person through the impact that the deaths or the separation from the loved ones have in the innermost aspects of our personality. When someone with whom I had an emotional attachment ceased to be part of my life, I have to recover from that loss by “withdrawing” the libido that I deposited, as it were, in the internal representation of the now absent loved one, and redirect this energy

to other activities or people. It is a “detachment piece by piece” (Freud 1917) of the psychic energy that I “invested” Freud would say that, in the internalized figure of the beloved one, removal of the libido of “each of the memories and each of the expectations” generated in the relationship with that other. The work of mourning consists precisely in that gradual withdrawal of the amount of affection sedimented in a person's inner world and redirecting it towards new aims. [21]

Mourning and Melancholia shows the vicissitudes of that psychic energy. If Freud's use of the word “libido” in this article is consistent with that which dominates the rest of his books, we can conclude with him that it is the succession of intense episodes with the significant ones, episodes that can be understood in terms of Dewey's theory, that are transferred to one's inner world and transformed into the ghostly presence of the significant others, which determine the most stable characteristics of our personality. I am positing then a causal and necessary connection between our more stable affections and moments of most intense feeling.

If the above considerations are correct, we have reached a more naturalistic understanding of some of the phenomena that Freud grouped under the name of psychic energy and, by that way, a modified way of understanding drive or desire within psychoanalytic theory. The drive is a conative attitude, an impulse to change a state of affairs, which coincides with what analytical philosophy has labeled as desire. Psychoanalysis has insisted that many of these desires are accompanied by an amount of affection, libidinal or aggressive psychic energy, the intensity of which must be understood, with Dewey, as the repercussion on the consciousness of the changes produced in the body when the person acts or is going to act in a concrete situation that is generally unforeseen. Such intensity or energy has the potential to be displaced and become a more stable trait of personality when, through custom or habit, it becomes an

[21] About grief this is what Dewey has to say: “They are phenomena of *loss.* Reactions surge forth to some stimulus, or phase of a situation; the object appropriate to most of these, the factor necessary to co-ordinate all the rising discharges, is gone; and hence they interfere with one another- the expectation, or kinesthetic image, is thrown upon itself¨. (Dewey 221)

expression of the affective commitments we assume. Thus, in a way suggested already by Hume and developed by Freud, the emotional intensity, at the beginning episodic and triggered by specific environmental stimuli, can become a steady part of the repertoire of attitudes. It constitutes then, in a more naturalistic language, the psychic energy that Velleman believes can make up for the deficiencies of the propositional psychology model.

It is precisely by attempting an explanation of the type of behaviors or actions that in philosophy have been called irrational or incontinent, that Freud and his followers conceived of the idea of drive as a metabolized expression of our biology. The considerations I have presented in this part of the book, inspired by analytical philosophy interested in action and psychoanalysis, recommend leaving this idea aside.

Rather, in order to understand irrational or incontinent behavior, psychoanalysis had to look at what constitutes its most decisive contribution to the understanding of the human being: the unconscious. Because it is in the relationship that these impulses have with our linguistic capacities and with the other mental contents that we must seek the explanation of our most erratic and unpredictable moments.

Part two.

I. Freud and The nature of the unconscious.

Among the writings that Freud devoted to elucidating the concept of the unconscious the most influential have been *The Interpretation of Dreams* published in 1900, the *Writings on Metapsychology* of 1915, in which the article entitled "The Unconscious" stands out, and then the book *The Ego and the id* published in 1923.

The article "The Unconscious" is an example of an essay which is at once brilliant in suggesting lines of inquiry but falls prey to the reification of concepts referring to mental contents. This short work begins with penetrating pages in which he justifies the necessity of the unconscious concept, a justification that remains valid to this day and probably served the Wittgenstein of the *Blue Book*.[22] But then, in the sections that follow this powerful introduction, Freud tries to construct an explanation of unconscious functioning in which he describes an inner world inhabited by entities and processes so disconnected from visible behaviors that it is difficult to prove their existence (i.e. that of these entities and processes). Thus, for example, when Freud asks himself how the unconscious differs from the conscious, he initially poses two options for an answer: either it is the case that an idea (representation) that was unconscious produces, when it passes to the conscious "a new fixation, in the manner of a transcription of the corresponding representation" or it is the case that the passage from the unconscious to the conscious supposes "a

[22] Freud (1915, 120): "Now Psychoanalysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this method of inference to ourselves also- a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not constitutionally disposed. If we do this, we must say that all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belong to someone else and are to be explained by the mental life ascribed to that person". I think that these evoking lines may have influenced Wittgenstein on how to conceive the unconscious contents and later developments by Donald Davidson on the same subject.

change of state that is fulfilled in identical material and in the same locality" (Freud: 1915: 170). These two possibilities are even very difficult to conceive of. In no other text does Freud give even a suggestion of what is meant by "a new fixation or transcription", nor does he elaborate what is meant by "a change of state in the same locality". Only when one treats mental contents and processes as things, i.e discrete entities and the mind as a private theater, and when one obliterates the conceptual and therefore necessary connection of the mind with actions, is it possible to tinker with these options.

In the end, as it could not be otherwise, Freud dismisses both possibilities and opts for a third one, which is the position he will hold throughout his work, namely that conscious contents are linguistified contents while unconscious ones are not.[23] This position however is problematic as well. In fact, we saw in the previous chapters that the thesis that the passage from the unconscious to the conscious consists in the adhesion of words to images, because unconscious representations or ideas are "the idea of the thing", and conscious representations are thing-representations plus language, assumes mental categories that some time ago were discredited in the philosophy of mind.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, most of the philosophers whose ideas on psychoanalysis I have been dealing with, concur with Freud in that the notion of unconscious motives has widened our understanding of human behavior. Therefore, they would all agree with Freud when he says that psychology needs the concept of the unconscious because with it many more behaviors become intelligible. The concept unconscious is needed because "... our most intimate daily experience introduces us to sudden ideas the source of which we are ignorant and to results of mentation arrived at we not know how." (Freud 1915, 117).

[23] This sense of "linguistification" that can be attributed to Freud is different from the one we find in Habermas.

Freud approaches the task of clarifying the ontological status and the causal relations of unconscious contents from two different perspectives. These two perspectives somehow coincide with the two ways that psychoanalysis has had in conceiving of desire.

The first perspective from which Freud endeavours to explain the unconscious can be called the “First nature perspective”. It gives paramount importance to the contents of the unconscious which are anchored in a body putatively unsocialized. According to this point of view, there exists in the mind, whenever a grown up individual perceives something, " the idea of the word (Wortvorstellung) " and "the idea of the thing” (Sachvortstellung). The latter is the representation that is caused by a perception. It is like an image or pictorial reproduction of the thing seen (or felt or touched or smelled) in the manner proposed by classical empiricism. According to Freud, unconscious representation is only the idea of the thing. The conscious representation or the conscious idea is the representation of the thing plus the representation of the word or, which is the same, the idea of the thing plus the idea of the word. "The conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus the verbal idea corresponding to it, whilst the unconscious idea is that of the thing alone". (Freud: 147). Moreover, for Freud the unconscious system contains the “thing cathexes of the object, the first and true object cathexes”.

Unconscious content would then be something of a pre-linguistic or paleo-linguistic substratum and the conscious would be that pre-linguistic substratum to which the verbal has been added or adhered.

In terms of their functional status, the unconscious is the domain of the primary process, which is chronologically first and more rudimentary than the secondary process to which the cognitive or higher functions of the human being correspond. When Freud speaks of the primary process he is referring to a mode of functioning of thoughts and ideas which is free from the constrictions of rationality and also to certain characteristics that states of mind supposedly have when they are "pure state," purified, that is,

from the influence of socialization and culture. As we have said, for Freud these unsocialized or first-nature mental contents subsist throughout life and are traceable in adult life.

In the primary process the pleasure principle reigns. The primary process, says Freud in *The Interpretation* of Dreams,is " unable to do anything but wish." By this expression he means the putative state of desires before they are challenged by the demands of reality. Primary process is subject to the pleasure principle. "Their fate depends only upon the degree of their strength". In addition, the primary process is timeless, which means that they are not ordered temporarily, nor are they affected by the passage of time. "In fact bear no relation to time at all".

In addition, these processes are exempt from mutual contradiction which means that this system does not repudiate contradictory ideas. We could sum up Freud' notion of the primary process by saying that it substitutes psychic reality for external reality. Freud always held that the primary process becomes visible in fantasy and child playing, in impulsive behaviors and in schizophrenia.

As I mentioned in the first part of my work, on different occasions Freud hinted at the body as the seat of these contents. In *The ego and id* , he said that the unconscious takes place or exists "in a material that remains unknown" (Freud 1923). This kind of expression has stimulated many authors after him to speculate about that unknown medium which would be the realm of the unconscious. Many have suggested - starting from Freud but repeating an idea that can be found even in Plato - that this realm is closer to the somatic than to the mental.

Thus conceived, the unconscious is the source of all desires, beliefs and thoughts. Everything else, such as language for instance or more complex cognitive operations, has a contingent relationship with these primary process contents.

The other perspective from which Freud approaches this topic stresses the mental contents that come into being as a consequence of the collision between the desires and the external world. These are the contents related to repression and the defense mechanisms.

Freud does not always negotiate well the supposed existence of these two types of unconscious contents.

This second perspective takes off ground from the fact that there are desires that do not fit well in the interaction of the person with her environment. Either because those desires contradict social norms and what the person wants to think of herself, as Freud sustained in his early writings, or because the content of those desires generate in the child the fear of losing her parents' love, as he sustained in his later works. Whichever explanation is more convincing, the fact is that individuals soon learn that many of their impulses collide with societal expectations. When this happens, the person has at his disposal the possibility of "censoring" or "repressing" these desires and the beliefs associated with them, without being aware of this procedure. From this repression arises the unconscious.

From this second perspective, in which the defense mechanisms are of paramount importance, unconscious contents have more intentionality. They are not blind forces stemming from the body, but rather desires, with their concomitant beliefs, that have undergone a disfiguration so that they can be gratified in a disguised form.

The content of dreams is the paradigm of this kind of reshaping of desires. The dream is like the symptom in neurotics, in the sense that in the dream a kind of agreement or transaction crystallizes between the unconscious impulses that are inadmissible for the person, and the ideas that push for that censorship. This transaction takes place through the deformation of those desires. The unconscious desires and thoughts must be distorted because in this way, covert or disguised, they can appear in the person's consciousness without causing as much anxiety.

In this second perspective, the emphasis is on the deformation of the desires. Some of these complicated strategies are depicted by Freud in the article "Instincts and their vicissitudes" and in many of his clinical writings. Unlike the first perspective, this more intentional view portrays the unconscious as more strategic.

Anglo Saxon philosophy has considered exclusively this second, more plausible perspective for thinking about the unconscious. As we also saw in the first part, there is not much that can be said about the primary process as has been conceived by Freud and by many contemporary psychoanalysts, except to correct its fundamental assumptions. Whereas the process of deformation or concealment of desires has proven critical, for some authors, for the understanding of the more common forms of irrationality.

From the works I am about to gloss it can be gathered that Anglo-Saxon philosophy has tried two ways of explaining the unconscious concept. One is the one followed by MacIntyre, Habermas and Finnkelstein, for whom this concept is clarified if we focus on desires, affections and thoughts that are expressed in the person's behavior but that the person cannot verbalize. We find this idea canvassed in Wittgenstein.

The other path is the one that derives from the holistic conception of the mental. Its champions are Davidson, Rorty and Marcia Cavell. For this second path, unconscious are those "parts" of the mind, each composed of desires, beliefs and feelings that have been set apart from other mental contents, i.e. that do not participate in the internal conversation with the rest of the network of conscious beliefs and desires of the person. The unconscious would be those mental contents that do not have such a strong logical link with the rest of the mind, namely with the conscious part and with the principles that guide rational behaviors.

These two modes are figures, something like diagrams useful to illuminate unconscious behaviors. They are instruments designed to make the idea of unconscious contents clearer and to avoid the path of hypostatizing a "material that remains as yet undefined" whose ontological status is impossible to pin

down. My suggestion is that each of these two characterizations corresponds to distinct types of unconscious contents or to distinct moments in the process by virtue of which an unconscious desire or thought becomes conscious so I will defend the proposition that the integration of the two models is desirable. However, I will also contend that some instances of the unconscious are not captured by either of these two approaches, from which I conclude that a general account of the unconscious is not possible yet.

II. The unconscious as dilinguistification.

s) MacIntyr

While the discussion of psychoanalytic ideas carried out by Russell, Dewey, and Wittgenstein takes place as chapters within works of more general scope, Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-) published in 1958 *The Unconscious. A Conceptual Analysis*. (Routledge 1958, 2004), the first book devoted entirely to interpreting psychoanalytic ideas from the perspective of analytic philosophy of mind. It is a short work that acknowledges Freud's brilliant contribution to the human sciences and expresses conviction about the healing power of psychoanalytic therapy, while pointing out conceptual confusions in Freud's thought.

MacIntyre believes that the conceptual framework for understanding psychoanalytic theory is Aristotelianism. What prevents a human being from achieving the ideal of a rational life, as Aristotle conceived this ideal, is living dominated by ill-conceived desires, desires generated by exaggerated feelings and fantasies. To intensely fear something that is not dangerous or to be indifferent towards a threatening situation are examples of mistaken practical judgments.

For this reason a psychoanalytic understanding of desire and fantasy is necessary to understand, and to be able to overcome, the obstacles that interfere with the achievement of a rational life.

This, logically, has implications for political philosophy because a theory of a just society, which for an Aristotelian like MacIntyre is a society in which citizens can develop their potential as human beings without barriers, must incorporate the teachings of psychoanalysis about the internal, emotional attachments, one might say, that impede the self-realization of individuals. A political theory that does not take psychoanalytic insights into account is therefore "seriously flawed" in the same way that a

psychoanalytic understanding that is not integrated into, and complemented by, a moral and political philosophy is seriously flawed. (MacIntyre 2004: 27).[24]

One might disagree with MacIntyre when he says that Aristotelian philosophy is the one that has best articulated, in the Western tradition, the ideal of a rational life, but one cannot deny that the concept of psychoanalytic cure needs a normative ideal to make it clearer. Nor can it be denied that the normative ideal of psychoanalysis, regardless of whether it is formulated under the canon of Aristotle's practical philosophy, as proposed by MacIntyre, must be related to the ideals of freedom and rationality. Psychoanalytic therapy exists to help people recover their inner freedom.

Like Wittgenstein, MacIntyre postulates that an unconscious desire is one that, while being the motive of a behavior, cannot be expressed verbally by the person. When I act motivated by an unconscious desire there is a discrepancy between what I do and what I say as an explanation for my behavior. To the question "Why are you doing that?" When I am doing something driven by an unconscious desire, my answer will be involuntarily and necessarily false, because a sort of interference or short circuit in my internal world prevents me from knowing and articulating my true motives.

MacIntyre's thesis is that Freud was a victim of conceptual confusion in formulating this finding. This thesis has two related parts: the first is that Freud did not differentiate between motives and causes of behavior; the second is that the concept of "unconscious" as put forward by psychoanalysis is useful for the description of behavior but dispensable for explanation. According to the second part of the thesis, the causal relations between childhood experiences and adult personality traits, about which psychoanalysis

[24] One point of collaboration between psychoanalysis and moral philosophy is the study of the problems of reification and alienation. The treatment given to these problems by the still vigorous Frankfurt school, Axel Honneth to the problem of reification and Rainer Forst to that of alienation, is an invitation to an interdisciplinary collaboration with psychoanalysis. This is already found in Honneth's work but not in Forst's, whose understanding of the phenomenon of alienation (noumenal alienation, as he calls it) could be enriched with a psychoanalytic contribution.

more than any other current of psychology has insisted on, can be established without invoking the concept of the unconscious.

Regarding the first part, Freud's most important achievement, for MacIntyre, was to discover for psychology a new way of looking at the actions of human beings. Thanks to this new look, Freud found motives and intentions in actions in which no one, before him, had been able to discern a purpose[25]. Freud revealed that the obsessive ritual, daytime fantasies, dreams, some forgetfulness, lapses in speech and writing, among other behaviors, have a purpose. There is something that people want to say and do through these symptoms. The revolutionary finding of psychoanalysis consists therefore in having discovered a teleological dimension, a meaning, in behaviors that previously seemed erratic:

Even those novelists most aware of how much of human reality is opaque, Marcel Proust and Henry James, portrayed the shadows of misunderstanding against a light of comprehension. But Freud systematically explores the puzzling, the hitherto incomprehensible and the abnormal in human life to such a degree that he alters the boundaries between the intelligible and unintelligible. (MacIntyre: 91)

MacIntyre's contention is that Freud would not have fully understood his own finding since he referred to the unconscious desires of neurotics, as "causes" of behaviors, when in fact they are motives or, what amounts to the same thing, purposes, intentions or reasons.

The difference between reasons (or purposes, motives, intentions) and causes has been posited by several philosophers, emblematically by Kant. The actions of human beings are directed by reasons, i.e. by purposes, which can be explained by the person acting. They are reasons which, from the agent's

[25] It is thanks to psychoanalysis that we have widened the range of what the word "actions" covers. For we now know that, for example, a bodily paralysis that has no organic causes can be also a way of acting.

perspective, confer rationality on an action. Causes, on the other hand, exist in the natural world, which is why one often speaks of "blind forces" to refer to the forces of nature that act as causes. The dominant view in the analytic philosophy of mind was, until Davidson's writings, that the explanation of the behavior of human beings should pay attention only to the purpose, i.e. the reasons, of the action. In the explanation of the events that take place in nature, on the other hand, it is necessary to establish laws that make clearer the connection between the causes, which are the antecedent conditions, and their effects. This cause- effect relationship found in the natural world is contingent, since it has not been decided by any of the objects participating in this relationship. In the behavior of humans, on the other hand, the decision that the person makes about the order or sequence of his actions is essential.

This view, that explanations in psychology must be teleological and therefore hermeneutic, was developed by Wittgenstein precisely in his criticisms of psychoanalysis and was taken up by several generations of analytic philosophers[26]. Elizabeth Anscombe, in this line of thought, affirms that in the explanation of intentional actions, exclusive attention must be paid to purposes. She does not deny the existence of causality in mental phenomena ("mental causality") but when it comes to feelings and actions, which are the mental facts that interest psychoanalysts, causal factors explain much less - if anything - than reasons. Thus, in feelings, says Anscombe, also following Wittgenstein, we must differentiate between the object of the feeling, say fear, and the cause of that fear. I can be annoyed by what a person said, and that, the remark of the person, would be the object, but the cause of my annoyance is the instant that something or someone reminds me of what that person said. A child can be frightened in front of a red rag, when his older brother, in a malicious way, tells him that the red rag is a piece of Satan. The cause of the child's fear is the evil remark of the older brother, but the object of the

[26] Until Donald Davidson, through a famous article published in 1963, persuaded many analytic philosophers that a teleological explanation of behavior is also, necessarily, a causal explanation.

fear, that to which the fear is directed, is the rag and its meaning. In the case of actions, Anscombe says that some respond more to causal factors, as when a loud bark makes me drop the glasses I was carrying and others that are clearly driven by reasons, as when I act motivated by revenge, jealousy or compassion. The criterion for differentiating causes from reasons is that one can criticize reasons and not causes. It makes little sense to tell someone that he should not react that way to a bark; it does make sense to tell him that jealousy or compassion are not reasons for this or that action. The line separating reasons from causes, in the behavior of human beings, is not so sharp. "In general, the more one describes an action as a response, the more one is going to be inclined to use the word cause; whereas the more one describes an action as a response to something having a meaning that is pondered by the agent in the description of his action, or a response surrounded by *thoughts and questions,* the more one is going to be inclined to use the word reason." (Anscombe. My emphasis) Likewise with feelings. The object of a feeling is something surrounded, or constituted we would better say, by thoughts and valuations. The cause on the other hand is any event that triggers the thoughts that are part of the object of the feeling.

Like Anscombe and like most analytic philosophers of the time when he wrote *The Unconscious,* MacIntyre assumed this sharp distinction, very sharp according to some, between causes and reasons and argued that unconscious desires are, in their essence, reasons; they also have a causal element but, for MacIntyre, Freud put this causal factor in the wrong place.

Pace MacIntyre this criticism is valid if it is directed at some of Freud's epistemological or theoretical writings in which unconscious desire is occasionally given the treatment that corresponds to a cause. The failure to distinguish between cause and reason was otherwise common to almost all philosophers and psychologists until that distinction pointed out by Kant came to psychological philosophy through Wittgenstein. In Freud's case, as in that of others, it was not merely a terminological confusion; in some of these theoretical writings he ignored any intentional element in amorous and aggressive impulses and came to think of them almost as equivalent to electrical discharges.

But this occurs only on the occasions when Freud attempted a "metapsychological," read theoretical, view of the mind. Instead, in most of his clinical works he considered the unconscious desires of neurotics as motives or reasons. The title of one of his lectures "The Meaning of Symptoms" (Freud 1917) and its content leave no doubt about that. Although he did not differentiate as is usually done today between the terms "causes" and "reasons," he clearly established in this article that neurotics acting under the compulsion of these desires could, after successful psychoanalytic therapy, articulate the purposes that their symptoms express. The obsessive might say, only after being enlightened by psychoanalysis, something like that his purpose in repeatedly washing his hands is "to clean the stains of bad thoughts of a sexual nature that haunt me relentlessly." The masochist could explain, also only after a therapeutic process that fulfilled its objectives, that his compulsion to punish himself was a way to alleviate a feeling of guilt. In the paradigmatic case presented in this essay, that of the woman who performed the ritual of staining a tablecloth with red ink and calling her maid to see the stain, the patient could also tell us, again only if thanks to the psychoanalytic cure she gains access to her true motives, that the purpose of her action was to combat the shame aroused by her frustrating wedding night. Undoubtedly, in the reasoning that has led to this type of action there is always a faulty step, which is usually the premises. But in all these cases, these are actions in pursuit of an end.

In addition to not considering this aspect of Freud's writings, MacIntyre must also be reproached for not taking into account that unconscious desires, being unconscious, act in a way similar to causes and that therefore the causal element cannot be so neatly separated from the intentional element in unconscious drives. Unconscious reasons do not act only as reasons. A reason is, by definition, an argument that can be criticized and contrasted with other reasons. That does not happen with reasons that act from the unconscious. Precisely because they are unconscious, they have eluded, or ignored, this comparison with other reasons. That is why they are reasons that are usually at the service of irrationality, if the oxymoron

fits. These reasons push most of the time to do things that, from the observer's perspective, are compulsive, erratic, emotionally costly and in many cases little less than useless.[27]

We will see in the following sections that both Jurgen Habermas and Donald Davidson have developed ingenious schemes to try to understand how unconscious reasons, while remaining reasons, are also, and fundamentally, causes.

In the second edition of his book (MacIntyre 2004) he acknowledges that he did not pay enough attention to "desire" but to reasons; and that unconscious motivations act in a different way from conscious reasons. This is a way of admitting that when talking about unconscious desires a distinction cannot be made as blunt as the one he makes between causes and reasons. Despite this problem, this first part of MacIntyre's thesis is useful insofar as it emphasizes the teleological nature of unconscious drives and thus combats the biologizing tendency still existing in contemporary psychoanalysis.

The second part of MacIntyre's critique of Freud is about the true nature of the causal factor in psychoanalytic explanations and about the usefulness, or uselessness, of the concept of the unconscious for these explanations. According to *The Unconscious,* it is not impulses or motives that have causal force but rather traumatic experiences sedimented in memory that act as triggers for those impulses. From this MacIntyre concludes, in what is the most provocative thesis of his work, that in order to explain this causality, and therefore to be able to predict behaviors in the manner of a science, we do not need the concept of the unconscious.

According to MacIntyre's interpretation of Freud's texts, there is a causal factor in neurotic compulsions that interacts with unconscious purposes or motives. This causal factor originates in traumatic experiences

[27] Most of the time because, as Rober Audi demonstrated, there are unconscious motives that are rational. A failed act can be, in some circumstances, a person's most rational response to a situation.

in childhood. It is these experiences, which are etched in the memory with a distressing emotional charge, that serve as a kind of catapult for motives such as those described above. These purposeful actions are therefore "defenses" against pain, escapes from distress. In them lies the intentional element emphasized by MacIntyre. These motives need, in order to exist, that sediment of experiences that functions as a cause. To support his interpretation, MacIntyre refers to the case of the 19-year-old woman who rigorously performs a complicated ritual before going to sleep, which Freud reports in the same article "The Meaning of Symptoms". It is an obsessive ritual that has the purpose of reducing anxiety. This anxiety in relation to sleep, the causal element for MacIntyre, originated in a childhood experience that Freud only hints at and that seems to have been the discovery of his parents' coitus. In adult life there will be situations that evoke this anxiety, and although the patient will not be able to remember the experience or understand the object of this anxiety, this anxiety will be the one that will causally drive the defensive maneuvers that in the case of Freud's patient are the very complicated obsessive rituals. Thus MacIntyre constructs the conjunction between a causal power and a reason in neurotic actions. For MacIntyre we can clearly differentiate them, because they are logically independent. The causal is in the traumatic situations and their affective presence, the intentional in the behaviors through which the person wants to diminish anxiety.

MacIntyre believes, and this is the central thesis of his book, that to understand this causal aspect of the desires of neurotics the concept of the unconscious is not necessary. "Psychology owes an immeasurable debt to Freud for having so clearly suggested these correlations, but there is nothing particularly Freudian about them. " (MacIntyre: 94) "Freud's hypotheses about the infantile origin of adult traits and disorders can be formulated without any reference to the concept of the unconscious." (MacIntyre: 97) In other words, there is nothing particularly Freudian in establishing this causal relationship between early experiences and adult personality traits. Psychology can investigate this relationship in the same way as

any other causal relationship between psychological variables should be investigated. In this research, the concept of the unconscious has no explanatory role.

For this reason, MacIntyre concludes, whenever they are used as adjectives or as an adverb "unconsciously or unconsciously" they are useful because they allow a finer description of behavior: "He (Freud) introduces 'unconscious' as an adjective to describe what we had hitherto observed but had not recognized or classified" (MacIntyre 2004: 78). (MacIntyre 2004: 78) But when Freud uses the term unconscious as a noun, this implies that we are considering the unconscious as a concept whose justification is its causal effects. And what MacIntyre cannot see is what those effects are and what is therefore the contribution to science of the unconscious concept, and of the concept of repression, to understand the causal relationship between infantile experiences and adult personality.

For while Freud illuminatingly describes a good deal of behavior as unconsciously motivated and describes also how the recall of events and situations of which we have become unconscious may have a therapeutic role, he (Freud) wishes to justify not only the adverb or the adjective but also the substantive form: the unconscious. Yet from the supposition of such an *entity,* what consequences flow that could not otherwise be predicted? (MacIntyre 2004: 97. My emphasis).

We do not need the unconscious concept to establish causal relationships between childhood and adulthood. MacIntyre proposes that empirical research need only establish the variable or variables that refer to some childhood experience and, on the side of the supposed effects, personality traits. Research will tell us whether the conjectures are corroborated or refuted. It is a matter of "amassing evidence" (MacIntyre 94).

Before attempting to refute this part of MacIntyre's thesis, it is convenient to rescue the element of truth that exists in his reconstruction of Freudian theory.

It is a fact of nature that from childhood we establish associations between the environment and our desires, and that many of these associations are sedimented and become stable affective valuations about the things and people around us. These appraisals are, as a tradition going back to Hume and Blackburn and others has pointed out, an important element in the motivation of our actions. These affective associations are generated mechanically, i.e. they are not the consequence of intentional actions. For this reason the development in the individual of several of these appraisals that will have motivational power is best explained in causal terms. For Freud this tendency to establish associations between contiguous situations in time or space is one of the characteristics of the primary process. This type of mental contents must correspond to what David Finkelstein calls "brutes likes and dislikes", personality traits that do not respond to a cognitive or propositional structure, but which from their function as springs form an important part of our motivational flow. They are affective proclivities that become part of our practical deliberations. If we think of the desire-belief model, they are an important part of the pole constituted by desire. These sediments will be a part of the causal factor of some responses in adult life. Freud himself gave credence to these types of factors. For instance in his famous case “Little John”, he tells us that one of the facts that contributed to John’s phobia to horses, and not to other animals, is that little John`s father “used to play at horses with him.” (Freud 1926)

MacIntyre is right when he says that there is nothing particularly Freudian about these correlations and that they can be explained without specific theory. Or perhaps we should say, correcting MacIntyre, with a behaviorist approach. Our lives are full of attitudes, feelings, and desires, which have become established as habits, and for many of these habits there is no better explanation of their acquisition than one that follows a behaviorist model. Through experiences of pain and pleasure we accept certain things and reject others. These acceptances and rejections are part of our way of being. Some of these attitudes therefore originate with minimal involvement of desires and beliefs. They are rather generators of desires and beliefs.

But MacIntyre unjustifiably generalizes this truth to all probable relations between biography and mode of being. Even in the examples he considers, it is only if the explanation is superficial that the concept of the unconscious is not needed. For example he posits the causal relationship between the type of attitude toward the mother and the type of attitude toward the romantic partner. Of course, an investigation of this fact may choose to establish only the most general, or superficial, aspects of this causality. It is likely that some are attracted to people with physical or personality traits similar to those of their caregivers. To establish this relationship, which might even provide insight, it is true that the notion of the unconscious is unnecessary. But a deeper look, i.e. a look that captures more aspects of this correlation, will require psychoanalytic concepts.

MacIntyre's mistake is not to have taken seriously enough what he himself considers a triumph of psychoanalysis. For a better, or finer, description of the actions of human beings, such as that obtained thanks to psychoanalysis, cannot be only an aesthetic achievement, as Wittgenstein mistakenly thought and MacIntyre seems to believe. In science and in psychology description and explanation are two levels of knowledge. Explanation is a higher level in the sense that it brings us closer to the truth. But better description has to generate better explanations. New and better descriptions imply that there is a new and better explanation not yet revealed; the same thing is now seen, with the new description, from another angle. New variables to be taken into account appear. In every better description there is therefore an implicit causal relationship waiting to be systematized.

If we leave the general view, at a distance we could say, and penetrate into the desires and beliefs of people, we will make intelligible correlations between biography and personality that remain incomprehensible without the idea of the unconscious. This is what Freud said when he justified the concept of the unconscious. What MacIntyre did not take into account, although he mentions it on more than one occasion, is that actions caused by unconscious contents do not manifest themselves with the clarity with which actions motivated by conscious reasons manifest themselves. Precisely the category

"unconscious" is necessary to explain speech acts that are not intelligible. This is the idea implicit in Wittgenstein's suggestion of his definition of the unconscious. In our everyday understanding of other people, and of ourselves, we use a grammar that confers coherence or rationality to our actions. According to that grammar there are actions that are unintelligible until we introduce the concept of the unconscious. The same thing happens with the causal relationships between past experiences and present personality. It is not understood how there can be a causal relationship between, on the one hand, a very severe, even abusive father with his daughter, and a loving attitude of the daughter towards that father, until the concept of an unconscious reactive formation makes the daughter's response intelligible. It seems incomprehensible that a person who grew up with intense feelings of envy towards a sibling has in his adult life, as a defining personality trait, an extremely benevolent attitude towards that sibling, but this attitude is clearer if we know that idealization is an unconscious way of making a history of feelings of envy less painful. The examples can be multiplied. The point is that the unconscious concept not only makes our present understanding of human beings more intelligible, but also the relations between past and present in people's lives.

It contributes to the fact that MacIntyre does not see the need to introduce the notion of the unconscious in order to understand the correlations between childhood and adult personality that he does not seem to understand what the repressed consists of.

MacIntyre believes that what is repressed are ideas, probably following Freud who in the Metapsychological Writings made an assertion to that effect. In those articles Freud states that ideas (*Vorstellung)* are what is repressed. But today we know that the unconscious contents are neither as simple as the not very clear category of "ideas" nor as general as "the mother's attitude". They are rather speech acts that were censored and have left a sediment that is part of the personality. They are intentions that did not crystallize because the environment did not allow it. As such, the repressed, or unconscious, are complex thoughts that refer to actions, even if they were never carried out. I will say more about this

in the next chapters. My contention is that in most, if not all, of the cases when we consider an unconscious content, we are referring to intentions that include at least three elements: thoughts and feelings elicited by a typical [28]situation, a desire or desires to deal with that situation and means to accomplish an end or aim to alter the situation. [29] And among the beliefs and feelings that a situation elicits, thoughts about oneself are of paramount importance. In the philosophy of action, J.D Velleman has emphasized the function that the idea that one has of oneself has in the formation of intentions. Something to which psychoanalysis directed its attention since its beginnings.

The coldness of a father in the face of an action that the child considers an achievement and the resulting anger of the son; the severity, and implicit grandiosity, of a mother who demands almost perfect results and the anguish that this generates in the daughter; the seductive style of a father in front of his daughter and her belief that only by acting seductively can she get closer to him, point to situations, scenarios we could say, where non-crystallized actions have been repressed. These are situations that evoke a response or an attempted response on the part of the infant and these interactions, these atmospheres we could say, with its feelings and beliefs, the desires elicited and the means to realize that desire, is the essence of the repressed. Psychoanalysts such as Alfred Lorenzer and Otto Kernberg have captured this idea as shown when they stress the necessary connection between impulses and interactions.

If the repressed is understood in this way, we see that the unconscious concept is a scientific advance in the explanation of certain psychological traits. For if we consider these speech acts repressed in childhood we can predict and/or explain consequences in adult life that otherwise remain incomprehensible. These

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[28] The word "typical" makes reference to the fact that in many, or most of our significant interactions we associate a present situation with past experiences. This is part of the concept of transference in psychoanalysis. We usually make sense of our current goings on with a framework based on personal history. This is true when unconscious desires are the main motives guiding the person.

[29] Here I am loosely following Anthony Kenny when he says that in talking about "motives" he says: "Very often what happens when a human being performs an action may be described as follows. First there is a state of affairs of which the agent disapproves; then the agent does something; after his action there exists, in place of the original state of affairs, a different state of affairs of which he approves". (Kenny 2003, 63)

are causal relationships to be tested, as MacIntyre rightly points out. But by carefully stating the variables whose causal relationship psychoanalysis can unveil, we can broaden our understanding of behavior. Incidentally, it is this understanding of the unconscious that would enable psychoanalysis to respond satisfactorily to the demands placed upon it to increase its scientific rigor. Psychoanalysis must put forward hypotheses of scientific laws that are testable. This is, for example, the project of the psychoanalyst and philosopher Pushpa Misra, namely, to respond to the objections of Karl Popper and Adolf Grünbaum about the instability of psychoanalytic propositions, in the case of Popper, and about the null predictive power as far as Grünbaum is concerned. It would be, of course, predictions with a certain degree of laxity. From a precisely described parental style or type of childhood experience it is possible to foresee certain consequences on future personality, provided that these consequences are expressed in the broad and lax language of traits.

The Unconscious is the first systematic attempt in a book to interrogate psychoanalytic theory from the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. The result is a work that postulates that Freud's ideas serve to narrate the lives of human beings in a different, sharper, more entertaining and novel way, but not to explain or predict the actions of human beings. I have tried to refute these assertions while highlighting the achievements of this work in bringing psychoanalysis closer to analytic philosophy of mind and along this path.

After MacIntyre's book several philosophers continued to work to assemble the teachings of the philosophy of language originating in Wittgenstein with psychoanalysis and with the idea that unconscious motivations are those that can be grasped by an observer but that the agent cannot articulate verbally. One of them is Jurgen Habermas who approaches the idea of the unconscious in a similar way to MacIntyre, by connecting discrete units of the mental (preponderantly desires) with the expressive

capacities of the person but distances himself from him when he argues that the relationship between unconscious impulses and behavior is a causal one. The other is David Finkelstein who defines the unconscious in a similar way in his studies on self- knowledge.

t) Habermas: Freud as a Kantian physician.

The standing of psychoanalysis within the humanities and social sciences would be very different from what it is today if it were not for the work of Jurgen Habermas, which contains one of the most productive uses of psychoanalytic knowledge in a theory of society.

Jurgen Habermas (1929-), whose main philosophical interests are the topics of rationality and democracy, believes that psychoanalysis is necessary for a social theory because human beings sometimes orient their actions according to motivations that they themselves cannot explain.

A theory of society must take into account these kinds of motives, which are present in individual and group behaviors, which seem to escape the possibility of linguistic articulation by the actors. These motives for action are part of Marx's concept of ideology, which Habermas has analyzed with a psychoanalytically influenced gaze.

Psychoanalysis contributes to Habermas' social theory both its stock of knowledge and its methodology. Its stock of knowledge, because the theory of defense mechanisms broadens the understanding of the social pathologies that Habermas studies under the label of "strategic" actions, among which is "systematically distorted communication", a notion that Habermas has created by combining Freud with the language theory of Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle. This concept is Habermas' proposal to explain the process through which individuals suffer a loss of rationality and freedom due to the pervasive action of economic and political systems, that is, money and power. To this loss of rationality Marx referred with

the concepts of commodity fetishism and alienation and Georg Lukacs with the concept of reification of consciousness.

Reification means to turn into a thing, in this context to treat a human being as we treat a thing. The capitalist system, according to Marx and Lukacs, penetrates people's souls in such a way that they see themselves and their fellow human beings as things or commodities. Habermas recognizes in contemporary society the symptoms described by Marx and Lukacs and elaborates them in his "mature" social theory (i.e. The Theory of Communicative Action) with the concept of systematically distorted communication.

With this idea he refers to an interaction between people in which language, "whose inherent telos is understanding between human beings'' (Habermas: 1981) is degraded and used in such a way that the unspoken and the success in achieving an end is more important than understanding what is said. Words serve, in this case of distorted communication, to conceal rather than to reveal and for the speaker to achieve certain purposes that have not been clearly formulated and have not been discussed with his interlocutor. This happens for example when I make a veiled threat or when I appeal in my speech only to the emotions of my interlocutor to push him to do something or to adopt a belief. In these cases, what I seek is to attenuate my listener's capacity to think about my purposes and about the place I assign to him or her. Just as dreams and neurotic symptoms express desires and beliefs in a covert way, in social life this falsifying task corresponds to ideology, in the Marxist sense of the term, that is to say, in the sense of mystification. Social injustice can be understood in Habermas' work as the situation that systematically subjects groups and individuals to interactions that implant covert motives for action in their minds, which diminishes the capacity of the people thus subjected to think and discuss the reasons that should justify the laws and institutions of a society. From the perspective of the intrapsychic, which Habermas analyzes with the theory of defense mechanisms expounded by psychoanalysis, the reification of a consciousness resembles the mechanism of neurosis, because in both cases certain motives are removed from

consciousness while the "I" seeks a unifying or compromising solution, in the sense that an illusion has to give the veneer of coherence to people's motives and actions.[30] In the social sphere, the imperatives arising from the economic system and power penetrate, or "colonize" Habermas would say, the minds of people. This colonization usually manifests itself in bad reasons that are neither freely nor clearly discussed. They are beliefs that are "violently" imposed and that, endowed with causal force, undermine the capacity for rational deliberation.

Habermas' political philosophy has significantly expanded the understanding of the damage caused to a society founded on the moral principles of equality and freedom by the mutilation of the capacity of human beings to reason about their inner world, about their beliefs and motivations and about their living conditions. This contribution of psychoanalytic knowledge, in relation to the intrapsychic aspect of distorted communication, has been constant throughout Habermas' work.

On the contribution of psychoanalytic methodology, in *Knowledge and Human Interest* Habermas points out that psychoanalysis is the only scientific discipline in which self- reflection is both the method and the object of study. It is because he placed the capacity for self-reflection at the center of his inquiries that Freud opened the way to develop theories that, having universal validity, are fit for the understanding of individualized historical processes. In other words, for Habermas psychoanalysis is the first promising attempt to meet the challenge of developing scientific theories, whose object of study is life, i.e. the biographical particularity of human beings. The detail of how Habermas proposes in this work to resolve the tension between causalism and interpretationism, that is, between general laws and particular processes, should be part of the heritage of psychoanalysis and the human sciences, as I propose below.

[30] "Generally the way defense works is that barriers to communication are set up in the psyche, separating the (unconscious) strategic aspect of action (which serve the gratification of unconscious desires) from the manifest intentional action that aims at reaching understanding… Unconsciously motivated action can be explained as a latent reversal of the differentiation between strategic and communicative action, a dedifferentiation that is hidden from the actors and from others". (Habermas, 1990, pg 188)

Similarly, Habermas initially believed that he could rely exclusively on psychoanalytic methodology to develop the psychological counterpart of a theory of social evolution based on Marx's theory. It has been a permanent interest of Habermas to demonstrate that normative structures, what in Marxist language is part of the "superstructure," are not mere reflections or manifestations of the development of the productive forces.

Habermas has argued throughout his work that the evolution of these normative structures - the capacity for moral insight and for the resolution of conflicts through agreements - have their own logic and it is those normative structures that facilitate the development of new productive forces and not vice versa. Thus, in *Knowledge and Interest* Habermas*,* inspired by the social theory that Freud outlined in *The Future of an Illusion*, postulates that one can penetrate the process of the evolution of moral and political beliefs in a society with psychoanalytic instruments and at the same time analyze these beliefs both in their mystifying aspect and in their emancipatory potential. However, in the maturity of his social theory Habermas will realize this goal, namely, to rid historical materialism of the "philosophical ballast" (Habermas 1981) of insisting that moral consciousness is determined by the development of productive forces, relying no longer on Freud's insights but on Piaget's model of developmental psychology. Towards the end of this section I will evaluate Habermas's unfinished idea, in the sense of understanding some aspect of the development of ideologies and political ideals of a society with psychoanalytical tools.

The work in which Habermas discusses psychoanalysis in depth is *Knowledge and Human Interest.* The guiding idea of this book is that a theory of society must be prefaced by a theory of knowledge, because the basic and universal interests of human beings that determine the form of their cognitive activities are the interests that explain the evolution of the species. In other words, understanding the interests that move us to know the world is necessary to understand the process of the construction of institutions and social practices.

For Habermas there are three types of knowledge, each determined by an interest. The interest in controlling nature generates the empirical or analytical-positivist sciences, or, redundancy aside, the natural sciences; the interest in understanding the relations between human beings and their works is what generates the historical-social sciences or traditional hermeneutics; and the interest in self-knowledge, fundamentally in the inner world, generates what Habermas calls "the hermeneutics of the profound" of which psychoanalysis is the paradigm. Habermas assumes the pragmatist point of view, via Charles Sanders Peirce, in the sense that the impulse to know arises when there is a disturbance in the relationship of the human being with his environment. According to Pierce, doubt, or uncertainty, is what led the human being to try to know. When the expectations that human beings have in relation to the interaction with their environment are disrupted, human beings must reestablish a balance through more stable beliefs, the set of which we call knowledge. But Peirce, unlike Habermas, did not include the internal world among the spheres of existence where doubt and the subsequent need for knowledge can arise.

Understanding the nature of unconscious motivations and their influence on the evolution of society also serves Habermas to combat the false conception that positivism is the only possible form of knowledge. Not reflecting on the conditions that make knowledge possible, a transcendental reflection in the Kantian sense, leads to adopting the false belief, linked to positivism, that social problems have only an empirical or technical side. To get rid of this idea, a critical theory of society must include self-reflection, because it is this that allows human beings to understand the role that their interests play in the constitution of both knowledge and social practices and institutions. This self-reflexive dimension makes necessary, yet another reason, the presence of psychoanalysis in a theory on the evolution of the species.

Habermas believes however that, although Freud introduced science into the new territory of self-reflection, he gave in to the positivist temptation to understand his own findings from the objectivizing

viewpoint of empiricism. For psychoanalysis to be part of a critical theory it must free itself from this misunderstanding through a reinterpretation.

This reinterpretation of Freud's theory has three parts: A) a reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory under the parameters of the theory of language that Wittgenstein began to formulate. For this reason Habermas' interpretation takes place in a reconstruction of the dialogue between psychoanalysis and analytic philosophy; B) a defense of the scientific rigor of psychoanalysis. Once the unconscious has been understood in the light of the theory of mind that Wittgenstein began to elaborate, and the scientific force of psychoanalysis and the conditions of truth of its propositions are made clear, we arrive at C) the contribution of psychoanalysis to a social theory with foundations in Marx's thought.

A) Although psychoanalysis is the only discipline specialized in self-knowledge, Habermas believes that its self-reflective potential is threatened by a "scientistic" misunderstanding incurred by Freud himself, which led him to confuse the scope of his intellectual enterprise by giving the processes and entities he postulated a treatment that corresponds to that which the natural sciences give to their objects of study.

> "Because Freud was caught from the beginning in a scientistic self-understanding Freud succumbs to an objectivism that regresses immediately from the level of self-reflection to contemporary positivism in the manner of Mach type and that therefore takes on particularly crude form." -(Habermas 1982: 252)

It is because of this misunderstanding that Freud conceived the unconscious and repression under an objectivist mold, he thought of instinct as a natural force, repression as the result of a clash of energetic forces (cathexias) and the unconscious under the model of distribution of psychic energies, where what is unconscious is that accumulation of thoughts, affections and intentions that have not received the cathexias (psychic energies) of the ego. But "not a single one of the statements referring to quantitative relations, deduced according to the point of view of the economy of drives, has ever been experimentally verified". (Habermas 1982: 251) The supposed neurophysiological events that would correspond to these

energetic discharges are not corroborated. But the most negative effect of this misunderstanding was not that psychoanalysis reified the mental furniture that came with its theory, this being already a problem. The more onerous consequence is, according to Habermas, a fact that is a consequence of this reification, namely, that psychoanalysis departs in its theory from what is its raison d'être, the human being's capacity for self-reflection.

Freud surely surmised that the consistent realization of a "scientific naturalistic" program or even rigorous behaviorist psychology would have had to sacrifice the intention to which psychoanalysis owes its existence: the intention of enlightenment, according to which ego should develop out of the id. But he did not abandon this program (the scientific naturalist). He did not understand metapsychology as the only thing it can be in the system of reference of self-reflection: a general interpretation of the self-formative processes. (Habermas 1971: 254)

Even though Freud abandoned the strict physicalist program of his early *Project for a scientific psychology,* he retained the neurophysiological language and spirit and applied them to mentalistic terms. Thus energy became instinctual energy, although about the physical stratum of the latter no statements can be made.

It should be noted that for Habermas this misunderstanding occurs only in psychoanalytic theory: it does not contaminate what happens in the consulting rooms. The scientistic misunderstanding is a consequence of Freud's attempt to construct a theory using a formalized and objectivist language and therefore a model of explanation and corroboration which conflicts with the essence of psychoanalysis, which is the therapeutic encounter. The language of Freudian metapsychology is poorer than that of technique because there is nothing in this metapsychology that cannot be said or explained with the

language of everyday life, which is the language used by the analyst with his patient and from which the technique is derived.

To eliminate this misunderstanding, psychoanalytic theory must not forget that its origin and essence lie in the relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst. Habermas calls the knowledge generated in psychoanalytic therapies "the hermeneutics of the profound" (Habermas 218), which differs from other hermeneutics, such as philological hermeneutics for example, because the true meanings that psychoanalytic interpretation unveils have been obscured and distorted, not by external agents, but by the patient himself, who has thus sought to deceive himself and others about the content of his own thoughts and emotions. In other words, unlike the corruption of texts that the philologist corrects through interpretive work, corruption generally caused by the passage of time, psychoanalysis must deal with distortions and concealments that are unconscious but intentional. The psychoanalyst's task is to understand the motives behind these distortions.

This deep hermeneutics, as enhanced by Habermas, brings together two currents of thought: a theory of language inaugurated by Wittgenstein and continued by J.L. Austin and John Searle, and the psychoanalytic theory of conflict and emotional development. The former is necessary because language determines our behavior. The actions of a human being are the actions of an animal that must describe and explain what it does, that lives in a temporal dimension in which one can live only if one is competent in the use of certain concepts that allude to the past, present and future, and that has the capacity to consider different courses of action as possibilities for a situation and to bracket certain vital situations and treat them as hypotheses. All these mental operations, which require competence in the use of language, constitute the elementary particles of our actions and are expressed in them. These observations are very general but necessary to correct the false objectification, a reification we could also

say, of mental contents in which psychoanalysis and many of the currents in psychology have incurred. Because language is the backbone of our behaviors, the actions of human beings can only be understood against the backdrop constituted by the grammar of the language games that the child internalizes in the process of socialization.

However, understanding between human beings would be impossible if we depended exclusively on language. Understanding is possible because in order to understand the intentions of the other person we also read the text constituted by his actions and by his "expressions", a term that Habermas uses as Dilthey used it to refer to gestures, mimics, body language, looks, involuntary physiological responses such as blushing; that is to say to the semantics of the nonverbal. Wittgenstein taught that we are socialized in such a way that our acts and our expressions, expressions in the sense of Dilthey appropriated by Habermas, underpin what we say. At the same time, we are trained from a young age to understand the acts, utterances and expressions of others in a joint way. We enter the world harmonizing the verbal with the nonverbal and we understand others in this way. This is the unavoidable basis of socialization. But there are situations in which this coincidence breaks down; it happens when what the person says about his motives does not coincide with his behavior or with his corporal expression. These are the situations in which the person cannot articulate using language the motives of his actions and expressions. Psychoanalytic theory emerged to understand these mismatches between language, expression and behavior.

From psychoanalysis, deep hermeneutics incorporates not only the explanation of the mechanism of symptom formation. It also uses the idea, implicit in Freud, that the life of human beings is a process of self-formation guided by the impulse to rationally appropriate one's own biography, to understand the present of our lives in light of the past. The development of cognitive capacities and the maturation of our

affections share that telos which is the understanding of one's own existence. Psychoanalytic theory offers an explanation of the stages through which this self- reflective process passes, stages each of which involves characteristic conflicts, challenges and probable pathological deviations. Failures on this path give rise to the patient's symptoms: when the child, emotionally overwhelmed by the demands of a stage, appeals to a substitute formation, to a fantasy fulfillment of desires, which will acquire a compulsive form and therefore a causal force.

This self-reflective path has the form of a drama. There are roles that we occupy on this path. Daughter, son, mother, father, sister, brother. Psychoanalytic theory has explained the general script, the libretto, we could say, of that play in which each of us is, as Habermas says, both actor and critic. The family structure has then the skeleton of a drama. Fraternal rivalry, oedipal situation, process of separation and individuation, are some of its characteristic acts. But it is only a structure. Its staging is executed, in a unique and unrepeatable way, by each one of us. At a later point after *Knowledge and human Interest* Habermas will incorporate in his understanding the theory of George Herbert Mead to deepen the explanation of this dialectic between the individual and the general that we already find in Freud.

It is this drama that allows us to speak of a meaning of life, not only in the narrower sense of what we consider a good life, but in the broader sense that our actions are explicable, have meaning, only when we see them through these stages of cognitive and emotional development.

Having thus understood the scaffolding of psychoanalytic theory, it is necessary, at the risk of incoherence, to free its most important concepts, which are desire and the unconscious, from the reification generated by Freud's adoption of a positivist or scientistic perspective. The incoherence would be that if we treat the processes and entities proposed by psychoanalysis to understand the mind as if they were physical or quasi-physical objects, it is impossible to understand how psychoanalysis can liberate people from their suffering through self-reflection. The expansion of self-reflective capacity has always been the main goal

of psychoanalytic therapy, in all its interpretations and "schools" and this expansion cannot even begin to make sense if one persists in thinking of impulses as having a physical or quasi-physical and not a linguistic nature. Similarly, and this is of interest to social theory, only if the unconscious is understood through a theory of language can the nature and action of ideology be understood. For these reasons Habermas undertakes the task of reformulating the concepts of psychoanalytic furniture with the support of Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of the psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer.

For Habermas, (Habermas 1982) repression and the unconscious occur "within language". It is an innate response of the child to flee from unpleasant or painful external stimuli. But sometimes the danger is not external but comes from within the child's own mind, as when the child has thoughts or desires that go against the expectations of the caregivers. Since in such cases the escape cannot be by physical means, it has to be an "internal escape", through language. Faced with pressure from the external world, say parental censorship, the child learns that he can detach certain behavioral motives from their socially accepted or "grammatically correct" linguistic expression in order to hide his desires or feelings from himself and others. What Habermas calls the "ungrammatization" or de-linguitization of these motives for action takes place in this way. De-linguistified, de-grammatized or privatized (these are all equivalent expressions in Habermas' interpretation) motives for action are the unconscious motives. They are desires that have been deformed and that gratify, in a covert way, the original impulse. The child learns that he cannot express openly, grammatically we would say with Habermas, for example, the anger he feels towards a parent or a sibling and develops skills to express this anger in disguise, with language and gestures that can be tolerated by the environment because they do not manifestly express anger. A defense mechanism is the dissociation that the child has made between that anger, on the one hand, and the words and behaviors that normally, that is, in everyday public language, are used to refer to that feeling, on the other hand.

The original defense process takes place in a situation of infantile conflict as an escape from a superior interlocutor. It subtracts the public communication from the linguistic interpretation of the rejected motive of action. Thus the grammatical texture of the public language remains intact, but certain parts of its semantic content are privatized... The isolated content is not completely outside the public language connection; but the grammatical connection has somehow become subterranean. (Habermas 255)

The concept of the "privatization" of semantic contents, indispensable to understand his notion of the unconscious, is elaborated by Habermas by integrating Freud's model of The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1900), Wittgenstein's philosophy and the appropriation of this philosophy by the psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer.

Just as dream censorship deforms desire so that in the dream desires manifest themselves in a disguised way, dissociated from their socially accepted form, in neurosis the motives for action excluded from public language can gain access to consciousness in disguise. This disguise is provided by the defense mechanisms thanks to which the person establishes a "private" connection, idiosyncratic we might say, between, on the one hand, a socially accepted linguistic symbol and/or behavior and, on the other hand, an action motive that has been censored. Thus the censored impulse is gratified but in a way that the gratification is not so evident, neither for the person himself nor for those around him.[31]

This notion of privatization is well explained by the psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer, whom Habermas follows closely, in relation to the case of Little John. This is Freud's famous clinical case in which a 5-year-

[31] The word privatization is, in this context, a borrowing Lorentzer makes from Wittgenstein's work. The sense that this word has in this context is different from the one it has in Wittgenstein's discussion of the possibility of a private language.

old boy develops a phobia of horses, a phobia behind which is hidden the fear of his father. The equivalence that exists in Johnny's mind between the symbol "horse" and the symbol father is, in the sense of Lorenzer and Habermas, a "private" connection because horse and father do not mean the same thing; or rather, they mean the same thing only in Johnny's mind. Only by investigating the particular history of the child can we find the explanation of this false link between horse and father.

In other words: the concept of Horse contains and hides a part of the meaning of "father". When we say that this significant part is unconscious, it implies that it is excluded from ordinary communication and, therefore, it is not formulable in a linguistic sign. Reciprocally, the linguistic sign "horse" is modified with respect to the usual meaning. Thus "horse" acquires a meaning that differs from the linguistic use of general communication. The word "horse" has been privatized. (Lorenzer 2001: 116) For Habermas, unconscious desires and thoughts are those that have been separated from their usual linguistic form and can only appear in the conscious life of people in this camouflaged form. Little John could not say, "I am afraid of my father," but he can say that he is afraid of horses. And with this statement he is giving expression, in a mitigated form, to the fear he feels towards his father.

Habermas insists that this dissociation is explained only in language and that it is a mistake to suppose that the body acts as a kind of reservoir of these motives excluded from consciousness. Similarly, it is a mistake to think of non-linguistic mental contents. In a much quoted passage, and questioned by many psychoanalysts, Habermas says: "Now, the distinction between verbal representations and representations without symbols is problematic, just as the hypothesis of a non-linguistic substrate on which these representations detached from language could be effected is insufficient". (Habermas 241) Habermas is thus defending the idea that we found in Dewey, namely, that aggressive and sexual tendencies are significant in motivation only when the child has within his reach the linguistic articulation and the capacity to deliberate, however incipient this deliberation may be, about them.

Although Habermas shares with MacIntyre (MacIntyre 2003) the idea that unconscious motives are motives that the person cannot articulate linguistically or recognize as his own, there is an important difference between the two authors in relation to the way in which these repressed impulses fulfill the role of motivational forces. For Habermas it is wrong to think, as MacIntyre does, that unconscious drives are motives and not causes. For Habermas, on the contrary, motives have an intentional structure, but they exert their action "over the heads of the subjects" and have become causes: "It is the hidden and deviant intentions that are transformed by conscious motives into causes and subject communicative activity to the causality of natural conditions". (Habermas 254)

The unconscious impulses exert their influence in the life of the person converted into causes. They have acquired the virulence and compulsion that gives them not only an appearance of physical force - hence the temptation of Freud and his followers to express this influence in quantitative and physical terms - but are themselves causal forces. It is the "causality of fate and not of nature" says Habermas, repeatedly quoting Hegel. Unconscious impulses become, through repetition, symptoms. Symptoms are habits, rigid responses sedimented over time, which, thanks to their relative success, mechanize aspects of the person's life; they act as if they were a force of nature external to the person and lacking in logic. But this absence of rationality is an appearance, because these impulses turned into symptoms do hide a logic. They exert their influence as if they were natural phenomena - causes - but they are also motives, reasons; they contain a strategy that has been condensed and is unrecognizable to the subject. This is why, although they respond to a private semantic, unconscious impulses have not lost their relation to public language. "Nevertheless there still subsists a logical connection between the deformed and the public language as long as some translation of the private dialect remains possible - and in this precisely consists the work of the language analysis which the therapist carries out." (Habermas 241) In the case of Little John, the logical connection between "horse" and "father" remains. This connection is given by the fact that father and horse are for little Juan strong and powerful figures and here lies the residue of rationality

or "grammaticality" in the association that Juanito makes of these two words. And it is this residue that the psychoanalyst's imagination and talent must reach in order to reestablish the concealed links.

The causal force of unconscious impulses, by making libidinal and aggressive tendencies evident, makes a theory of instincts necessary as well. Habermas does not develop this theory. He merely points out the need to formulate it, warning that this theory must not forget that the word "instinct" is applied by human beings to animals. It arises from a human context and is therefore a form of anthropocentrism when it is attributed to animals. "The concept of instinct, when it returns from being applied to animals to being applied to human beings, is still rooted in meaning structures of the lifeworld, however elementary they may be." (Habermas, 256) They are therefore descriptions of human habits, not of natural phenomena. Moreover, there is no justification for using the concept of instinct or drive outside the realm of explaining pathological behavior as described by psychoanalysis. It is the rigid neurotic responses that validate speaking of impulses. Habermas thus limits the idea of causality to this type of reactions, unlike Donald Davidson who maintains that all the reasons for a behavior are also its causes.

The causal nature of drives and symptoms, and the theory of emotional development proposed by psychoanalysis converge to demonstrate that Psychoanalytic interpretations, “general interpretations” as Habermas called them, can be subject to a falsifying procedure. Habermas thinks indeed that “Freudian theory does contain assumptions that can be interpreted as *lawlike hypotheses in the strict sense*. Thus it also grasps causal connections''. (Habermas. *On the Logic of Social Sciences,* 185. My emphasis) The falsifying procedure for psychoanalytic hypothesis is not that of the empirical sciences, to be sure, but one which is anchored in the self reflective capacities of the patient. Thus we come to what I have considered Habermas's second objective which I earlier called "to demonstrate the scientific rigor of psychoanalysis" but should be better called "to demonstrate that psychoanalysis is not completely at odds with empirical corroborations."

B). While each life is a unique and unrepeatable drama, it would be incredible if there were no similarity between people's existential trajectories. It is this similarity that makes it possible, according to Habermas, to define for each of these stages the demands they characteristically place on the lives of individuals, and to construct an external criterion which can serve to evaluate the success or failure of the person in satisfying these demands. Psychoanalysis offers an explanation of deviations or "wrong" behaviors, of failures we could say, which become visible through recurrent discrepancies between action, expression and discourse. These discrepancies are expressed in symptoms that are substitute gratifications for impulses, gratifications that also acquire a compulsive character. Armed with accumulated theoretical knowledge about the cognitive and emotional development of the human being, i.e. knowledge of what is common in the growth of human beings, the psychoanalyst can make predictions, in the manner of scientific conjectures, about the type of deviations or symptoms that may occur at each stage. The initial conditions for these predictions would be constituted by the family situation and by the stage in the child's emotional development. With these conditions, predictions can be made which are hypotheses about probable deviations.

These predictions made in every psychoanalytic treatment are subjected to critical examination by the physician and his patient. They are therefore refutable in the Popperian sense of the term.

Psychoanalysis, in Habermas' interpretation, can thus cope with some demands of the deductive nomological model of scientific explanation through a functionalist approach to the mind that is “hermeneutically enlightened”. (Habermas, *The Logic of Social Sciences*)

The patient is the one who corroborates the psychoanalyst's hypotheses, since the first- person perspective is an epistemologically privileged position along the self reflective process to elucidate whether a behavior is a substitute gratification that hides and disguises an impulse that has been

censored. That is, no one better than the patient to realize that his actions contradict his assertions about his motives, and that these censored motives determine his action.

The first-person perspective has been somewhat disdained by some critics such as Adolf Grünbaum, (Grünbaum 1984) who in his influential critique of the scientificity of psychoanalysis has pointed out several objections to Habermas' idea of the primacy of the patient's point of view as the final arbiter of the truth of psychoanalytic interpretations. These criticisms are : That the patient may be suggestible by the psychoanalyst and led to believe something that in truth is not, whereby, if it occurs, the psychoanalyst would be increasing, far from diminishing, the patient's self-deception; that psychoanalysis is not a special case of the epistemological privilege of a human being in the verification of a scientific hypothesis, since in physics and medicine a researcher can corroborate in himself, in his bodily reactions, a conjecture; that the knowledge that we human beings have of our motives is not "privileged" but inferential, in the same way that an observer has it. For all these reasons, extra-clinical evidence is needed to prove psychoanalytic conjectures. The patient cannot be the guarantor of the truth of psychoanalytic interpretation, says Grünbaum against Habermas. [32]

But different authors inspired by Wittgenstein's work, such as Richard Moran (Moran 2001) and David Finkelstein (Finkelstein 2003) who I have already mentioned and will discuss in more detail in the coming pages, have defended the idea of the first person authority as the ultimate court of appeals to elucidate the truth of an individual's inner world. Although by different paths both have elaborated the idea of epistemic asymmetry between the first person and the point of view of an observer, not only with regard to the reporting of sensations, but to more complex mental states such as beliefs and desires. For both Moran and Finkelstein we should think that the authority we have when we think and talk about our inner

[32] The book by philosopher and psychoanalyst Pushpa Misra (2016) is devoted exclusively to responding to Grünbaum's criticisms.

world is crystallized in the "spontaneous utterances (avowals)." Finkelstein suggests that we think of the expression of a desire as similar to a smile or a frown. They are expressions that spontaneously and effortlessly reveal what a person desires and what feeling accompanies that desire. Moran has worked on the idea of the authority of the first person's privileged first person from the close relationship between the volitional aspects of individuals and their beliefs and intentions. Our status as rational agents, a status we human beings need and demand, lies in the fact that when one asserts that one has such an intention one is not revealing the result of a psychological inquiry performed on oneself, but is giving voice to a resolution. It is rather a deficit requiring therapeutic attention that the person cannot make up his mind and shows a wavering will. Grunbaum is emphatic in saying that self knowledge of causal connections between mental states is possible only through inferences and for this reason there is no epistemic privilege from the first person perspective. (Grunbaum 1984 , p 30) Since Grunbaum´s phrase “causal linkages as actually connect some of his own mental states” has to refer mainly to motives of behavior, the works of Finkelstein and Moran can be mentioned as defending the opposite claim, namely, that a person has access to the motives of his behavior not through inference but through a direct access. For both authors, the inferential access to one's own mental states is a degraded form of self knowledge. For this reason we can see in the works of these two writers support Habermas’ idea that the patient in a psychoanalytic process has a privileged point of view regarding his inner world.

Finkelstein and Moran also agree that the unconscious contents that the psychoanalytic cure deals with, if not explored and articulated, constitute a deficit in the faculty of self-knowledge, a barrier between the person and his own states that results in a degradation of his authenticity and dignity as a human being. Stimulated by Freud, both elaborate the difference between talking about a feature of one's personality in "theoretical" or "empirical" terms, as when I remember and say what my therapist has told me about my inner world, and giving voice, or giving spontaneous expression ("to avow" in English) to that aspect of my own being. Only the latter can properly be called self-knowledge. What is missing from the first (the

"theoretical" discourse about my being) Freud would say is affect, Finkelstein a connection with other contents linked to what Dilthey called expression, and Moran would say that what is missing is an endorsement, a commitment of me as a rational agent to the desire or belief that I am expressing. There is therefore support in the recent literature on the authority of the first person for the idea that it is the process of self-reflection that is the place where the psychoanalyst's conjectures must be corroborated or refuted.

It is also clear from the work of Finkelstein and Moran that although the risk of suggestion exists, the idea that human beings can be easy prey to suggestion in relation to their biography and personality is counter-intuitive. It is part of the natural history of the species that this capacity to understand oneself can impose itself on the also frequent moments of self-deception or illusion. Thus the patient may be induced by the psychoanalyst to believe something false about himself only occasionally, but to assume that this happens as easily as Grünbaum seems to think is to assume that human beings can only fortuitously form true beliefs about their motives for action.

Once psychoanalytic theory has been purged of biologistic and Cartesian resonances and it has been established that psychoanalysis can satisfy the demands of a (modified) nomological deductive science Habermas will explain C) how psychoanalysis can complement the Marxist view of the evolution of the species.

Habermas' initial social theory assumes the philosophy of history that Freud outlined in *The Future of an Illusion.* Freud's suggestion is that a decisive factor in the construction of social institutions is the amount of aggressive and libidinal drives that remains free, so to speak, after the process of repression that takes place in the family. In other words, the need to associate in order to produce and preserve the species

makes it imperative to repress aggressive and libidinal drives whose "excess" would make such association impossible. Such repression takes place within the family. But there is a part of aggressive and libidinal energies that cannot be kept within the confines of family repression. This excess will find a second line of resistance, as it were, from society in social institutions, in the form of substitute gratifications or neurotic symptoms. Aggression and sexual desire thus find sublimatory channels, in institutions that offer a disfigured gratification. Habermas points out that this analysis places psychoanalysis on a higher level of explanation than Marxism by understanding institutions not only in their relation to the development of productive forces, but as human achievements that have a history of their own and that gratify impulses in fantasy. These impulses are legitimate aspirations such as protection from suffering or universal solidarity, and social institutions offer rewards in a disfigured ("delusional") way with the objects of these impulses. Thus Habermas believes that the analysis of social evolution is more complete and more accurate than Marxist analysis when social institutions and practices, and the ideologies that justify them, are understood as "distorted communication". Social institutions are like neurotic symptoms, in that both are products of the work of the psychic apparatus and of society to find a diminished gratification of impulses or aspirations.

But the aspect of Freud's social theory in which Habermas seems most interested about is the emancipatory potential of these channelings. Citing Freud, Habermas reminds us that social institutions are not exclusively constituted by delusional promises. They also contain, in a disguised form, legitimate and eventually realizable aspirations that can be translated into ideology in the good sense of the word, that is, into a critique of the conditions of life that also implies a proposal for change. When technical progress makes some of these institutions unnecessary and frees a portion of libidinal and aggressive energy, they can be transformed, purify their most fantastic elements and become political discourse and aspirations for change. For Freud this should be the beginning of a process of trial and error, in which social reforms are tried out, the results of which are not guaranteed. For Habermas, this demonstrates

once again that institutions, practices and interactions cannot be understood only as "superstructure" in the sense of reflecting the social relations of production. The economy only sets certain limits and points out certain directions for the repression of drives. But the form of these practices and institutions, and their history, must be understood with the model of explanation that psychoanalysis has mapped out for defense mechanisms and neurotic symptoms.

In his later works Habermas abandons the project of a psychoanalytically informed philosophy of history because, one may conjecture, it is a very difficult project to undertake. Linking the "degree" of sexual repression to the technical progress of society has no empirical support. Similarly, linking this degree of sexual repression to the development of normative structures does seem problematic as well. It could be argued, in defense of this second intuition, that the decrease in sexual repression in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly since the 1960s, has been a factor that has determined the incorporation of issues related to feminism and sexual minorities in the public agenda. But this is a statement that is difficult to corroborate since no one has been able to establish precisely what is meant by the degree of repression. Moreover, this idea, which we already find in Marcuse, does not seem remotely applicable to the case of aggressive drives. For while it is plausible, despite the obscurity of the term, to speak of degrees in the sexual repression of different epochs, it is more difficult to speak of a degree of repression of aggressive drives.

It seems more promising to apply psychoanalytic theoretical instruments to the understanding of aspects of the social and political conjuncture. Thus, for example, the need for a psychological counterpart to the phenomenon of self-deception in relation to the social and political can be seen in Marx in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, when, after describing how the isolated and unconnected situation of the peasants prevented them from forming a social class to fight for their interests, he explains that these peasants voted for Louis Bonaparte, because he represented "a master, an authority over them, an unlimited governmental power to protect them against the other classes and send them rain and sunshine

from on high". (Marx The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). Psychoanalytical research would be useful to decipher the origin of this type of fantasies, which are commonplace in the 21st century, and to answer the question if the figure of an omnipotent authority is an affective aspiration originating in the family environment that moves to the sphere of collective and political aspirations.

Notwithstanding these remarks, it is valuable to assert, with Habermas, that false consciousness responds to the ego's need for synthesis, to the need for coherence we could say, and that this false consciousness is a regression of the psychic apparatus towards more condensed modes of functioning.

It is a progress of psychoanalytic knowledge to understand desire, drives and the unconscious through the theory of speech acts derived from Wittgenstein's work, and by that way to develop Dewey's proposal of an internal world dependent on the social world. Both the explanatory preeminence of the linguistic in the mental and the social nature of psychic contents are theses of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy that Habermas has advantageously placed in psychoanalysis.

This advance, however, is vulnerable to three criticisms.

The first is that this reconstruction conceives the unconscious fundamentally as a degraded consciousness, as an instance of the mental arising only from the frustration of expectations and constituted solely by the person's strategies for adapting to the obstacles of the external world. Strategies, moreover, constructed exclusively on the basis of self-deception.

Certainly, in this way of seeing things there is fidelity to Freud's vision. It cannot be denied, moreover, that an important part of what we call the unconscious has the genesis and characteristics attributed to it by Habermas. But that is not the whole story. There is a creative, exploratory and playful dimension of

the unconscious that Habermas' model, as well as MacIntyre's, cannot accommodate. It is that part highlighted above all by the work of the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott (Winnicott 1971). To put it in the language of Habermas' own sociological theory: for him, the unconscious is related almost exclusively to human interactions that he calls "strategic" when the truth is that, if we follow Winnicott, the unconscious belongs to the level of communication that in the same Habermasian theory is called "expressive": it is that level that has to do with sincerity in exploring and communicating the inner world.

Habermas mostly focused on the defensive side of the unconscious, undoubtedly its most important aspect, but he did not give so much importance to its creative potential.

The second objection is that Habermas language at times suggests that what becomes conscious in the course of a psychoanalytic treatment are "memories" or "experiences." And if these expressions refer to discrete contents of the mental, this would be a way of reifying the contents of the unconscious. This is the same mistake that Grünbaum makes, which is why the Habermas-Grünbaum controversy does not occur in the territory in which it should occur. As I have said before in reference to MacIntyre, what psychoanalysis unveils are patterns of beliefs and desires that the person has in relation to typical life situations. Many of these beliefs and desires have the form of unconscious fantasies that have become second nature. We have already seen that these unconscious beliefs, converted into a sort of schema that rigidifies the person's responses, derive from speech acts that in the past did not find full expression. But such aspects are only loosely related with "episodes" as Habermas sometimes suggests, and as Grünbaum believes, that have sedimented in memory. Personal history makes its presence felt in these beliefs and desires through the parental styles that have become sedimented in the inner world of the person. I have defended the idea that the best concept that exists in psychoanalysis to refer to these sedimentations that have taken place in the formative years of childhood and adolescence is that of "internalized object relations", that kind of internal shadows with which the person maintains a dialogue all his life and which determine his way of being. Habermas and Grünbaum agree that psychoanalytic

theory must test its hypotheses. And although they differ on how to corroborate them, both agree that psychoanalytic conjectures, the explanans, are constituted by initial conditions that have the form of repressed episodes. But the initial conditions of psychoanalytic hypotheses can no longer have that orthodox Freudian flavor that links experiences, or clearly delineated episodes, with repression and symptoms. Experiences and memories are important but only because they make more intelligible a history that in the inner world of the person has become that which is best described as "internalized object relations". It is these internalized relations and their fantasies and beliefs that should serve as the initial conditions that explain and predict neurotic behaviors. If one wants to test psychoanalytic hypotheses, one should not shirk the task of defining the initial conditions that can explain and predict responses, in terms of object relations, however difficult the task may seem.

Finally, as a third criticism, the attempt to understand ideology, in the Marxist sense of the term, through the concept of distorted communication, seems to be better directed if the objective of the analysis is the most episodic illusions, which, because they are episodic, are no less influential in the course of history. On the other hand, it seems doomed to fail if the idea is to establish a relationship between the development of the productive forces and the history of the repression of erotic and aggressive impulses. That is, perhaps we can penetrate into the nature of the illusions that were used by Nazism, the right-wing authoritarianism that enraptured poor people, such as those of Trump and Bolsonaro, or the search for a "strong government," so common in Latin America. It is possible, along these lines, to link collective moods and see, through the theory of defense mechanisms, how certain fears and discomforts in public opinion are combated, precisely as a defense, with exaggerated idealizations or reaffirmations of tendencies that aim to protect group identity from supposed external dangers. In the same way, psychoanalysis can contribute to a better understanding of the nature of these perceived dangers, because they are generally dangers fed by catastrophic fantasies which, as psychoanalysis teaches, are at the same time cover-up fantasies.

That psychoanalytic theory may be more useful in understanding more malleable aspects of subjectivity, rather than more stable aspects such as cognitive structures, seems to be the conviction Habermas acquired throughout his work. In the last part of *The Theory of Communicative Action* he states that psychoanalysis should study the effects on psychic structures of the penetration of households by the systemic pressures of money and power. Habermas thus endorses the well-known conjecture that the changes that the economic system of the second half of the second century brings about in family dynamics have generated more borderline pathologies and diminished the disorders that dominated the clinical environment when psychoanalysis emerged. This conjecture has never been corroborated by epidemiological studies, but given that it is supported by a large part of the psychoanalytic community, attempting to corroborate it may be the starting point for empirical research along the lines indicated by Habermas. In the same way, psychoanalytic theory can help to understand aspects of political culture, as suggested by Alexander Metterlich in relation to authoritarianism and intolerance. Such contributions of psychoanalysis to sociology are still necessary and rarely undertaken.

Notwithstanding these objections, if they are objections at all, Habermas' reflection on psychoanalysis is exuberant and a progress in the direction of opening psychoanalysis to a convergence with other sciences.

At the same time, however, I will be arguing that something seems to be left out if an explanation of the unconscious concentrates only on those bits of subjectivity that motivate actions and that cannot be expressed in words by the person thus motivated. Habermas' perspective must be complemented by an explanation of the relationship of these "de-linguistified" motivations to the rest of the motives for action.

That complement may come from the position defended by Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Marcia Cavell.

III. The unconscious as disintegration.

u) Davidson, Rorty and Cavell

The other way in which Anglo-Saxon philosophy has understood the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious was forged in the effort of some philosophers to explain irrationality. Phenomena such as self-deception, incontinence or akrasia, or wishful thinking - the most discussed cases of irrationality - are only clarified, these authors argue, if one assumes that the human mind is made up of semi- independent structures, each composed of thoughts, desires, memories, something like several persons or quasi-persons within the same body. Irrational behaviors occur when one of these substructures loses communication with the others. The Freudian unconscious, this approach continues, must be understood as one of the substructures that has the peculiarity of having broken the logical link with the rest of the mental contents.

The idea of the unconscious as semi independent mental structures within one person, already sketched out in Freud, was formulated in philosophical language by Donald Davidson (Davidson 1982) and David Pears (1984) and hence became key to explaining irrationality. Richard Rorty later pointed out that the unconscious of which psychoanalysis speaks must be understood as these "quasi-persons". [33] That seems to have been Davidson's conception as well.

Davidson's idea has its starting point in a holistic conception of the mental. According to this picture, every mental content owes its existence to a larger network of other mental contents. Thus belief and desire are always sustained by other beliefs and desires. They cannot be grasped in isolation; they can only be identified and understood, in everyday life and in the study of psychology, as part of a logical network. In addition, not only beliefs, as well as desires, have this logical relationship with each other,

[33] The expression “quasi person” used by Rorty is however resisted by some of the same writers who are sympathetic to the core of the idea of mental partitioning.

but also belief and desire are internally (i.e logically) connected with intentions and behavior. In every action a certain consistency is revealed.

There are, however, occasional behaviors and thoughts which appear to elude these rational networks. For example it can happen that a person holds certain beliefs that run against the principles of a rational agent. As when he believes something even though he has no evidence to believe it or even when he has received evidence that contradicts his belief, i.e he does not accept the overwhelming evidence that his romantic partner is unfaithful; or somebody acts against what she considers best, as when she has concluded after careful thought that she should not continue drinking alcoholic beverages and yet despite her resolution does so; or sometimes I can deceive myself as when I attribute to my action noble motives when in fact I have acted guided by purposes that are not praiseworthy. In these cases of irrational thought or irrational action the holism has suffered a fracture. A substructure of beliefs and desires has acquired a certain pernicious autonomy with respect to the general fabric of desires and beliefs of the person. What has been broken is the logical link between the set - or subset if you will - of desires and beliefs that motivates the so-called irrational behavior with the rest of the person's beliefs and desires.

What should hold beliefs together in the mind of a rational or consistent person are other beliefs, among which are some principles that are constitutive of rationality. Principles such as taking as true that which has the most evidence to support it or acting according to that action which we consider to be the best course of action.

To act rationally is to choose a course of action or to believe something after weighing and taking into consideration the relevant information. For Davidson to act rationally means to evaluate impartially, as it were, all possible actions and choose the one supported by the best reasons. In the case of beliefs, the claim is that the rational thing to do is to give credence to those beliefs supported by evidence.

In the case of beliefs, some authors claim that we too choose our beliefs. To these writers to come to have a belief is a voluntary act. Others, like Derek Parfit, (Parfit 2011) think that some facts of the world give us decisive reasons to have some belief and coming to have this belief is not voluntary. Nevertheless, as Parfit states, our being rational consists in that we can be asked why we believe something and we can our reasons. In any case, the rational evaluation of intentions and beliefs implies a comparison with other courses of action or other beliefs.

But in irrationality, a substructure formed by desires and belief has imposed itself eluding this comparison, or making the comparison faulty. In the case of incontinence or wishful thinking the incontinent's motives have eschewed such rational scrutiny. Either because the desire is rebellious and defies, using strategies that psychoanalysis illuminates, that scrutiny, or because, as other authors suggest, the desire is too strong.

Donald Davidson (1916-2002) does not state that his primary intention is to elaborate a theory of the unconscious. It is Richard Rorty who argues that Davidson, in his attempt to understand some forms of irrationality, has put forward a new definition of the unconscious.

While it is true that Davidson's psychoanalytically informed explanation of irrationality is contained in his article "Paradoxes of irrationality" (Davidson 1982) there are two earlier writings in which he elaborates his theory of incontinence (*Akrasia)* and self-deception. In "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", published in 1963 (Davidson 1980) Davidson persuaded many philosophers that the explanation of actions is a causal explanation. This means that a person's motives are, in addition to being reasons, causes of her behavior. The second article, which is more closely linked to the theme of irrationality, is "How is Weakness of the Will Possible"? published in 1969 (Davidson 1980) in which he sets out a first theory of the formal conditions for incontinent actions, although at this point he did not use direct contributions from psychoanalysis. The central thesis of this second article is that in incontinent actions -irrational actions-

the motive is a cause and not a reason. They are motives that having lost their power to act as reasons, retain their capacity to motivate as causes. This loss of the rationality of certain actions is explained by the broken relation of the motive of the action with the rest of the mental contents.

According to Davidson, incontinent or acratic actions are those in which a person, placed in a decision between two possible intentional actions, say "A" and "B", evaluates each of these options and judges that A is the best and yet, despite that consideration, does B. How to understand this type of behavior in which the person goes against his own judgment? A person has decided to quit smoking. He has concluded that it is best for his health not to smoke, but, despite his resolution, which he has reached after deliberation, he accepts a cigarette when someone offers it to him. One may be tempted to reply that in such cases the strength of desire has overcome the voice of reason. The same explanation may be offered in cases of wishful thinking and self-deception. The force of desire has defeated other convictions held by the person. But this explanation, which has been adopted by much of the philosophical tradition and as convincing as it seems, does not allow us to explain cases in which the person acts incontinently without being under the spell of a violent passion. Sometimes the best course of action or the belief supported by the evidence is not hidden but rather before our eyes, and yet we do not act by choosing what we judge to be the best action or the true belief. If we can explain those more blatant contradictions, we will have a general structure of incontinence and therefore of other forms of irrationality.

To build that structure we need to incorporate, Davidson contends, three ideas that he believes are found in Freud. A) that the mind is formed by semi independent structures; B) these structures are in important respects similar to a person, in the sense that the desires, thoughts and memories of this structure can combine to cause other events within the mind or outside of it. These substructures also have a greater degree of consistency than the person has and C) in incontinent actions, these attitudes and events that populate the substructures must be viewed as physical forces when they affect other substructures of the mind or when they result in actions. (Davidson 1982: 290) .

Davidson makes use of an example of Freud's own that we find in a footnote to the clinical history of the "Rat Man" (Freud 1909) in which the case is told of a man who:

> ... had tripped over a branch lying in the road; he then threw it into the surrounding bush. On the way home he was suddenly seized with the worry that the branch, perhaps now somewhat protruding in its new position, might cause an accident to someone passing behind him in the same spot. He was forced to jump off the streetcar, hurry back to the park, find the spot and put the branch back where it had been, even though it would be obvious to anyone other than the sick man that this former position was perforce more dangerous to a passer-by than the new one in the middle of the undergrowth. (Freud 1909, 152 n29)

The man in Freud's example has, according to Davidson, reasons to perform both actions. To move the branch and throw it into the bush, but also he has reasons to get off the streetcar, to reverse what he had already done and return the branch to its original situation, the one he had at first considered dangerous to a passerby. At first he believed that the branch in the road was a danger to others, so he had a reason to throw it into the bush. In the second moment, he also has a reason to return the branch to its original situation, which is to believe that in the bush as he had left it it is also a danger. So both actions considered separately are rational. But only if they are considered separately. Rationality involves precisely the comparison of the reasons in favor of the different actions that are presented as options. In this case the irrationality consists in the fact that the man in returning to the park acted against his own evaluation in the sense that, after weighing all the relevant facts and comparing both courses of action, he had arrived at the conclusion that it was better, given the time it would consume, not to return to the park. But the man did return. “The officer contended that, considering the whole situation, he should not return to the park. Given his principle that one should act in accordance with that conclusion, the rational thing for him, of course, was not to return to the park. Irrationality entered in when his desire to return caused him to ignore his principle." (Davidson 297)

That a person should follow the course of action that, after analyzing pros and cons, is considered the best, is what Davidson calls the principle of continence: a rational human being carries out the actions

that he or she considers the best, considering all the reasons available at the time. It is a constitutive principle of rationality, which means that we learn this principle while learning to think. Many irrational actions such as incontinence, wishful thinking or self-deception have for Davidson this defining feature: the agent ignores principles that are constitutives of rationality. Another example, inspired by one of Davidson's, is that of self-deception and wishful thinking, and in these cases it is another constitutive principle of rationality that is overturned. Let us think of someone who desires to have to be a good poet, and this leads her to believe that she is a good poet. But the desire to be a good poet is neither evidence of being a good poet nor sufficient reason to believe it. For such a belief to be rational it must be supported by evidence and desire does not provide any. This is the very common case of wishful thinking, which is another form of irrationality. In this case the principle of rationality that the hopeful writer has ignored is not the principle of continence but of rationality: "Give credence to the hypothesis that is supported by all the relevant evidence that is available" (Davidson 1980: 41) also called the principle of total evidence. A rational person believes to be true what is supported by all the evidence that can be examined. This writer clearly had the possibility of examining other evidence before believing that he was a good poet. We could say that in order to acquire the belief that he is a good writer he only listened to the voice of his desire.

How to understand the man's compulsion to return to the park when he considers that it is not his best option and how to understand the behavior of our writer who judges she is a good poet without taking into account the evidence? It is here that the idea of the partition of the mind and the idea that some of these parts can interact with the other parts of the mind as if they were physical forces are of decisive importance. Two notions that, according to Davidson, Freud put forward.

Contrary to MacIntyre, for Davidson the motives of a behavior are reasons and causes. But in the irrational action, the motives act mainly as causes even though those motives may have initially been grounded on reasons. An action is rational when the reasons that motivate it have been contrasted with

other reasons that can speak against that action or in favor of others. To use Freud's phrase, they should enter into "associative commerce" with other ideas and reasons. The man in the park had good reasons for going back and repositioning the branch in its original position. But he had more powerful reasons, i.e, he judged to be better, for leaving it in the bush. The poet in our example has a reason to believe that she is a great author (say she likes her poems and would like to be acclaimed), but she has not taken into account all the reasons that she should consult to arrive at that conclusion, i.e that she is a great poet. In both examples, there was no weighing of reasons, nor hierarchical ranking of them. Davidson's argument is that, absent the logical connection, only their causal power remains and that is why their influence can be compared to the influence of a physical force. Hence Freud's use of metaphors taken from physics.

Thus if the question about incontinence is "what is the agent's reason for doing a when he thinks it would be better, all things considered, to do something else, then the answer must be: for this the agent has no reason." (Davidson 1980: 42) He has only impulses that are causes which as such have escaped rational examination.

Davidson thinks that the core ideas of his explanation of irrationality are already present in Freud. The independent substructures, although Davidson does not want to endorse the precise language of the Ego, the id and the Super -Ego; the causal influences of impulses which may have led Freud to use a physical language to refer to this influence; and the positing that desires and beliefs can combine within these substructures to cause other mental contents or to cause actions.

It is worthy to note that Habermas as well grants to these unconsciously motivated behaviors a causal force, but he does so because of their compulsive aspect. Davidson, on the other hand, arrives at a similar conclusion by default, or through the argument to the best explanation. That is to say, having established that reasons are causes, and having ascertained that the motives of an incontinent action do not resist

rational scrutiny, he concludes that what remains for these motives is only, or almost only, their causal force.

Davidson warns that to explain incontinence or self-deception it is not mandatory to assume unconscious contents. In some cases the person knows that he is going against his better judgment. However, he believes that if we add to this explanation of incontinence or akrasia the assumption of the existence of unconscious states, the theory improves. The standard case of *akrasia* is one in which the agent knows what he is doing and why, and knows that it is not the best thing to do and why. He recognizes his own irrationality. If all this is possible, then the description cannot become untenable if it is assumed that sometimes some of the thoughts and desires involved are unconscious. “If to an unobjectionable theory we add the assumption of unconscious elements, the theory can only become more acceptable, that is, capable of explaining more”. (Davidson 1983: 305)

It was Richard Rorty who saw in this explanation of irrationality the best way to understand what Freud meant by unconscious states. In interpreting Davidson, Rorty identifies Davidson's semi-independent structures as conscious and unconscious.

He identifies being a person with being a set of coherent and plausible beliefs and desires. He then points out that the strength of saying that sometimes a human being behaves irrationally is that he sometimes displays behavior that cannot be explained in reference to that unique set. Finally he concludes that the reason for "splitting" the self between a conscious and an unconscious is that the latter can be considered an alternative set, incongruent with the known set that we identify with consciousness but with sufficient inner coherence to pass for a person. This strategy leaves open the possibility that the same human body may house two or more persons. These persons establish causal relationships with each other, as well as with the body whose movements are triggered by the desires and beliefs of one or the other of them. But

they do not normally maintain conversational relationships. That is to say, the unconscious beliefs of one do not constitute reasons for a change in the conscious beliefs of the other... (Rorty 1993: 207).

Freud had indeed already walked the path suggested by Rorty in this quote. The notion of the mind as made up of "subminds" dialoguing and causally affecting each other is hinted at in several of his writings. Psychoanalysis after him, however, has not paid much attention to this idea, perhaps because Freud did not see in this intuition of his the explanatory power it really has.

In fact the idea of a causal - and not a logical - relation between mental states has its paradigm, according to Davidson, in interpersonal relationships. This is an example from Davidson: Let's say I want you to come into my garden. To that end, I decide to plant a beautiful flower in my garden. You pass by and seeing the flower and attracted by its beauty, you enter. My desire for you to enter my garden has been the cause of your action, that is, of your entering my garden. But my desire cannot have been a reason for you. It is likely that you didn't even know of my desire. This is an example of one mental event (my desire) causing another mental event (your feeling of attraction to the flower I have planted), without my desire being a reason for you. Davidson proposes that what happens in a social interaction can apply to a single mind and person.

Similarly, when Freud attempted to justify the concept of the unconscious, he used the model of social interaction to justify the notion of the unconscious. (Freud 1914):

...It must be said that all the acts and externalizations that I notice in myself and do not connect with the rest of my psychic life must be judged as if they belonged to another person and must be clarified by attributing to this person a psychic life...the analysis points to the fact that the various latent psychic processes enjoy a high degree of reciprocal psychic independence as if they had no connection with each other and knew nothing of each other. The analysis points out that the various latent psychic processes

enjoy a high degree of reciprocal psychic independence as if they had no connection with each other and knew nothing of each other... a part of these latent processes possess characters and peculiarities which seem to us strange and even unbelievable, (These latent processes) admit of being most closely described as cases of the splitting of the soul's activity into two groups, the same consciousness then moving alternately into one field or the other.

Likewise, the idea of a divided mind is present, in preliminary form, in Freud's brilliant explanation of fetishism (Freud 1930) In that work, Freud sustains that in the fetishist mind there exist side by side contradictory beliefs regarding the castration of women. On one side of his mind, the fetishist believes that women have been castrated and on the other he disavows this belief. Later in his work on the splitting of the Ego (1940) Freud tells the story of a boy who has endeavoured to divide his mind in similar fashion. On one side he continues to pursue onanistic satisfaction ignoring the fear of castration. On the other side he developed a symptom which shows that he recognized the danger.

In the introduction to this article Frued wonders whether what he is about to say is something new or something well known. I take this declaration as implying, in line with Rorty and Davidson, that rather than one defense mechanism among several, this fragmentation of the mind is the way we should conceptualize the unconscious.

Post-Freudian psychoanalysis has mostly considered splitting to be one defense mechanism among others, found most prominently in certain severe psychopathological conditions considered “borderline cases”. Perhaps it is necessary to consider the clinical cases labeled as borderline by psychoanalysis as cases that exhibit a more pronounced splitting, or a splitting not balanced by other beliefs and other feelings. If that view is adopted, then we can see Freud's writings on fetishism as paving the way for the

conceptualizations of a divided minda developed by Davidson and Pears. In the same manner, it was Freud who, by linking the knowledge we can have of unconscious states to the knowledge we have of the mental contents of other people, opened up the possibility to understand unconscious impulses as exerting a merely causal influence in behavior. And these are two of the ideas that Davidson thinks are necessary to understand irrationality.

Now, Davidson´s is the description of a structure, but not of the process of the formation of these substructures. In this sense Marcia Cavell, who claims to endorse Davidson and Rorty conception of the unconscious as disintegration, says:

(Davidson) does not think he is enlightening us about the psychological stratagems at work, or characterizing mental sub-divisions, or showing us how splitting takes place and how partitions are kept away from each other. He is not explaining anything in this sense, but drawing an abstract picture of the mind...The model says nothing about the permanence of the substructures over time. The partition is a crude logical notion and nothing more. And this crudeness is its virtue (Cavell 1993: 201).

To cover this lack, Marcia Cavell offers an elucidation of the processes that result in the constitution of these substructures in a single mind.

Although this explanation belongs mostly to empirical psychology, it is also pertinent for conceptual analysis. The explanation of how unconscious mental contents are constituted and maintained over time could shed light on the nature of the unconscious and about the structure of some irrational actions. In fact, philosophers such as Davidson, Pears and Mark Johnston have proposed explanations for fantasy

and repression, two unconscious processes that seem critical to clarify the essence of irrational actions. For this reason, it is important in my work that I dwell in this subject matter.

To be sure the process by virtue of which an unconscious mental process is brought into being is obscure in itself and still causes perplexities among philosophers interested in psychoanalytic theory. Ernst Tugendhat (Tugendhat 1986) says that the unconscious and repression are undeniable facts that so far have not been satisfactorily explained and David Finkelstein (Finkelstein 1999) states that "it will be a long time before we can understand what the blockage of the consciousness of some mental contents consists of." So we have here an uncomprehended process bringing into existence a yet unclarified state. Nevertheless, one hopes that the attempt to explain the activities that result in a mental state being or becoming unconscious may alleviate some of the difficulties in explaining what an unconscious mental state is.

Cavell proposes an answer to this puzzle. She tells us that these partitions occur in infancy when the child does not have the conceptual and linguistic instruments to process the fears that she experiences. An inner "flight" would be responsible for the creation of substructures, clusters of desires, beliefs, memories and fantasies, which, as a consequence of infantile anxiety, were "exiled" by the child, placing them outside the rational demands of other psychologically more mature substructures.

These...early splits become established in the character, dividing, on the one hand, fragmentary impressions, together with fantasies created as a defense against those impressions, and, on the other hand, more actual perceptions that may be in conflict with the structure of the fantasy...What began as wishful thinking acquires the force and structure of a habit, a way of acting and also a way of perceiving that reinforces the initial avoidance (Cavell 203).

Lest there be any doubt that Davidson's model of partitioning the mind is the one Cavell uses to speak of the unconscious, she ends by saying that "in the model I propose the concept of the 'unconscious' rather calls attention to the ways in which early unconscious states, barely understandable to the adult mind, are preserved, made fuzzier and more *isolated.* The adult learns to reveal his unconscious as he learns to listen to the child within him". (Cavell 1993: 205, My emphasis.) Finally, it is through habit and reinforcement that these substructures are sedimented.

These two notions, that of habit and reinforcement, do not have the weight in Cavell's theory that they should have had and for this reason her attempt to provide a fine grained causal explanation of the process that produces these splits, and the elusive phenomenon of repression, can be called into question.

Indeed, Marcia Cavell departs from Davidson´s split mind model and supports a neurophysiological view that contradicts not only psychoanalytic theory but the most plausible explanations we can conceive of for repression and fantasy.

Cavell thinks that the unconscious processes are "non-declarative" processes, also called "implicit." In this connection Cavell cites the work of one of several cognitive psychologists (Kihlstrom 1987) for whom "declarative" knowledge is not the only form of knowledge. In a paper subsequent to *The Psychoanalytic Mind* Cavell asserts that unconscious processes involve what cognitive psychologists call "implicit" non-declarative or procedural knowledge. (Cavell 2006).

"What psychoanalysis calls defenses to regulate unpleasant affects presumably involve implicit unconscious procedures." (Cavell 2006: 15)

Thus, Cavell contends that by incorporating the distinction made by some neuroscientists between explicit or declarative memory or knowledge and implicit and procedural memory or knowledge, the elusive phenomenon of repression is illuminated. My contention is that this may not be so. Implicit, procedural

or non-declarative memory or knowledge are those that manifest themselves in automatic behaviors, skills, things we do without paying attention. They are the ones that explain the responses that are acquired through classical conditioning. Non-declarative memory "is that which underlies changes in abilities to respond appropriately to stimuli through practice, as a result of conditioning or learning through habit," claim Milner, Squire and Kandel, who have popularized this concept.

The idea of non-declarative *knowledge o*r memory has been criticized from a philosophical standpoint by Hacker and Bennett, for whom processes such as habituation by conditioning are not processes that involve anything cognitive and therefore it is not correct to refer to them as instances of knowledge nor as instances of memory. What neuroscience considers implicit or nondeclarative knowledge or procedures are actually activities that are best expressed by the expression "being able to" or "having the ability to". Human beings have, in addition to innate abilities such as breathing, acquired abilities such as the ability to walk, or to talk, or to be able to be patient or to remain quiet. These skills are learned and correspond to what neuroscience calls declarative knowledge, but in reality they are not forms of knowledge or memory.

The reason that the application of this idea to unconscious contents is doomed is that the unconscious processes studied by psychoanalysis have a cognitive aspects at their core, namely the perception of a situation that is considered dangerous and an ensuing defense strategy. This was pointed out by Freud both in *The Ego and the id* and in I*nhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety.* This is also true in unconscious processes in which the person has a passive role. I.e when the child identifies with an adult figure and develops modes of behavior similar to that figure. In these cases there are also cognitive aspects involved. Cavell, going against part of what she herself affirms, insists that this is not necessarily the case and that neuroscientific research authorizes us to speak of affective evaluations of which the person is unaware, that is without cognitive awareness. In the first part of this work I raised doubts about the claim made by some neuroscientists regarding this type of (radical) unawareness. Those doubts should also be applied

here. One can be completely unaware of perceptual contents if these perceptions are minute and fleeting. But one cannot be radically unaware of one's own beliefs and desires. Unconscious desires and beliefs do not have that type of unawareness that Damasio has shown to exist regarding other mental contents, because they (beliefs and desires) affect actions, and more often than not unconscious motives can be grasped by someone observing the actions of the person motivated by those impulses.

There is another claim made by Marcia Cavell that should also be called into question. It is her assertion that what propels fantasy is a desire with no belief accompanying it, what she labels "a mechanism".

In fact, for Cavell it is absurd to suppose that little John has the belief that he will reduce the anxiety towards his father if he fantasizes that his anxiety is directed to horses. In the same way, so this argument goes, that it would be absurd to attribute to the woman who pours red ink on a tablecloth the belief that by doing so she will be able to amend her wedding night. Processes such as fantasy, she claims, are processes where a mental mechanism is at work in which there is only desire but no instrumental belief. An instrumental belief is a belief about the means or the instruments that can bring about the desired state of affairs. In fantasy, according to this author, that belief is lacking.

In an analogous fashion, distinct philosophers have elaborated the idea that there are motives of intentional or "subintentional" [34]actions which do not include instrumental beliefs. Alfred Mele (Mele 2001) has argued that individuals acquire beliefs motivated exclusively by a desire in some cases of self-deception. It is absurd, Mele argues, to attribute to a person who, say, persuades himself that he has a superior ability to get along with others, the belief that by acquiring such conviction, he will become a person who gets along well with others.

[34] This is an expression used by Mark Johnston to qualify self-deception.

Likewise, Rosalind Hursthouse (Hursthouse 1991) has called "*a*rational actions" to actions where the motive is not the belief-desire pair, but rather a desire fueled by strong emotion, but with no reason that justifies the action. Intentional actions such as:

a) explained by a wave of love, affection, or tenderness-kissing or lightly touching in passing, seizing and tossing up in the air, rumpling the hair of, or generally messing up the person or animal one loves; talking to her photograph as one passes, kissing it; (b) explained by anger, hatred, and sometimes jealousy-violently destroying or damaging anything remotely connected with the person (or animal, or institution) one's emotion is directed toward, e.g., her picture, letters or presents from her, awards from her, books or poems about her; the chair she was wont to sit in, locks of her hair, recordings or "our" song, etc.; (c) explained by anger with inanimate objects-doing things that might make sense if the things were animate, e.g., cars that refuse to start, tying towels that keep falling off a slippery towel rail on to it very tightly and then consolidating the knots with water; muttering vindictively 'I'll show you', or 'You would would you'; (d) explained by excitement-jumping up and down, running, shouting, pounding the table or one's knees, hugging oneself or other people, throwing things; (e) explained by joy-running, shouting at them, throwing an "uncooperative" tin opener on the ground or out of the window…

These and others, are intentional actions motivated by an intense emotion but in which the person doing such activities does not have a reason to do them. In other words, the agent does not believe that talking to a photograph, damaging something connected with a person he hates, or hitting a car when it refuses to start are means to accomplish anything. The agent does not have those instrumental beliefs. The actions described by Hursthouse belong to the same class that those that David Finkelstein mentions to

support his claim that there are actions that show expressive relations between the inner and the outer that are not reason- relations and yet they are internal, conceptual relations. We can make sense of someone who, moved by anger toward x, destroys a photograph of x. We can also make sense of the one who, moved by joy, jumps up and down. But it would be odd if somebody jumps up and down out of anger or destroys someone else's picture out of love. There would be, therefore, as Finkelstein points out, an internal relation between mental contents and behavior that is not rational and yet it is logical. It is the logical space of animal life. These are cases where mental content and behavior, says Finkelstein, make sense together. The question is whether, as Finkelstein and Hursthouse think, there is no reason, i.e., no instrumental belief in those behaviors.

Mark Johnston, on his side, has argued that what lies behind self deception, wishful thinking and repression, is a “tropism”, that is, a mental mechanism better understood through behavioristic lenses. Human beings somehow acquire, perhaps after one successful experience, that self deception or wishful thinking is an effective way of reducing anxiety. Self deception, wishful thinking and repression originate like many other habits acquired involuntarily. With time they become subintentional responses in the sense that there is guiding desire, that of reducing anxiety, but no instrumental belief, so Johnson thinks. Lines below I will say more about Johnston´ explanation of irrationality.

All of these authors concur with Marcia Cavell in that the desire -belief model of explanation of human action has no application in various instances of irrational behavior, because in those cases desire acts alone. Marcia Cavell thinks that this occurs in fantasy. This is a difficult topic but an important one to be discussed by the psychoanalytic community.

My contention is that in many of the cases mentioned by these authors, there is an instrumental belief, albeit one that does not figure prominently in the mind of the agent. An unconscious instrumental belief

we could say. Clearly in the cases that Marcia Cavell speaks of. There is always, I will claim, an intentionality in repression and fantasy.

For example we can quarrel with Mele´s claim that it is absurd to attribute to the self deceiver the belief that by acquiring a belief, say of having good social skills, it becomes the case that he or she has good social skills. Contrary to what Mele says, it may seem that the desire of the self deceiver is to avoid the pain of lacking a skill he values. One way to accomplish that is to actually work on improving social skills. The other way, albeit the faulty one, is to take the shortcut and persuade oneself that one has that skill. Acquiring a comforting belief about oneself without evidence supporting that belief is a strategy that one learns in childhood and therefore can be considered an instrumental belief. If it is effective in reducing anxiety it is because, as David Pears (Pears 1998) says, the pleasure or satisfaction of having a superior ability to get along with others comes not only from actually having the superior ability but also from believing one has it.

In the challenging and interesting cases presented by Hurthouse, it should be noted that those behaviors seem to be not rationally grounded only if they appear on a single occasion. But the picture changes if those actions correspond to a behavioral pattern. That is, if every time that Mary is upset she intentionally hits an inanimate object, then in that case one would be more inclined to try to find an instrumental belief in that action. There is something that Mary thinks she is accomplishing every time she hits an object. What she is accomplishing and how, i.e., by what means she is accomplishing it, are admittedly cloudy mental contents for Mary herself. But the fact that Mary could express her grievance in different ways and somehow choses to hit the table is a reason, I propose, to claim that an instrumental belief is not absent. Hitting inanimate objects or destroying something remotely connected with the person I am jealous about are not like reflexes but something akin to intentional actions that have a meaning.

I said earlier that the behaviors Hurthouse lists as examples of a-rational actions, which she considers to be intentional nonetheless, can be also used as instantiations of what David Finkelstein calls a necessary (i.e internal) but not rational relation between emotion and behavior. There seems to be in these authors, and others, a search for a manner of formulating some relations between the inner and the outer which are not neatly reasons- directed and yet exhibit some form of meaning. Merleau Ponty can also be mentioned among those authors worried with finding the language and the structure that can account for relations of this sort. It has been claimed that this writer posits that the way human beings understand their environment and cope with it is preconceptual, something that functions *in the space of reasons below concepts.* [35] My claim is that in this type of action some sort of instrumental belief figures in the motivational stock of the agent. Not a clearly formulated belief, which is to say not one that the person thus acting can easily acknowledge, but one that pre-consciously, if you will, guides the election of some means toward an end.

Nor certainly the examples chosen by Marcia Cavell support her claim that actions propelled by fantasies and repression are actions where no instrumental belief can be found. Against what Cavell affirms, Freud is clear in saying that little John did have the unconscious belief that fantasizing the fear of horses would lessen the fear of his father. Granted, it is a belief with delusional content. But it is precisely the task of psychoanalytic theory and practice to uncover and explain the way those beliefs operate. Much clearer is the case of the female patient, because the purpose of the ritual is precisely to persuade herself and others of her husband's sexual fitness. It is precisely one of the most significant contributions of Freud and psychoanalysis to the human sciences to call attention to the intentional and cognitive aspect of these beliefs, which do not cease to be beliefs just because they are delusional, or irrational, if you will. In the case of Freud's patient, the belief present in the mechanism is even more evident, because the woman's

[35] Charles Taylor, in his stellar presentation of Merleau Ponty's ideas in "Merleau Ponty and the Epistemological Picture. In *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau Ponty* edited by Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen.

actions, her rituals, are intended to reinforce a belief, namely, that her husband was not impotent. David Pears has pointed out that one of the contributions of psychoanalysis to philosophy, in relation to the problem of irrationality, is to have shown that the cases of self-deception exhibit that which Freud's patient shows, namely, actions whose purpose is to reinforce a false belief.

While there is controversy among scholars about whether a delusion is a belief and Cavell seems to think it is not, both little John and Freud's patient exhibit what can be called unconscious delusions. Those are beliefs that to a certain extent are similar to a scientist´s hypotheses. The difference is that, whereas a scientist should abandon a conjecture if the evidence rejects it, in the case of obsessive rituals, the person persists in believing, against the evidence, that his rituals can ward off some dangers. Beliefs that we call strange or irrational because they are beliefs that have managed to place themselves where rational scrutiny does not reach. I hence think that to describe what this state is like, the idea of a divided mind, as envisioned by Freud and further developed by Davidson and Rorty, is useful.

Consequently, the theory of mental partitioning needs another empirical complement, different from the one elaborated by Cavell. As far as the process in the biography of each person through which these partitions become part of the individual's behavioral repertoire, Cavell's idea is correct. But equating the processes in which an unconscious impulse has gained control over the actions of the person with what neuroscience groups under the label of non-declarative processes is, for the reasons we have stated, misleading.

The theory of mental substructures represents progress towards a better understanding of some cases of irrationality. There seems indeed in these cases to be in play a sub structure, composed of a desire and a belief, that somehow collides with other contents, that at the same ignores. It is however a suggestion that leaves unexplained how these semi persons originate and function within the mind.

Any effort to clarify this must be wary about the fact that repression, fantasy, wishful thinking, and self-deception are names that cover many types of behavior. Most theories fail to capture all cases.

My suggestion as to how these partitions operate and become part of personality structures must draw on models and concepts that are more commonly used outside psychoanalysis and which also seem to have with each other few communicating vessels: behaviorism and phenomenology.

This is what I propose. Moved by anxiety, the infant discovers that he can use his words and actions to hide from himself the mental contents generating the anxiety and thus secure some relief in the short term. In the cases that most interest psychoanalysis, this type of strategic "solution" will become rigid and established as part of the personality due to a process of conditioning. What characterizes the behaviors that bring up relief is, as Merleau Ponty claimed, that they place the threatening idea off from the "available mental field," "at a distance" enough to overlook it.

> Thus in hysteria and repression, we may overlook something although we know of it, because our memories and our body, instead of presenting themselves to us in singular and determinate conscious acts, are enveloped in generality. Through this generality we still have them, but just enough to hold them at a distance from us. (Merleau Ponty 1996: 162)

Merleau Ponty´s claim fits well if we think of physical distances, as this author is mostly focused on our bodily dealings with the world. But nothing prohibits to take his suggestion and use it to posit that language can also serve as an instrument to distance oneself from unpleasant thoughts. Language can perform the same task, although the way it does is more difficult to describe than the way we can physically distance ourselves from an unpleasant stimulus. Because with language, it is a matter of using meanings, and the operation through which meanings are set apart or distanced from each other is difficult to account for. And yet, Freud frequently spoke of the distance that exists between the repressed idea and the symbols that substitute for that idea. He stressed that this distance can vary. In the case of Little John, for instance, the distance between horse, the substituting idea, and father, the repressed idea,

is not so big. Neither in the case of the obsessive person who washes his hands compulsively to fight off ¨dirty¨ thoughts. On the other hand, it has been argued by different psychoanalysts that in the case of surgeons their trade is a way to mask and sublimate aggressive impulses. In this latter case, Freud probably would agree that the distance between the repressed idea and the substitutory symbols is bigger than in the former cases.

Mark Johnston follows a similar approach as Merleau Ponty. At least for some cases of self-deception, Johnston contends, the person self deceived uses means from the external world to push away unpleasant ideas. For this author there are instances of self deception where the agent arranges the things surrounding him so that the interaction of those things produce the forgetfulness or the repression of an unpleasant belief or of the evidence that counts against what he wants to believe, without his (the agent´s) monitoring of the causal interaction of those things. Johnston ´s claim is that the agent somehow manages to create a situation where those very things that produce, through their causal interactions, the wishful belief or the forgetfulness escape his attention. In my view, this explanation has much in common with Merleau Ponty´s in that both invoke the confusion and messiness in the person's surroundings as the means through which self-deception or wishful thinking can be produced.

Johnson concludes that the best ground we can offer for these irrational responses is that one of the forms of mental adaptation of human beings is "doses of hopeful beliefs" or illusions that deny aspects of reality. In other words, to cope with the environment and its demands we tend, in addition to rationally monitoring our desires and beliefs, to adopt here and there the strategy of believing things simply because they are more pleasant or convenient. [36]Because this strategy is sub intentional and learned through a conditioning process, Johnston calls this explanation "anti-intentionalist and tropic".

[36] Charles Sander Pierce also said that outside practical matters it is probably of more advantage for the human being to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth. (Pierce 1958, 96)

However he does not elaborate on the role as reinforcers that hopeful beliefs may have. Though he mentions that a wishful thought has a certain operant level and, because of its balsamic properties, is very likely to be reinforced, the truth of the matter is that something cannot be a reinforcer if it happens only once. The conditioning theory mentioned by Johnson is a learning theory, it explains how organisms learn specific techniques to cope with a demanding environment. Johnston speaks of "belief of this sort" (i.e wishful beliefs) that tend to arise in the presence of some desires, a phrasing that suggests the correct account of the matter: that what the individual learns and becomes accustomed to is to a certain type of thinking, not specific thoughts. I agree that relief from anxiety plays a role, through a conditioning process, in the acquisition of wishful thinking or self-deception as part of the individual's behavioral repertoire. But since these are styles or types of thinking, its specific content has to be chosen anew. Thus every time that the child faces an anxiety provoking situation she has at her disposal various possible strategies to overcome the situation. Since she has already experienced the pleasure that fantasy or daydreaming can afford to her, this may be one of them. But daydreaming and self-deception have to be furnished with some content, and this may happen the way Merleau Ponty and Mark Johnston suggest, i.e as exploiting the "generality" of the environment. The intentional element comes in when we realize that choosing among options, i.e among possible means to attain the end of reducing anxiety, as the variety of defense mechanisms attest, is a key factor in the performance of daydreaming, fantasy and self-deception. Hence the conditioning posited by Johnston as a key element of some irrational behaviors, does occur but only for placing, as it were, within the agent´s horizon the possibility of self-deception or of wishful thinking. But the contents of fantasies and self-deception are geared for each particular situation and thus there has to be in the agent's mind the belief that some fantasies, and not others, can pull the trick of making the environment less rough. This, I think, demonstrates that intentionality and an instrumental belief is present in wishful thinking and self deception.

v) The limits of the fragmented mind model.

The divided mind model, as posited by Davidson and Rorty, seems to work better for describing impulsive behaviors in which an unconscious desire has taken the upper hand and is the primary motive. Indeed these are the cases where unconscious motives resemble, to use Freud´s expression, "a foreign body" in relation to other contents. This model thus seems to be geared to explaining psychic and moral conflicts.

There are, however, other unconscious processes and unconscious contents that do not show an easy compatibility with the idea of partition. For example, the process of identification, so important in the constitution of the personality. Freud said that the part of the personality that he called the "I" (Das Ich) is the result of the identifications of the infant with people in her environment: "The character of the I is a sedimentation of the resigned object investments, it contains the history of these object choices" (Freud: 1923). It is undeniable that on our way of becoming individuals we almost universally adopt attitudes, gestures, ideas and so on, of some of those who take care of us in the first years of life. Both that journey and its outcome, namely the traits of our personality whose raw material is our interactions with significant others, can occur without there being necessarily conflict between the attitudes we internalize from others and the rest of our desires and beliefs. Of course, there can be conflict in this area and it is in many the case. It may also be the case that in each individual life some identifications may not be rationally related to other personality features. And something of a partition takes place. But in many other cases, the logical link of that unconscious identifications to our actions and to the conscious image we have of ourselves has not been broken. The same can be said of unconscious fantasy which is, as Jonathan Lear has pointed out, an element that structures people's lives and actions. Robert Audi has also shown that some psychoanalytically explainable actions, that is unconsciously motivated actions, can be rational. As when I perform an action which is worthwhile for me but I am not aware of the reasons why the action is in my best interest. For instance, after a bitter argument with my fiancée I unconsciously

leave an umbrella at her house in order to have a reason to see her again and mend up things with her. It can be argued that this unconsciously motivated forgetfulness is rational and in my best interest. In such a case holism is at work.

The conclusion that follows from these cases is that Rorty may have rushed in asserting that Davidson´s idea of mental partitioning as a model for explaining irrationality can be taken as a definition of the unconscious. There are instances of unconscious mental contents having a rational connection with conscious ideas and feelings and where, therefore, the holism of the mental is not ruptured.

IV. David Finkelstein and the two models. Conclusion.

There have been two ways of conceiving the notion of the unconscious in Wittgenstein-influenced philosophy. On the one hand, the one proposed by Habermas and Mc Intyre, which defines unconscious contents as those mental contents manifested in a behavior that the agent cannot express verbally. On the other hand, the idea of mental partitioning, where unconscious contents are identified as being disconnected or forming an isolated network with respect to the beliefs that most frequently guide the person's actions.

The comparison and combination of both ways of understanding the unconscious has been developed by David Finnkelstein, who partially assumes the model of the mental partition but improves it it with an idea of the unconscious that is in line with what has been exposed by MacIntyre and Habermas, i.e. the unconscious as those mental states that the person cannot express verbally.

According to Finkelstein, Davidson and Rorty´s understanding of unconscious states as resembling the mental states of a separate person is tempting but wrong. Although this author retains the idea stressed by Davidson that the relation between unconscious mental states and conscious mental states, as well as between unconscious mental and the behaviors these states motivate are "merely causal" relations, that is, not reasons related, (Finkelstein 1999, 2003, 2011) he thinks that this model is unable to explain the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious mental state. Nor does Davidson's and Rorty's explanation permits us to look at the process by virtue of which an unconscious mental state becomes conscious. Although Finkelstein offers no detailed explanation of the process of repression and how it is overcome, and stresses the fact that the process of an idea or a feeling becoming unconscious is thus far unexplained, "It will be a long time before we can understand the sense in which an unconscious mental state has its access to consciousness blocked," he tells us, he nevertheless believes that by

examining our way of talking about unconscious states, we may expand our understanding of the unconscious beyond the partition model.

For Finkelstein an unconscious state is a mental state that the person affected by it cannot express through a self-ascription. The idea of expression, critical in the work of this author, makes reference to the capacity to confer publicity to an inner state of mind. One can express one's inner states with words or with actions. [37]When one does so verbally it *may* be a case of an expression through self attribution and therefore a case of a conscious mental state. However there are cases in which although I use language to talk about a mental state of mine, it is not a case of an expression with first person authority.

The difference between an expression by self attribution and one that is not is important to clarify Finkelstein´s notion of the unconscious. The characteristic that marks off conscious mental states is that I can express my conscious mental states through a self attribution; this self attribution is an expression, as well as an assertion, of the mental state that I am attributing to myself which is not made on the basis of evidence[38]. This last point means that, for instance, I realize that Mary is upset by attending to the evidence: her tone of voice, her gestures, her facial expression and what she says. In contrast, I don't notice or infer that I am upset. I simply am upset. When my annoyance is conscious I can express it through spontaneous and effortless verbalizations. Only if I can verbally express my state of mind through self-attribution, without consulting the evidence, can I be said to speak with the authority of the first person, that is, I am speaking from a privileged perspective about my conscious inner states. Finally, for Finkelstein the utterance "I am annoyed" expresses my state of mind as much as my frown. In the same

[37] Although one can also express to one self a state of mind in thought.

[38] When Finkelstein says that a self attribution is an expression of the state that I am attributing to myself, refers to the fact that when I avow that I am angry I both say that I am angry and express my anger. My utterance has therefore an assertoric role as well as an expressive one. I express something at the same time that I say something true about myself.

way that a smile is as much an expression of my mental state as the statement "I am happy". But is only the verbal capacity for this self attribution that marks off conscious mental states from unconscious ones.

Unconscious mental states can be, and usually are, expressed in my actions. Nevertheless, because they are unconscious, I cannot verbally attribute -in the strong sense of self-attribution that Finkelstein uses. I say there is a strong sense of self attribution that Finkelstein uses, because for this author there are weak cases, so to speak, where I can *talk* about my mental states, but where an expression with first person authority does not take place. For example if I say "My therapist has told me that I have an unconscious anger towards my father and, indeed, I can tell by my tone of voice when I talk to him or by the fact that I am always late for my encounters with him, that I have an unconscious anger towards him". Such a statement is not, in Finkelstein's sense, an expression with first person authority. I am doing it on the basis of evidence. Finkelstein would say that I am of the *opinion* that I am unconsciously angry towards my father. But I am not conscious*ly* angry at him. Hence, despite what my therapist told me and I repeat, that hatred remains unconscious. [39]

In this way, Finkelstein believes that his explanation of the unconscious, as a delinguistified content, to borrow an expression from Habermas, is superior to the one offered by the idea of mental partition because it allows us to understand what it is for an unconscious mental state to become conscious and because his is a better explanation of the difference between conscious and unconscious states.

Finkelstein´s is an attempt to explore and systematize the place of non-verbal expressions in the communication of human beings. For this author, there is an aspect of the relationship an internal, but not rational, relationship between the inner world of individuals and their nonverbal language such as facial expressions (smiling, frowning and so on) or gestures such as banging the table or slamming the door when frustrated or moaning or groaning. These actions are expressions of mental states. What he

[39] Finkelstein thinks that the adverbial is a form to differentiate the conscious from the unconscious.

calls the logical space of animal life is a space that considers that these verbal expressions, together with the verbal ones, form a whole of meaning. Groans, gestures and so on make sense together with verbal utterances. But, as has already been said, only verbal expression by self attribution is a channel for conscious mental states.

Hence, Finkelstein thinks that the dilinguistification model complements and supersedes the partitioning model, as a way of conceptualizing the unconscious.

w) The limits of the delinguistification model.

The delinguistification model appears to have a better application in those cases where the unconscious motive that one is looking for is a well defined feeling.[40] The examples that Finkelstein presents are of that type. In those cases, there is a behavior that is an expression, partially at least, of a feeling to which one can pinpoint. For instance, when I cannot make sense of my talking to someone in a hostile tone of voice or my being always late for an scheduled encounter with that person, it may be true that a feeling of anger that I harbor towards that person and that I can not ascribe to myself explains my behavior. It is therefore possible that after some therapeutic work I may realize that my tone of voice and my constant lateness are expressions of a hitherto unconscious feeling of resentment and after that realization I should be able to express that feeling also through self attribution.

However, unconscious motivations are not always that simple to verbalize. A simple and direct connection between a well described feeling and an action usually is the tip of the iceberg. That is the case because the motives for my anger toward the person I talk to in an angry tone of voice are of course unconscious as well, and when they become conscious they are not expressible by one stroke of verbalization. Here, it is more of a narrative that is needed to express the motives for my feelings. More

[40] I have raised a related objection to McIntyre conceptualization of the unconscious.

often than not, this narrative is going to be different each time that the individual refers to the same complex of motives. And it is likely, in fact very often, that that self ascription of an attitude that unconsciously motivated an action relies on evidence every time it (the self ascription) occurs. What psychoanalysis offers a human being is not necessarily knowledge of a clear cut list of motives, but rather an ability to observe oneself through the lenses of a theory that conceives biography as an amalgam of internal objects and defense mechanisms. So in thinking and talking about our motives of behavior we move incessantly between conscious and unconscious motives for each one of our actions. Reflection is always needed and goes hand in hand with expression. And this reflection requires evidence. By the same token, the certainty Finkelsteri thinks is a necessary condition for talking with first person authority seems to be absent when the person ascribes to herself attitudes that are more complex, as is the case for instance with the defense mechanisms. It rather seems that in verbally ascribing one of them to oneself, a self exploration based on evidence is needed.

Not only the dilinguistification model, as presented by Finkelstein, does not do justice to the complexity of our inner motivations. It also seems to deny the possibility that a person speaks with first person authority about things she did in the past. Because it is the case that about the unconscious motives for something that we did in the past, many times we can only become aware of them through an inference. In the case of Finkelstein, an author who has done the most to sharpen the idea of an unconscious motivation as a motive that I cannot verbally ascribe to myself, it is important in his argumentation that genuine self attributions are the ones that are not made relying on evidence. This is the role that the word "merely" has in his formulation. My contention is that, contrary to Finkelstein´s idea, there are other recurrent motives in our lives where it is not possible to obtain a simple and direct relation between some words, on one hand, and motives of behavior, on the other. For example past actions unconsciously motivated are of this sort. Also, one can discover oneself on the edge of an impulsive behavior and, upon self observation based on evidence, understand the unconscious motive pushing us toward that reaction.

Observation and inferences are needed because of the difficulty inherent to the task of finding out our motives for behavior. Kant famously said, in a passage where the concepts of self deception and the unconscious are present, albeit not explicitly, that it is almost impossible to know with precision the reasons that move a person to act in the way she does. In writing about motives Merleau Ponty also said that "ambiguity is of the essence of human existence and everything we live or think has always several meanings. " (Merleau Ponty 1962: 169) We live our life in that ambiguity where the inner and the outer are interlocked, because my body is so connected with the surroundings it is such the magnitude of flow of motivations that any attempt on my part to determine a single motive could only focus on one of the many motives that are actually moving me. For example, it is "impossible to determine, in a given decision or situation, the proportion of sexual to other motivations" (169) So it is with any other motives, according to this author. When faced with that flow of motivations I am in an interrogative state, "in wonder before the world". (Merleau Ponty 295) And that any step to move from the indeterminate or the ambiguous or the meaningless to the positing of the reasons of why I act, runs the risk of giving some motives more importance than the one they actually have in determining my behavior.

Notwithstanding these difficulties pointed out by Both Kant and Merleau Ponty, psychoanalytic theory shed some light about what the latter called "indefinite collection of motives, within an act of consciousness." It does so, I have contended, by focusing on our "internalized objects" and also on the defense mechanisms which are an important part of what defines us as the particular beings we are. As authors such as Habermas and Davidson have stressed, there is a combination here between causal factors and reason guided motives. It is because of this difficulty that many of our motivations may not be immediately available for self attribution. Thus, the grammar of our motives for action cannot be assimilated to that of sensations nor to that of feelings because the motives for action that Psychoanalysis focuses on, involve complex strategies contrived by the individual to lessen anxiety. By focusing almost

exclusively on feelings and the ability of expressing, Finkelstein unwittingly comes closer to the detectivist positions on self-knowledge that he rightly rejects.

The conclusion is that both the linguistification model and the partitioned mind model are useful ways of approaching in a more clear way, the concept of the unconscious. But there are manifestations of unconscious matter that do not fit well with any of two models.

I have already mentioned that the partitioned mind, or the holistic model if you will, does not accommodate well unconscious identifications are other motives that, while clearly unconscious, are not severed from other conscious content by a logical fracture. On the contrary, being unconscious, they are rationally compatible with conscious motives. Robert Audi examples serve as well to illustrate the same objection. On the other hand, the dilinguistification model seems to focus on too narrow a notion of mental contents. “Motives” or “feelings” are only portions of a more complicated network of causes and reasons, of feelings, desires and mental strategies than can not be easily verbalized nor known without observation.

Moreover, There are other instances that cannot be conceptualized under either of the two models. What Jonathan Lear calls unconscious fantasy is one of them. Likewise, the influence that mood exerts in our actions and thoughts, an influence that most of the time, if not always, is unconscious, is difficult to portray under either of the models.

Although they represent progress in the task of explaining unconscious states, nor the fragmentation model nor the dilinguistification model can claim for them the status of a general account of the unconscious. Too many counterexamples run against that claim.

The initial appeal for considering the combination of these two models as a possible theory of the unconscious is that each one of them captures a step in the therapeutic process through which unconscious content becomes conscious. The first step is articulation through language. The second step

is that this motive or feeling, which the subject can now recognize as his own and to which he can also give voice, must be related in a coherent way to the rest of the conscious impulses and feelings. That is to say, it must leave its expatriate character and reintegrate its logical, rational links with the network of beliefs and feelings that form the conscious mental life of the person. And it is this second step that is closely related to Davidson's model. [41]

While each of the two models capture a good deal of what is usually referred to as unconscious motivations, as I said there are other legitimate uses of the concept unconscious that do not fit in any of these two conceptualizations. Some examples have been given. The shortcomings of both of them demonstrate that there is a heterogeneity here that makes a single characterization difficult. This heterogeneity outruns all the attempts made to present a unified representation of the unconscious contents. Except the very wide generalization of being actions that the person is not aware of performing, there seems to be little in common between, say, erroneously carried out actions and an unconscious fear of success.

It is rumored that Ruth Millikan said something along these lines: that in her next life she will study, within the philosophy of mind, the problems related to consciousness. But in this life she will continue working on the problems related to intentionality. I propose that the difficulty in finding a general account of the unconscious stems from the fact that consciousness and intentionality seem to be two fields of study far apart. The urgency for understanding the nature of unconscious beliefs and desires forces one to bring together these two fields, with the difficulties that my last reflections have highlighted. It appears that for the time being a unified theory of unconscious contents has to wait.

[41] In this I am following Alexander Mitscherlich.

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